Monique Wells v. Deputy Mason, et al.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

MONIQUE WELLS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-cv-165 (MTT) ) Deputy MASON, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) __________________ )

ORDER On April 29, 2026, Plaintiff Monique Wells, proceeding pro se, filed her complaint against Deputy Mason, the City of Milner, Georgia, Wells County, Georgia, and various unknown Milner Police Officers, Wells County Sheriff’s Deputies, jail deputies, and John/Jane Does. ECF 1. That same day, she filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 2. For the following reasons, Wells’ motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. But her complaint lacks important factual allegations that Wells may have omitted because of her pro se status. Thus, the Court ORDERS Wells to amend her complaint by September 14, 2026. I. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Proceed IFP 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) governs motions to proceed IFP. It provides: [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.1

When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation modified). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely destitute.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307–08). However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, it “conveys only a privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs without undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2014). District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a plaintiff can proceed IFP, and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil cases for damages.

Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306.

1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court has reviewed Wells’ IFP affidavit. Her affidavit establishes that she cannot pay the court fees without undue hardship. ECF 2. Thus, Wells’ motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. B. Frivolity Review

Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions. “Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (citation modified). When allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court shall dismiss the case if the Court determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’

or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”2 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Wells is proceeding pro se, her “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).

Wells brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and unlawful traffic stop escalation; (2) Fourth Amendment false arrest; (3) Fourth Amendment excessive force; (4) Fourth Amendment unlawful search; (5) Fourth Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment violation of her right to bodily privacy; (6) Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs; (7) “First Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment – retaliation, intimidation, and improper motive”; (8) failure to intervene; (9) Monell liability; (10) state-law assault and battery; (11) state- law false imprisonment/false arrest; and (12) state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF 1. While Wells provides some factual allegations in her complaint, many important allegations are lacking such that the Court is unable to conduct a thorough

frivolity review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) (stating that a court is required to dismiss a case brought by a pro se plaintiff if it (1) is frivolous, or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief). For example, Wells does not allege when the traffic stop, arrest, or jail detention occurred. And she makes many allegations against “Defendants” collectively, without alleging what each individual did or did not do to violate her rights. Wells also brings nearly every count against “Deputy Mason, Unknown Supervisor, Unknown Officers, and John/Jane Does.”3 For her deliberate indifference to medical needs claims, Wells does not allege facts to demonstrate that she had a serious medical need or that any defendant was subjectively aware that she was at risk of serious harm. See Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2024). In addition, her Monell liability claim

contains only conclusory allegations and fails to identify any City of Milner/Wells County policy or custom or a pattern of similar violations. See Groover v. Israel, 684 F. App'x 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2017). However, given Wells’ pro se status, the Court will afford her an opportunity to amend her complaint to state viable claims. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court should give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it.”). For these reasons, Wells is ORDERED to amend her complaint to include all facts that she wishes to make a part of these proceedings and cite the appropriate

statutory or constitutional authority for bringing her claims. Wells shall have until September 14, 2026, to file her amended complaint. In the “statement of claims” section of her amended complaint, Wells must link any claims she makes to a named defendant. If Wells fails to link a named defendant to a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Wells makes no allegations in the body of her complaint against a named defendant, that defendant will be removed from the action.

3 Generally, "fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (2010). An exception to the prohibition on fictitious-party pleading exists when the plaintiff's description of the defendant is “‘at the very worst, surplusage’ because the plaintiff’s description of the defendant is ‘sufficiently clear to allow service of process.’” Vielma v. Gruler, 808 Fed. Appx. 872, 880 (11th Cir. 2020); see Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992). Wells must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate that each defendants’ actions or omissions resulted in the violation of her rights under a specific law. It is also recommended that, when drafting her “statement of claims,” Wells list numbered responses to the following questions (to the extent possible) along with the name of

each defendant: (1) What did each defendant do (or not do) to violate her rights? (2) When did each action occur? (3) How was Wells injured as a result of each defendant’s actions? The amended complaint will take the place of and supersede Wells’ original complaint. Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 F. App’x 845, 847-48 (11th Cir. 2013). Wells may not refer to, or incorporate by reference, her previous complaint. The Court will not look back to the facts alleged in the original complaint once the amended complaint is filed; the Court will only consider the facts in the amended complaint when it conducts the frivolity review required by § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271,

1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an amended pleading renders the previous pleading a “legal nullity”). After Wells files her amended complaint, the Court will conduct a frivolity review and, if necessary, dismiss any claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No defendant shall be served until after the Court completes its frivolity review of the amended complaint. C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Obligations The Court informs Wells of her obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 11(b), which governs Wells’ representations to the Court.

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper— whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). D. Artificial Intelligence Finally, the Court has seen a marked increase in the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) by unrepresented parties, who may not understand fully their pleading obligations. It is common knowledge that AI can produce what have become known as hallucinations. This happens frequently in responses to legal-related prompts. AI often provides false legal citations and inaccurate summaries of legal authorities and principles. Courts have severely sanctioned lawyers and litigants who have included hallucinations in their filings. To assist Wells in meeting her pleading obligations, the Court ORDERS the following: In all pleadings, including Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Plaintiff shall include a signed statement certifying that Plaintiff has verified the accuracy of all

facts and all legal authorities cited and legal theories advanced in the pleading. Failure to comply with this paragraph shall result in sanctions, including, if appropriate, dismissal of this lawsuit. II. CONCLUSION Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and for the reasons set forth above, Wells’ motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED, and Wells is ORDERED to amend her complaint no later than September 14, 2026. SO ORDERED, this 16th day of August, 2026. S/ Marc T. Treadwell MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT