Opinion issued February 27, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00196-CV ——————————— MONIQUE HARRIS AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellants V. MASUMEH, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1218145
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Monique Harris and all other occupants (collectively, Harris)
appeal a forcible detainer judgment in favor of appellee Masumeh, LLC. In two
issues, Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.
We affirm. Background
Masumeh, LLC filed the underlying forcible detainer suit against Harris in a
justice court on October 27, 2023. In its petition, Masumeh, LLC alleged that it
entered into a lease agreement with Harris for the real property located at 6343
Mystic Bridge Drive, Houston, Texas 77021 (the property). Under the terms of the
agreement, Harris agreed to pay $3,550.00 per month to lease the property from
Masumeh, LLC.
Masumeh, LLC alleged that Harris defaulted on the lease agreement by failing
to pay the rent due from June 2023 to October 2023, and that, despite giving Harris
written notice to vacate the property, she refused to vacate. Masumeh, LLC sought
possession of the property, unpaid rent, attorney’s fees, and court costs. It attached
as an exhibit to the petition a copy of the parties’ residential lease agreement.
The justice court entered a judgment awarding possession of the property to
Masumeh, LLC, payment of rent owed in the amount of $18,923.52, $1,200.00 in
attorney’s fees, and court costs. The judgment further ordered Harris to pay
$3,550.00 for each rental pay period during the pendency of any appeal.
Harris appealed the judgment to a county civil court at law.1 The county court
conducted a bench trial, and the court reporter has certified that no record was made
1 Justice courts have original jurisdiction over forcible detainer suits. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 27.031(a)(2). A party who is 2 of the proceedings. Following the trial de novo, the county court entered a judgment
and order awarding Masumeh, LLC possession of the property, $20,000.00 as rent
owed, $2,000.00 in attorney’s fees, and court costs.
Discussion
Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the county court’s
judgment. She argues that the lease agreement, absent a conveying document such
as a deed, is insufficient to establish that Masumeh, LLC owns, or is an agent of, the
property and is therefore insufficient to establish its superior right of possession.
Masumeh, LLC responds that (1) the question of possession in this case
depends on a landlord-tenant relationship and does not involve a title dispute, (2)
Harris failed to file a reporter’s record of the trial court proceedings, (3) absent
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court must presume that the trial
court found all findings of fact necessary to support its judgment, and (4) Harris’s
appellate brief fails to comply with the briefing requirements of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). Masumeh, LLC seeks an award of sanctions against
Harris under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45.
A. Forcible Detainer
dissatisfied with a justice court judgment in such a suit may appeal to a county court for a trial de novo. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.9. 3 A landlord may file a forcible detainer action to reclaim possession of property
when a tenant refuses to surrender possession of the subject property on demand.
See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a). A forcible detainer action is dependent on proof
of a landlord-tenant relationship. See Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 516
S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Villalon v. Bank
One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d); Rice v.
Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. App.—-Dallas 2001, no pet.). The only issue to
be determined in a forcible detainer action is the entitlement to actual and immediate
possession of real property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d
782, 785 (Tex. 2006). A determination of title, however, “shall not be adjudicated.”
Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 364–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no
pet.); accord Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“To maintain simplicity, the applicable rule of procedure
provides that ‘the only issue shall be as to the right to actual possession; and the
merits of the title shall not be adjudicated.”’ (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 746)).
B. Evidentiary Sufficiency
Harris appeals the sufficiency of the evidence to support the county court’s
judgment in favor of Masumeh, LLC. The court reporter has certified that no
reporter’s record exists of the county court bench trial. An appellant has the burden
4 to bring forward a sufficient record to show the trial court’s alleged error. Nicholson
v. Fifth Third Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.) (“[An appellant] cannot prevail in any evidentiary challenge without first
meeting his burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal.”). When a party raises
an issue on appeal relying on evidence presented to the trial court—as Harris does
here in her evidentiary challenge—we must presume the trial court had before it and
determined all facts necessary in support of the judgment absent any record of what
evidence the trial court considered. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30
(Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (“The court of appeals was correct in holding that, absent
a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial
court’s judgment.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gallagher v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 950 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. 1997)); see also Onwubuche v. Olowolayemo, No.
01-10-00945-CV, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.
29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Onwubuche did not file a reporter’s record as part
of his record on appeal. We therefore must presume that the reporter’s record
contains evidence to support the trial court’s rulings on all issues of fact.”).
Accordingly, we presume the trial court found the necessary facts to establish that
Masumeh, LLC had the superior claim to immediate possession of the property. See
Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229–30; Onwubuche, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3. We overrule
Harris’s first and second issues. See Gbadmassi v. Ron Ray L.P., 04-21-00170-CV,
5 2022 WL 2346630, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (presuming trial court found necessary facts to establish landlord’s right to past-
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Opinion issued February 27, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00196-CV ——————————— MONIQUE HARRIS AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellants V. MASUMEH, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1218145
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Monique Harris and all other occupants (collectively, Harris)
appeal a forcible detainer judgment in favor of appellee Masumeh, LLC. In two
issues, Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.
We affirm. Background
Masumeh, LLC filed the underlying forcible detainer suit against Harris in a
justice court on October 27, 2023. In its petition, Masumeh, LLC alleged that it
entered into a lease agreement with Harris for the real property located at 6343
Mystic Bridge Drive, Houston, Texas 77021 (the property). Under the terms of the
agreement, Harris agreed to pay $3,550.00 per month to lease the property from
Masumeh, LLC.
Masumeh, LLC alleged that Harris defaulted on the lease agreement by failing
to pay the rent due from June 2023 to October 2023, and that, despite giving Harris
written notice to vacate the property, she refused to vacate. Masumeh, LLC sought
possession of the property, unpaid rent, attorney’s fees, and court costs. It attached
as an exhibit to the petition a copy of the parties’ residential lease agreement.
The justice court entered a judgment awarding possession of the property to
Masumeh, LLC, payment of rent owed in the amount of $18,923.52, $1,200.00 in
attorney’s fees, and court costs. The judgment further ordered Harris to pay
$3,550.00 for each rental pay period during the pendency of any appeal.
Harris appealed the judgment to a county civil court at law.1 The county court
conducted a bench trial, and the court reporter has certified that no record was made
1 Justice courts have original jurisdiction over forcible detainer suits. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 27.031(a)(2). A party who is 2 of the proceedings. Following the trial de novo, the county court entered a judgment
and order awarding Masumeh, LLC possession of the property, $20,000.00 as rent
owed, $2,000.00 in attorney’s fees, and court costs.
Discussion
Harris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the county court’s
judgment. She argues that the lease agreement, absent a conveying document such
as a deed, is insufficient to establish that Masumeh, LLC owns, or is an agent of, the
property and is therefore insufficient to establish its superior right of possession.
Masumeh, LLC responds that (1) the question of possession in this case
depends on a landlord-tenant relationship and does not involve a title dispute, (2)
Harris failed to file a reporter’s record of the trial court proceedings, (3) absent
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court must presume that the trial
court found all findings of fact necessary to support its judgment, and (4) Harris’s
appellate brief fails to comply with the briefing requirements of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). Masumeh, LLC seeks an award of sanctions against
Harris under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45.
A. Forcible Detainer
dissatisfied with a justice court judgment in such a suit may appeal to a county court for a trial de novo. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.9. 3 A landlord may file a forcible detainer action to reclaim possession of property
when a tenant refuses to surrender possession of the subject property on demand.
See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a). A forcible detainer action is dependent on proof
of a landlord-tenant relationship. See Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 516
S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Villalon v. Bank
One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d); Rice v.
Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. App.—-Dallas 2001, no pet.). The only issue to
be determined in a forcible detainer action is the entitlement to actual and immediate
possession of real property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d
782, 785 (Tex. 2006). A determination of title, however, “shall not be adjudicated.”
Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 364–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no
pet.); accord Williams v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 315 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“To maintain simplicity, the applicable rule of procedure
provides that ‘the only issue shall be as to the right to actual possession; and the
merits of the title shall not be adjudicated.”’ (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 746)).
B. Evidentiary Sufficiency
Harris appeals the sufficiency of the evidence to support the county court’s
judgment in favor of Masumeh, LLC. The court reporter has certified that no
reporter’s record exists of the county court bench trial. An appellant has the burden
4 to bring forward a sufficient record to show the trial court’s alleged error. Nicholson
v. Fifth Third Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.) (“[An appellant] cannot prevail in any evidentiary challenge without first
meeting his burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal.”). When a party raises
an issue on appeal relying on evidence presented to the trial court—as Harris does
here in her evidentiary challenge—we must presume the trial court had before it and
determined all facts necessary in support of the judgment absent any record of what
evidence the trial court considered. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30
(Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (“The court of appeals was correct in holding that, absent
a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial
court’s judgment.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gallagher v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 950 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. 1997)); see also Onwubuche v. Olowolayemo, No.
01-10-00945-CV, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.
29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Onwubuche did not file a reporter’s record as part
of his record on appeal. We therefore must presume that the reporter’s record
contains evidence to support the trial court’s rulings on all issues of fact.”).
Accordingly, we presume the trial court found the necessary facts to establish that
Masumeh, LLC had the superior claim to immediate possession of the property. See
Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229–30; Onwubuche, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3. We overrule
Harris’s first and second issues. See Gbadmassi v. Ron Ray L.P., 04-21-00170-CV,
5 2022 WL 2346630, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (presuming trial court found necessary facts to establish landlord’s right to past-
due rent, post-judgment interest, and attorney’s fees in eviction case where tenant
raised evidentiary challenge to county court’s judgment and no reporter’s record of
county court bench trial existed); Roberson v. Chevalier, 01-13-00307-CV, 2014
WL 3512767, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 15, 2014, no pet.)
(rejecting defendant’s evidentiary challenges to county court’s judgment in forcible
detainer suit where no reporter’s record of trial proceedings existed, and court of
appeals presumed trial court determined all facts necessary to its judgment); Callejas
v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, No. 01-10-00932-CV, 2011 WL 2923759, at *1 (Tex.
App—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2011, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (concluding
defendants could not prevail on evidentiary issues raised on appeal of forcible
detainer action where no reporter’s record of trial existed).
C. Sanctions
In its appellate brief, Masumeh, LLC argues that Harris’s appeal is frivolous
because she raises an evidentiary challenge to the county court’s judgment, but there
is no reporter’s record of the proceedings. It asserts that it is entitled to damages
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45 because “[t]he filing of the [notice of
6 appeal on February 26, 2024] and “[] languid pace of finally filing a brief on
September 11, 2024, originally due on May 31, 2024, has damaged Appellee” and
“delayed Appellant’s [sic] rightful possession to the property and has caused it to
expend time, money, effort, and other resources to defend the appeal.”
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Rule 45, we may award “just damages” for a
frivolous appeal on the motion of any party or on our own initiative. T EX. R. APP.
P. 45; Pantlitz v. Sikkenga, 01-10-00581-CV, 2011 WL 5116464, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Smith v. Brown, 51
S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)). We apply an
objective test to determine whether an appeal is frivolous and conduct a full
examination of the record and all the proceedings from the viewpoint of the
advocate. Panlitz, 2011 WL 5116464, at *5; Smith, 51 S.W.3d at 381. The goal of
this inquiry is to determine whether the advocate had reasonable grounds to believe
that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed. Panlitz, 2011 WL 5116464, at *5;
Smith, 51 S.W.3d at 381. We exercise prudence and caution and deliberate carefully
before awarding damages under Rule 45. Panlitz, 2011 WL 5116464, at *5; Smith,
51 S.W.3d at 381. We award sanctions in truly egregious circumstances. Panlitz,
2011 WL 5116464, at *5 (citing Goss v. Hous. Cmty. Newspapers, 252 S.W.3d 652,
657 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)).
7 An appellant’s failure to provide a reporter’s record does not, standing alone,
make her appeal frivolous. See Pantlitz, 2011 WL 5116464, at *5; Mallios v.
Standard Ins. Co., 237 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007,
pet. denied). Further, in the absence of a reporter’s record, we cannot say that Harris
did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the trial court’s judgment should be
reversed. See Pantlitz, 2011 WL 5116464, at *5. We therefore decline to impose
sanctions against Harris. See id. (declining to impose sanctions under Rule 45 where
plaintiff failed to provide reporter’s record and court could not conclude that plaintiff
did not have reasonable grounds to believe trial court’s judgment should be
reversed); Sam Houston Hotel, L.P. v. Mockingbird Rest., Inc., 191 S.W.3d 720, 721
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (concluding plaintiff’s failure to
provide sufficient record for court of appeals to address its issues did not render its
appeal frivolous); In re A.W.P., 200 S.W.3d 242, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006,
no pet.) (declining to impose sanctions based on plaintiff’s failure to present
complete record on appeal where court could not conclude appeal was otherwise
frivolous).2
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the county court at law.
2 All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
8 Kristin M. Guiney Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Guiney.