Money Mailer, LLC v. Wade Brewer

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 15, 2020·No. 2:15-cv-01215·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MONEY MAILER, LLC, 8 NO. C15-1215RSL Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART 10 MONEY MAILER’S MOTION TO WADE G. BREWER, COMPEL COMMUNICATIONS 11 WITH CHUCK GOURLEY Defendant. 12 13

14 This matter comes before the Court on Money Mailer’s “Second Motion to Compel 15 Discovery” (Dkt. # 205) and Brewer’s “Cross Motion for Protective Order” (Dkt. # 215). Money 16 17 Mailer seeks to discover all communications between Brewer and Charles “Chuck” Gourley, 18 Brewer’s longtime friend and the Money Mailer franchise owner who introduced Brewer to 19 Money Mailer and acted as his adviser regarding the franchise. Gourley has information 20 regarding Brewer’s interest in, knowledge of, and negotiations for a Money Mailer franchise, 21 advised Brewer how to make the franchise profitable, and was in fairly constant communication 22 23 with Brewer as his relationship with Money Mailer deteriorated and litigation ensued. Brewer 24 asserts that he has produced all relevant, non-privileged communications between himself and 25 Gourley (approximately 420 communications), withholding communications that were 26 potentially responsive but were irrelevant because they “deal with the minutia of life commonly 27 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MONEY 1 discussed amongst friends,” and providing a privilege log of communications withheld under an 2 attorney/client, work product, and/or joint defense privilege. Dkt. # 215 at 2. 3 Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties, the 4 Court finds as follows: 5 A. Relevance 6 7 Brewer’s general relevance objection, pursuant to which he has withheld communications 8 that are responsive but irrelevant, is overruled. While there are undoubtedly emails and texts 9 with Gourley that discuss their favorite Facebook quiz or travel arrangements or other “minutia” 10 having nothing to do with the claims or defenses asserted in this litigation, those 11 communications are not at issue here: they need not be produced because they are not responsive 12 to Money Mailer’s discovery requests. Money Mailer seeks communications regarding the 13 14 franchise and/or Money Mailer, and Brewer offers no explanation for why communications that 15 touch on those topics are not relevant. Unless a communication involves only the minutia of a 16 friendship - and not the franchise and/or Money Mailer - the presumption is that it is relevant 17 and Brewer has not overcome that presumption. 18 Brewer alternatively argues that communications with Gourley regarding the franchise 19 20 and/or Money Mailer after the inception of the franchise are irrelevant because Brewer has 21 waived his claim for lost profits. Brewer claims that Money Mailer sold him a franchise by 22 misrepresenting its potential for profit, arguing that a Money Mailer franchise is simply not 23 viable. He also seeks damages. Gourley has (or is reasonably believed to have) information 24 relevant to what Brewer knew when entering into the franchise, how Brewer managed (or 25 mismanaged) the franchise, and whether Brewer’s losses were caused by acts or conduct 26 27 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MONEY 1 unrelated to Money Mailer. Defendant’s unilateral decision to abandon his claim for lost profits 2 does not make his communications with Gourley irrelevant. 3 Finally, Brewer argues that his communications with Gourley after Brewer’s franchise 4 terminated on August 4, 2015, are not relevant. There is every reason to believe that Gourley and 5 Brewer continued to discuss the events giving rise to this case, potential legal claims against 6 7 Money Mailer, Money Mailer’s potential defenses, etc. The existence of a twenty-five page 8 privilege log, 80% of which reflects communications that occurred post-termination, essentially 9 proves the point. These communications may contain reflections on past events, reveal the 10 existence of relevant documents, or contain party admissions. Any reasonable counsel would 11 want to know what the opposing party is telling his friend and business adviser about an ongoing 12 dispute: the communications are undoubtedly relevant. The issue is whether they are privileged. 13 14 B. Attorney/Client, Work Product, and Joint Defense Privileges 15 The day after Money Mailer filed its motion to compel, Brewer produced a twenty-five 16 page privilege log. The first two pages list documents identified as “Legal Research” or 17 “Attorney Notes” and state that the basis for withholding the documents is the work product 18 doctrine.1 Brewer’s counsel at the time states that these documents reflect her legal research or 19 20 were prepared at her direction in the spring and summer of 2015. These twenty documents need 21 not be produced.2 22 Brewer claims the attorney/client privilege protects from disclosure communications 23 24 1 One entry is described as “Prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Dkt. # 220-1 at 2. 25 2 To the extent Brewer withheld additional communications with Gourley based on the 26 attorney/client privilege, Dkt. # 220-1 at 5, he has not provided sufficient information regarding those communications to show that the privilege applies. 27 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MONEY 1 between Brewer and Gourley between March 2015 and July 2018. Brewer argues that these 2 communications were part of a joint defense or common interest agreement through which 3 Gourley and Brewer were evaluating, defending, and/or pursuing claims arising from their 4 respective Money Market franchises. The joint defense privilege expands application of the 5 attorney/client privilege and the work product doctrine by relaxing the requirement that a 6 7 communication be made in confidence. It essentially prevents waiver of the privilege where 8 confidential communications are shared between parties and counsel involved in a joint defense 9 or having a common interest. Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 692 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Metro 10 Wastewater Reclamation v. Continental Cas., 142 F.R.D. 471, 478 (D. Colo. 1992) (explaining 11 that the allied lawyer doctrine, is “merely an extension of the attorney-client privilege and the 12 work-product doctrine.”). The doctrine protects communications only when the communications 13 14 are part of an “on-going and joint effort to set up a common defense strategy.” Eisenberg v. 15 Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787 (3rd Cir. 1985). See U.S. v. Schwimmer, 872 F.2d 237, 243 (2nd Cir. 16 1989) (explaining that “[o]nly those communications made in the course of an ongoing common 17 enterprise and intended to further the enterprise are protected.”). Where a “joint defense effort or 18 strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel,” 19 20 communications may be deemed privileged whether litigation has been commenced against both 21 parties or not. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 244. 22 The evidence submitted by Brewer with regards to the establishment and continuation of 23 an ongoing common enterprise is remarkably thin. The privilege log describes communications 24 between Brewer and Gourley as “email communication regarding litigation,” Dkt. # 220-1 at 5, 25 or “text discussion regarding franchisee rights,” Dkt. # 220-1 at 6. Neither of these descriptions 26 27 ORDER GRANTING IN PART MONEY 1 suggests that the documents reveal privileged communications or that the exchanges were made 2 pursuant to perceived common interests. Neither Brewer nor Gourley has provided a declaration 3 regarding their understanding of the context in which these communications were made.

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