Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner

38 B.T.A. 716, 1938 BTA LEXIS 830
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedOctober 6, 1938
DocketDocket Nos. 86861, 87441.
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 38 B.T.A. 716 (Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 716, 1938 BTA LEXIS 830 (bta 1938).

Opinion

[722]*722OPINION.

Hill:

The first and principal issue in this case is whether respondent erred in disallowing deductions claimed by petitioner representing 3% percent of the mean of five certain reserve funds required by law and held by petitioner at the beginning and end of the taxable years, which reserve funds are referred to and described in our findings of fact above.

The Kevenue Acts of 1932 and 1934, governing the taxable years, provide in pertinent part as follows:

SEC. 203. NET INCOME OE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES.
(a) General Rule. — In the case of a life insurance company the term “net income” means the gross income less—
* ***** *
(2) Reserve funds. — An amount equal to 4 per centum of the mean of the reserve funds required by law and held at the beginning and end of the [723]*723taxable year, except that in the ease of any such reserve fund which is computed at a lower interest assumption rate, the rate of 3¾ per centum shall he substituted for 4 per centum. * * *

The parties have agreed that all the reserve funds involved were required by law; they have also stipulated the amounts of the funds held by petitioner at the beginning and end of the taxable years, and for what purposes they were held. Thus, the issue submitted for decision is narrowed to the single question whether these reserve funds were true insurance reserves, within the meaning of section 203 (a) (2), supra, or whether, as apparently contended by respondent, they were liability or solvency reserves, not peculiar to life insurance companies.

In Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 342, 350, it is said:

The term “reserve” or “reserves” has a special meaning in the law of insurance. While its scope varies under different laws, in general it means a sum of money, variously computed or estimated, which, with accretions from interest, is set aside — “reserved”-—as a fund with which to mature or liquidate, either by payment or reinsurance with other companies, future un-accrued and contingent claims, and claims accrued, but contingent and indefinite as to amount or time of payment.

In Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Insurance Co., 294 U. S. 686, arising under the Revenue Act of 1921, the Court, in defining an insurance reserve, said:

The word “reserve” has many meanings. Accounts creating reserves are set up in almost every line of business and funds evidenced by the book entries are held for many and widely different purposes. As the act does not permit corporations other than insurance companies to make deductions of the kind here under consideration, “reserve funds” may not reasonably be deemed to include values that do not directly pertain to insurance. In life insurance the reserve means the amount, accumulated by the company out of premium payments, which is attributable to and represents the value of the life insurance elements of the policy contracts.

In Continental Assurance Co. v. United States, 8 Fed. Supp. 474, cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the Inter-Mountain case, supra, the Court of Claims said:

After a careful study of the nature and purpose of reserves maintained by life insurance companies in the light of all the decisions which have been rendered upon the subject and the plan of taxation of such companies as provided in the federal taxing acts, we conclude: (1) That accrued liabilities are not the subject of the “reserve fund” deductions granted by Congress in any of the revenue acts; (2) that the “reserve” contemplated in the Federal statutes is “that fund which when added to the present value of future net premiums is equal to the present value of future death claims”; that is, the mathematical equivalent of the obligation incurred by the company to pay the sum insured at the death of the policyholder or upon the surrender and cancellation of the policy; (3) that the “reserve” contemplated in the federal [724]*724statutes is calculated upon tbe basis of a selected table of mortality plus an assumed rate of interest; and that reserves not so calculated, whether required by state law or by state officer, are not “reserve funds required by law” within the meaning of the federal statutes; and (4) that the “reserve fund” required by law within the meaning of the federal statutes does not include “solvency” reserves required to be maintained by state law or a state officer to keep the company in sound financial condition.

From tbe foregoing decisions it appears that the “reserve funds required by law”, in respect of which a deduction from gross income is allowed life insurance companies by the taxing acts, include only funds accumulated out of premium payments and “reserved” (1) to mature or liquidate unaccrued and contingent claims, and (2) claims accrued but contingent as to amount or time of payment; and do not include (a) values not directly pertaining to insurance, (b) reserve funds not calculated upon the basis of selected tables of mortality plus an assumed rate of interest, and (c) “solvency” reserves which may be required to keep the company in a sound financial condition.

In order to determine whether iJetitioner in the present case is entitled to the deductions claimed, we must examine the stipulated facts to ascertain whether the controverted reserve funds come within the limitations above indicated.

Two of the reserve funds involved herein, viz., the additional reserve on noncancelable accident and health policies and the reserve for unpaid and unresisted accident and health claims were considered by this Board in Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 38 B. T. A. 708, and there held to be reserves required by law within the meaning of the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926, which contain provisions similar to the 1932 and 1934 Acts. Accordingly, in so far as the deficiencies result from the denial of deductions computed on the basis of the two reserve funds just mentioned, respondent’s action is reversed and we hold for petitioner on authority of the cited decision.

This leaves for detailed consideration here only the first three reserve funds mentioned in our findings of fact; that is, (1) reserve for incurred disability benefits, (2) reserve for nondeduction of deferred fractional premiums, and (3) reserve for unearned premiums on accident and health policies. Reserves (1) and (2) pertain to life insurance contracts, and reserve (3) relates to accident and health policies.

Reserve for incurred disability benefits. — Petitioner’s life insurance policies during the taxable years contained a provision that petitioner would waive the payment of premiums by a policyholder on proof of total disability, which waiver would operate only during the continuance of such disability, and petitioner reserved the right to require annual proof of continuance of the disability. This fund rep[725]*725resented a reserve to supply the premiums so waived. The fund was accumulated out of premium payments, including income from investment thereof, and was required by state law.

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Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner (A)
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Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner
38 B.T.A. 716 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1938)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 B.T.A. 716, 1938 BTA LEXIS 830, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monarch-life-ins-co-v-commissioner-bta-1938.