12-4688-cv; 13-0918-cv Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc.
2 In the 3 United States Court of Appeals 4 For the Second Circuit 5 ________ 6 7 AUGUST TERM, 2013 8 9 ARGUED: OCTOBER 29, 2013 10 DECIDED: JULY 24, 2014 11 12 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv 13 14 CINDY MOLL, 15 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 16 17 v. 18 19 TELESECTOR RESOURCES GROUP, INC., DBA VERIZON SERVICES GROUP, 20 AKA VERIZON NEW YORK INC., 21 Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee. 22 ________ 23 24 Before: WALKER, CABRANES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 25 ________ 26 27 Cindy Moll (‚Moll‛) appeals from the decisions of the United
28 States District Court for the Western District of New York, William
29 M. Skretny, J., granting in part Verizon’s motion to dismiss and
30 motion for summary judgment, and denying Moll’s motion to
31 compel production of documents. 2 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 Moll alleges that Verizon discriminated against her, subjected
2 her to a sexually hostile work environment, retaliated against her for
3 complaints of discrimination and harassment and paid her less than
4 her male colleagues for equal work. The district court concluded that
5 Moll premised her hostile work environment claim on only the
6 allegations that were sexually offensive. And because Moll did not
7 allege any ‚sexually offensive acts‛ within the applicable statute of
8 limitations, it dismissed her hostile work environment claims. The
9 district court erred when it refused to consider all allegations in the
10 Complaint in their totality, including those that were not sexually
11 offensive in nature. Sex-based hostile work environment claims may
12 be supported by facially sex-neutral incidents and ‚sexually
13 offensive‛ acts may be facially sex-neutral. See Alfano v. Costello, 294
14 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 2002). We therefore VACATE the judgment of
15 the district court insofar as it granted in part Verizon’s motion to
16 dismiss.
17 We also find that the district court erred when it denied Moll’s
18 motion to compel documents related to Verizon’s Reduction in Force
19 events and, therefore, order the district court to compel production
20 of such documents. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the 3 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 district court insofar as it granted in part Verizon’s motion for
2 summary judgment.
3 In addition, we conclude that the district court erred when it
4 disregarded a witness’s affidavit because it contradicted the
5 witness’s prior deposition testimony. Although a party cannot create
6 a material issue of fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment
7 simply contradicting his earlier testimony, the ‚sham issue of fact‛
8 doctrine does not mandate that the court disregard a non-party
9 witness’s subsequent testimony when it conflicts with the non-party
10 witness’s prior statement. We thus VACATE the judgment of the
11 district court insofar as it granted in part Verizon’s motion for
12 summary judgment.
13 We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
14 opinion.
15 ________ 16 17 JOSEPHINE A. GRECO (Duane D. Schoonmaker, on 18 the brief), Greco Trapp, PLLC, Buffalo, NY, for 19 Plaintiff-Appellant.
20 JAMES S. URBAN, Jones Day, Pittsburgh, PA, for 21 Defendant-Appellee.
22 ________ 23 4 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
2 Cindy Moll (‚Moll‛) appeals from the decisions of the United
3 States District Court for the Western District of New York, William
4 M. Skretny, J., granting in part Verizon’s motion to dismiss and
5 motion for summary judgment, and denying Moll’s motion to
6 compel production of documents.
7 Moll alleges that Verizon discriminated against her, subjected
8 her to a sexually hostile work environment, retaliated against her for
9 complaints of discrimination and harassment, and paid her less than
10 her male colleagues for equal work. The district court concluded that
11 Moll premised her hostile work environment claim on only the
12 allegations that were sexually offensive. And because Moll did not
13 allege any ‚sexually offensive acts‛ within the applicable statute of
14 limitations, it dismissed her hostile work environment claims. The
15 district court erred when it refused to consider all allegations in the
16 Complaint in their totality, including those that were not sexually
17 offensive in nature. Sex-based hostile work environment claims may
18 be supported by facially sex-neutral incidents and ‚sexually
19 offensive‛ acts may be facially sex-neutral. See Alfano v. Costello, 294
20 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 2002). We therefore VACATE the judgment of 5 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 the district court insofar as it granted in part Verizon’s motion to
2 dismiss.
3 We also find that the district court abused its discretion when
4 it denied Moll’s motion to compel documents related to Verizon’s
5 Reduction in Force events and, therefore, order the district court to
6 compel production of such documents. Accordingly, we VACATE
7 the judgment of the district court insofar as it granted in part
8 Verizon’s motion for summary judgment.
9 In addition, we conclude that the district court erred when it
10 refused to consider a witness’s statements in an affidavit that
11 contradicted prior deposition testimony. Although a party cannot
12 create a material issue of fact to defeat a motion for summary
13 judgment by simply contradicting his earlier testimony, the ‚sham
14 issue of fact‛ doctrine does not mandate that the court disregard a
15 non-party witness’s subsequent testimony when it conflicts with the
16 non-party witness’s prior statement. We thus VACATE the
17 judgment of the district court insofar as it granted in part Verizon’s
18 motion for summary judgment.
19 We remand for further proceedings consistent with this
20 opinion. 6 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 BACKGROUND
2 Moll’s story begins in 1997 when Telesector Resources Group,
3 Inc.1 (‚Verizon‛) promoted her from clerical employee to System
4 Analyst/Sales Engineer in its Buffalo, New York office. Moll alleges
5 that beginning in 1998 she was subjected to sex-based disparate
6 treatment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation.
7 Moll alleges that in 1998 and 1999, Daniel Irving, a Senior
8 Systems Analyst, left Moll three inappropriate notes. And in 1999,
9 while they were on a business trip, Irving called her hotel room
10 repeatedly and asked her to come to his hotel room. After Irving
11 became her direct supervisor in March 2001, Moll alleges that he left
12 her a note that said he thought about her when he was taking a
13 shower. Moll also claims that Irving would not permit her to
14 communicate with him by email or telephone; she had to see him in
15 person. And Moll claims that throughout his tenure as her
16 supervisor, Irving refused to have her assessed for a promotion
17 claiming that there was a promotion freeze. However, two male
18 colleagues were promoted during this time period.
1 Telesector Resources Group, Inc. is owned 50/50 by Verizon New York Inc. and Verizon New England Inc., each of which is a wholly owned subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. NYNEX Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Verizon Communications Inc. 7 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 In March 2002, Irving placed Moll on a counseling plan based
2 on her job performance. That year Moll was the lowest paid Sales
3 Engineer in the Buffalo office. Moll occasionally worked at home,
4 usually when one of her children was sick. In May 2002, however,
5 Irving informed Moll that she could no longer work at home even
6 though, according to Moll, her male counterparts continued to do so.
7 Moll was denied a request to take vacation on July 5, 2002. Yet, Moll
8 alleges, male colleagues with less tenure were granted the same
9 vacation request. Moll also claims that she and other women in the
10 office were excluded from work-related social events, including
11 attending professional hockey games.
12 In January 2003, Christopher Gaglione became her supervisor.
13 In July 2003, Gaglione promoted Moll to Sales Engineer II.
14 On September 19, 2003, Moll filed a Charge of Discrimination
15 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (‚EEOC‛)
16 alleging that she had been ‚subjected to different terms and
17 conditions of employment than similarly situated male employees‛
18 and a ‚hostile work environment.‛ J.A. 67. Moll also complained
19 that she had been promoted ‚to a lower level position than similarly
20 situated males‛ and generally alleged retaliation after complaining 8 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 to Verizon management of sexual discrimination and harassment. Id.
2 The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue dated August 9, 2004.
3 On October 5, 2004, Moll filed a complaint with the district
4 court, alleging that she had been (i) subjected to gender-disparate
5 treatment; (ii) subjected to a sexually hostile work environment;
6 (iii) retaliated against; and (iv) paid less than male employees, in
7 violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 102(a) of the
8 Civil Rights Act of 1991, the New York State Human Rights Law
9 (‚NYSHRL‛), and the Equal Pay Act (‚EPA‛).
10 In December 2004, Verizon transferred the Sales Engineers in
11 the Buffalo office to the Syracuse office, purportedly because the
12 company wanted all of the Sales Engineers to work out of the same
13 office as their supervisors. Moll alleged that this transfer was
14 retaliation for her lawsuit. Verizon offered Moll three options:
15 (1) transfer to Syracuse; (2) find a new job at Verizon; or (3) take a
16 severance package. Moll claims she had no choice but to transfer to
17 Syracuse because she could not find another job at Verizon and
18 Verizon refused to give her details regarding her severance package.
19 Moll was told that she must report to the Syracuse office when she
20 was not in customer meetings and that she could not work from 9 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 home. Moll eventually took disability leave because of the
2 ‚overwhelming stress and anxiety‛ she experienced.
3 On December 20, 2004, Verizon filed a motion to dismiss the
4 complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), except for
5 a single purported incident of disparate treatment. In September
6 2005, the district court issued an order granting, in part, and
7 denying, in part, the motion. The district court, inter alia, dismissed
8 Moll’s claims of hostile work environment in violation of Title VII
9 and the NYSHRL on the basis that Moll failed to allege that any
10 sexually offensive conduct occurred within the applicable statute of
11 limitations and that therefore her hostile work environment claims
12 were time-barred. Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., No. 04-cv-805S,
13 2005 WL 2405999, at *7, 12 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2005).
14 In February 2006, Moll’s job was transferred to Buffalo and
15 Moll returned to work from disability leave. In February 2007,
16 Moll’s supervisor told her that there would be a Reduction in Force
17 (‚RIF‛) and that she would be terminated because her performance
18 was below the performance of her peers. Moll claims that no
19 documents or other evidence was offered to support her
20 supervisor’s conclusion that her performance was below par. On 10 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 February 7, 2007, Moll was officially terminated. On April 17, 2008,
2 Moll filed an Amended Complaint in the district court adding the
3 allegations that her termination and her transfer to Syracuse were
4 retaliatory.
5 On August 13, 2010, Moll filed a motion to compel the
6 production of documents relating to her retaliation claim. One
7 request (No. 20) sought, among other things, ‚all documents of or
8 concerning a reduction in force on or about February of 2007.‛
9 Verizon represented that it ‚performed a reasonable search and has
10 already produced all responsive documents, or has in its possession
11 no responsive documents.‛ The magistrate judge relied on this
12 representation and denied Moll’s request. Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp.,
13 Inc., No. 04-cv-805S, 2010 WL 4642931, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
14 A second request (No. 21), sought ‚all documents of or
15 concerning any position, including but not limited to sales engineer
16 a/k/a solutions engineer eliminated as a result of a reduction in force
17 in the Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, or Albany offices during the
18 period of January 2004 through the present.‛ The magistrate judge
19 denied this request on the basis that it was ‚irrelevant whether the
20 criteria utilized for a reduction in force preceding or following the 11 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 reduction in force which terminated plaintiff was similar or distinct‛
2 and denied the motion. Id.
3 A third request (No. 5), sought all personnel files of
4 employees who held the position of Sales Engineer in Buffalo,
5 Rochester, or Syracuse, which she argued may be used to support
6 her claim of sex discrimination as possible comparators. The
7 magistrate judge denied Moll’s request, finding ‚no basis for the
8 disclosure of confidential personnel records of employees in other
9 offices. Id. at *4. Following Moll’s objections, the district court
10 upheld this determination.
11 In September 2011, Verizon moved for summary judgment.
12 On May 30, 2012, the district court granted, in part, Verizon’s
13 motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims except that
14 her promotion to the position of Sales Engineer II was
15 discriminatorily delayed. Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., No. 04-cv-
16 805S, 2012 WL 1935087 (W.D.N.Y. May 30, 2012). Moll and Verizon
17 settled the discrete promotion-delay claim and entered into a
18 Stipulation of Dismissal. Moll appealed the district court’s 2005
19 ruling on Verizon’s motion to dismiss, its 2010 ruling on her motion 12 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 to compel, and its 2012 ruling on Verizon’s motion for summary
2 judgment.
3 DISCUSSION
4 I. Motion to Dismiss: Hostile Work Environment Claims
5 We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de
6 novo. Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). The
7 district court dismissed Moll’s hostile work environment claims
8 under Title VII and the NYSHRL, finding that Moll failed to allege
9 facts to support a claim within the applicable statute of limitations.
10 Moll argues that the district court improperly calculated the
11 NYSHRL statute of limitations. Moll also argues that events which
12 occurred prior to the statute of limitations are actionable under the
13 continuing violation exception. Finally, Moll argues that the district
14 court erred when it failed to consider acts that were not sexually
15 offensive in nature.
16 We conclude that the district court erred when it failed to
17 consider all allegations in the Complaint in their totality, including
18 those that were not sexually offensive in nature.
19 ‚A hostile work environment exists under Title VII where ‚the
20 workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, 13 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
2 conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
3 working environment.‛ Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122
4 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted),
5 abrogated on other grounds by Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434
6 (2013). ‚To decide whether the threshold has been reached, courts
7 examine the case-specific circumstances in their totality and evaluate
8 the severity, frequency, and degree of the abuse.‛ Alfano, 294 F.3d at
9 374 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). ‚Facially
10 [sex-]neutral incidents may be included . . . among the ‘totality of the
11 circumstances’ that courts consider in any hostile work environment
12 claim, so long as a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they
13 were, in fact, based on sex.‛ Id. at 378; see also Raniola v. Bratton 243
14 F.3d 610, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2001); Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d
15 141, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2000).
16 Moll’s Complaint includes both sexually overt and facially
17 sex-neutral incidents to allege a sex-based hostile work
18 environment. The district court should have considered all incidents
19 in their totality—including sex-neutral incidents—before it
20 dismissed Moll’s hostile work environment claims for failure to 14 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 allege an actionable incident within the applicable statute of
2 limitations.
3 On appeal, Verizon argues for the first time that Moll’s hostile
4 work environment claims also fail because her allegations are not
5 sufficiently pervasive or severe to support an actionable claim. ‚*I+t
6 is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not
7 consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.‛ Greene v. United
8 States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994). While the rule is not an
9 absolute bar, id., we choose not to address the merits of Verizon’s
10 argument.
11 Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s decision to dismiss
12 Moll’s Title VII and NYSHRL hostile work environment claims and
13 remand for further proceedings. We leave consideration of Moll’s
14 other arguments to the district court in the first instance and we
15 express no views on the merits of Moll’s hostile work environment
16 claims.
17 II. Motion to Compel
18 We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of
19 discretion. Wood v. FBI, 432 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2005); see also In re
20 Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the term of art 15 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 ‚abuse of discretion‛ includes errors of law, clearly erroneous
2 assessments of the evidence, or decisions ‚that cannot be located
3 within the range of permissible decisions‛ (internal quotation marks
4 omitted)). Moll argues that the relevance and materiality of her
5 request for documents relating to the February 2007 reduction in
6 force, previous and following reductions in force, and similarly-
7 situated Verizon employees is plain. We agree. The district court
8 erred by refusing to compel Verizon to provide the records Moll
9 requested in Request Nos. 5 and 21. While we are in no position to
10 second-guess Verizon’s representation that the documents Moll
11 sought in Request No. 20 do not exist, we note that the failure to
12 keep records of the reduction in force that resulted in Moll’s
13 termination may itself constitute evidence that the reduction in force
14 was pretextual.
15 ‚Evidence relating to company-wide practices may reveal
16 patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing
17 the likelihood that an employer’s offered explanation for an
18 employment decision regarding a particular individual masks a
19 discriminatory motive.‛ Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co. 895 F.2d 80,
20 84 (2d Cir. 1990). See also id. (concluding that discovery request that 16 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 ‚goes beyond the narrow confines of the [ ] facility in which
2 [plaintiff] worked . . . is relevant‛ to discrimination claim). This
3 same evidence may be used to detect retaliatory motives and
4 unequal pay. The district court’s refusal to compel Verizon to
5 produce the requested documents deprived Moll of the opportunity
6 to find evidence that might support her argument that Verizon’s
7 reasons for firing her were pretextual, that she was discriminated
8 based on her sex, or that she was paid unequally.
9 Accordingly, we vacate the order insofar as it denied Moll’s
10 motion to compel Request Nos. 5 and 21. We remand the case to the
11 district court with directions to compel Verizon to produce such
12 documents.
13 III. Motion for Summary Judgment
14 Because we reverse the district court’s order denying Moll’s
15 motion to compel, we vacate the summary judgment. If, following
16 discovery, Moll is unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact
17 suggesting Verizon discriminated or retaliated against her, the
18 district court is free to re-consider summary judgment for Verizon.
19 We note, however, that the district court erred when it
20 concluded that it ‚must disregard‛ Christopher Gaglione’s sworn 17 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 statement that Moll’s transfer was motivated by retaliatory intent
2 because it contradicted his prior deposition testimony. Moll, 2012
3 WL 1935087, at *22. The district court was not required to disregard
4 Gaglione’s testimony.
5 In November 2005, when Gaglione was employed by Verizon,
6 he testified at his deposition that there was a valid reason for Moll’s
7 transfer to the Syracuse office—specifically, to centralize resources in
8 the office where Gaglione, their manager, was located. In November
9 2011, however, after Gaglione was fired from Verizon, he stated in a
10 declaration that ‚*t]he primary factor for [the] decision [to transfer
11 Moll] was an effort to retaliate against . . . [her] for [her] continuing
12 complaints of discrimination and retaliation.‛ He went on to say that
13 Verizon ‚justified this transfer with the pretext that all *System
14 Engineers+ . . . should work together.‛ The district court determined
15 that it ‚must disregard‛ Gaglione’s second statement ‚because it
16 contradicts his prior deposition testimony.‛ Id. We conclude that this
17 was error.
18 The ‚sham issue of fact‛ doctrine ‚prohibits a party from
19 defeating summary judgment simply by submitting an affidavit that
20 contradicts the party’s previous sworn testimony.‛ In re Fosamax 18 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 Prods. Liab. Litig., 707 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
2 (emphasis supplied). See also Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252
3 (2d Cir. 2001) (‚[F]actual allegations that might otherwise defeat a
4 motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to do so when
5 they are made for the first time in the plaintiff’s affidavit opposing
6 summary judgment and that affidavit contradicts her own prior
7 deposition testimony.‛); Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614,
8 619 (2d Cir. 1996) (‚*A+ party may not create an issue of fact by
9 submitting an affidavit in opposition to a summary judgment
10 motion that, by omission or addition, contradicts the affiant’s
11 previous deposition testimony.‛). The purpose of the doctrine is
12 clear: ‚[i]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition
13 could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit
14 contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish
15 the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out
16 sham issues of fact.‛ Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d
17 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969). Thus, factual issues that a party creates by
18 filing an affidavit crafted to oppose a summary judgment motion
19 that contradicts that party’s prior testimony are not ‚genuine‛ issues
20 for trial. Id. 19 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 Here, however, Gaglione was not a party to the action, nor did
2 he have a familial or other close relationship with the plaintiff that
3 suggests Moll could influence Gaglione’s testimony. Moreover, there
4 is nothing in the record to suggest that Gaglione submitted the
5 declaration solely to create a genuine issue of fact. Therefore the
6 district court was not required to disregard Gaglione’s second sworn
7 statement.
8 In certain circumstance we have held that sham issue of fact
9 doctrine applies to third-party witnesses, particularly expert
10 witnesses. See Fosamax, 707 F.3d at 193 (holding that the sham
11 affidavit doctrine applies to stop a party from manufacturing a
12 factual dispute by submitting testimony from an expert whom she
13 tendered); AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626
14 F.3d 699, 736 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs’ expert report that
15 contradicted plaintiff’s prior representations was insufficient to
16 defeat motion for summary judgment). But in doing so we explained
17 that a party cannot ‚manufactur*e+ a factual dispute by submitting
18 testimony from an expert whom she tendered‛ with contradictions
19 that are, inter alia, ‚unequivocal and inescapable,‛ and
20 ‚unexplained.‛ Fosamax, 707 F.3d at 194. 20 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 Apart from not being a party to the action, Gaglione was not
2 an expert nor was he retained in any way by the plaintiff.2 Nor are
3 we convinced that his affidavit ‚inescapably and unequivocally‛
4 contradicted his earlier testimony without explanation. To the
5 contrary, there is a readily apparent, plausible explanation for any
6 inconsistency in his testimony: At the time of his earlier deposition
7 Gaglione was employed by Verizon; when he provided his
8 subsequent declaration Verizon had terminated him. The fact that
9 the later declaration was more favorable to Moll could be explained
10 in one of two ways: either he felt inhibited at the time of the first
11 deposition from portraying his employer in a bad light, or when he
12 issued his later declaration he wanted to get even with Verizon for
13 terminating him. Gaglione states in his later declaration that he
14 ‚regret[s] that [he] failed to do more to complain about the
15 retaliatory nature of the plan‛ because he ‚was more concerned
16 about losing *his+ job.‛ It seems to us that the veracity of the witness
17 in these circumstances presents a quintessential question of fact for
18 the fact-finder.
Although the fact that Gaglione was a non-expert witness bears on 2
our decision here, we do not hold that non-expert third-party witnesses can never be subject to the sham affidavit rule. 21 Nos. 12-4688-cv, 13-0918-cv
1 Ordinarily, when a district court is asked to consider
2 contradictory deposition testimony of a fact witness at summary
3 judgment, ‚a district court may not discredit a witness’s deposition
4 testimony . . . because the assessment of a witness’s credibility is a
5 function reserved for the jury.‛ Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing
6 Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 725 (2d Cir. 2010). It was error for the district
7 court to categorically refuse to consider Gaglione’s subsequent
8 declaration; the sham issue doctrine does not go so far. If defendant
9 files a second motion for summary judgment, we direct the district
10 court to consider Gaglione’s second sworn statement in his
11 declaration.
12 CONCLUSION
13 For the reasons set forth above, we (1) vacate the district
14 court’s 2005 decision granting Verizon’s motion to dismiss Moll’s
15 hostile work environment claims; (2) vacate the district court’s 2010
16 ruling on Moll’s motion to compel Request Nos. 5 and 21; and (3)
17 vacate the district court’s 2012 decision granting in part Verizon’s
18 motion for summary judgment. We remand for further proceedings
19 consistent with this opinion.