Moises Villalobos v. The Target Range

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedSeptember 30, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-07328
StatusUnknown

This text of Moises Villalobos v. The Target Range (Moises Villalobos v. The Target Range) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moises Villalobos v. The Target Range, (C.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 2:24-cv-07328-MEMF-PVC 11 Moises Villalobos, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE COURT SHOULD NOT DECLINE TO 13 v. EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OV ER PLAINTIFF’S 14 STATE LAW CLAIMS The Target Range; Nehen Industrial LLC; and 15 Does 1 to 10, 16 Defendant/s. 17 18 19 20 On August 28, 2024, Plaintiff Moises Villalobos (“Villalobos”) filed a Complaint against 21 Defendants The Target Range; Nehen Industrial LLC; and Does 1 to 10, asserting: (1) a claim for 22 injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 23 42 U.S.C. §§ 12010–12213; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 24 (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–52, et seq.; (3) a claim for damages pursuant to the California 25 Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54, et seq.; (4) a claim for damages and injunctive relief 26 pursuant to the Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; and (5) a claim for negligence. ECF No. 27 1.The Complaint alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over the ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 28 1 §§ 1331 and 1343, and that the state law claims are brought “pursuant to pendant [sic] jurisdiction.”

2 Id. at ¶¶ 6–7.

3 Principles of pendent jurisdiction have been codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute,

4 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when

5 deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in

6 each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

7 and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added)

8 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

9 California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for a limited group of lawsuits

10 brought under the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading

11 standard requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant

12 case to file a verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the

13 specific barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff

14 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a). A “high-frequency

15 litigant fee” is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t

16 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints

17 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately

18 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation”

19 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant

20 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing

21 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 22 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 23 is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 24 is a plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 25 high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 26 individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 27 individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 28 l In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Villalobos to show cause in writing why the Court 2 | should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim, the California Disabled Persons 3 || Act claim, the California Health and Safety Code claim, and the negligence claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 4 | 1367(c). In responding to this Order to Show Cause: 5 1. Villalobos shall identify the amount of statutory damages Villalobos seeks to recover. 6 2. Villalobos and Villalobos’s counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show 7 Cause with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the 8 Court to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by 9 California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). This includes, but is not limited 10 to: 11 a. the number of construction-related accessibility claims filed by Villalobos in the 12 twelve months preceding the filing of the present claim; and 13 b. the number of construction-related accessibility claims in which Villalobos’ counsel 14 has represented high-frequency litigant plaintiffs in the twelve months preceding the 15 filing of the present claim. 16 Villalobos shall file a Response to this Order to Show Cause by no later than fourteen days 17 | from the date of this order. The failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause 18 | may, without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 19 || the Unruh Act claim, the California Disabled Persons Act claim, the California Health and Safety 20 || Code claim, and the negligence claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 af 25 Dated: September 30, 2024 26 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 27 United States District Judge 28

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Related

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Moises Villalobos v. The Target Range, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moises-villalobos-v-the-target-range-cacd-2024.