Mohr v. City of Chicago

114 Ill. App. 283, 1904 Ill. App. LEXIS 414
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMay 26, 1904
DocketGen. No. 11,704
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 114 Ill. App. 283 (Mohr v. City of Chicago) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mohr v. City of Chicago, 114 Ill. App. 283, 1904 Ill. App. LEXIS 414 (Ill. Ct. App. 1904).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Windes

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant filed a bill against the appellees, which was subsequently amended and engrossed, to enjoin the city of Chicago from entering into or executing any contract for the construction of a steam boiler plant of six boilers to be erected at the Fourteenth street pumping station, Chicago, and to enjoin all of said appellees from taking any steps to carry out such contract, and to prevent the city from paying out any money on account thereof. The appellees, the city and Blocki, filed joint and several answers, and the Freeman Company, the lowest bidder for a contract for the construction of said plant, filed a separate answer, and, after issues joined, the cause was heard upon the pleadings and evidence taken in open court, and a decree rendered dismissing the bill as amended for want of equity, from which this appeal is taken.

The question presented for decision is, whether the city of Chicago, after making plans and specifications, .advertising for and receiving sealed bids for the construction of the boilers of a water plant to cost $95,000 and upwards, may, upon the opening of such sealed bids, change or modify the same in a material respect. While other questions have been quite elaborately argued in .the printed briefs, as well as in the oral arguments, we think the question as above stated is the only one that need be decided, since, in our view, it controls the case.

The statute (Hurd’s Rev. Stat. 1895, p. 285, ch. 24, art. 9, sec. 50), in reference to the letting of contracts for public works by municipalities, is as follows:

“ All contracts for the making of any public improvement to be paid for in whole or in part by a special assessment, and any work or other public improvement, when the expense thereof shall exceed $500, shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder in the manner to be prescribed by ordinance, such contract to be approved by the mayor or president of the board of trustees. Provided, however, any such contract may be entered into by the proper officer without advertising for bids, and without such approval, by a vote of two-thirds of all the aldermen or trustees elected.”

This statute was held by this court, in City of Chicago v. Hanreddy, 102 Ill. App. 1-7, to be in force and controlling in the letting of contracts by municipalities such as the one here in question.

The ordinances of the city of Chicago relative to the same subject-matter, in so far as material in this case, are as follows:

“ Sec. 1612. Whenever any public improvement shall be ordered by the city council, which is to be paid for by special assessment, * * * the commissioner of public works shall advertise in some newspaper printed in the city of Chicago, of general circulation, for proposals for doing said work. * * * A plan or profile of the work to be done, accompanied with specifications for the doing of the same, shall be first placed on file in the office of said department before any such advertisement shall be made.
“ Sec. 1626. When the expense of any work or public improvement shall exceed the sum of five hundred dollars and the same is to be paid out of the general fund or the water or sewerage fund of said city, the doing of said work shall be let by contract, in the same manner as provided in cases where the expense of the same is to be paid for by special assessment.”

No question is made in this case as to the sufficiency of the proceedings by the commissioner of public works and the city of Chicago toward letting the contract, so far as concerns the advertising for bids or any other matter, save that it is claimed the plan or profile of the work and the specifications accompanying the same, which were prepared by the city engineer and submitted to the different persons desiring to bid for the construction of the boilers in question, were not sufficient to furnish a certain and common basis for competitive bidding; also that the bidders were required to furnish their own plans and specifications; and that the bid of the Freeman Company, to which the contract was awarded, after the bids were opened, was changed in material respects, and the city was proceeding and intended to enter into a contract with that company to construct said boilers, upon the basib of such changed bids, for the amount thereof, to wit, $95,000. The plan or profile of the boilers cannot be reproduced in this opinion, nor need the specifications accompanying the same be stated, because of their length, and the conclusion reached by. us. For the purposes of this decision it may and. will be assumed that the plans and specifications for the work in question, prepared by the city and submitted to the different prospective bidders, were sufficiently definite and specific to furnish a basis for intelligent competitive bidding, and are in substantial compliance.with the ordinance above quoted. In fact the engineer of John Mohr & Sons, a corporation, which was one of the bidders, and whose president is the appellant, testified with regard to these specifications as follows:

“Q. Is there anything about these specifications required by the city which will show anything that you could not prepare an intelligent bid upon ?
A. We can make an intelligent bid upon it, yes.
Q. . And you did make an intelligent bid upon it?
A. I think so.
Q. Is there anything about it which will prevent anybody who understood their business as well as you and your firm did to make an intelligent bid ?
A. Eq, sir.”

Several other witnesses testified to the same effect, and that there was nothing ambiguous or unintelligible about these specifications.

Under the head of “ Special and General Requirements ” in the specification's appears the following, to wit:

“Tihe of Installation : As the time required for the installation of the boilers is an essential element of this contract, bidders will stipulate the length of time required by them to install the first battery, after being duly notified in writing by the commissioner of public works that the existing battery of three boilers is ready for removal. They will also stipulate the length of time required for the removal of the old boilers and their appurtenances, and the installation, ready for operation, of the second battery, after proper notification has been given by the commissioner of public works to proceed with the work. Similarly a time limit will be specified for the removal of the old boilers and the installation of the third battery. It is stipulated and agreed that the entire coal-conveying plant shall be complete and ready for operation within one week after the limit of time guaranteed for the installation of the third battery of boilers. This element of time as guaranteed will be taken into consideration in canvassing the bids. The work in the shops shall begin immediately after the signing of the contract.

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Bluebook (online)
114 Ill. App. 283, 1904 Ill. App. LEXIS 414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mohr-v-city-of-chicago-illappct-1904.