Mohammad Yasin Rezaee v. Christopher Chestnut, et. al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MOHAMMAD YASIN REZAEE, No. 1:26-CV-00746-DC-DMC-HC A-244-547-174, 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et. al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, an immigration detainee who is represented by counsel filed a petition 18 for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents filed an answer, ECF No. 19 20, and Petitioner filed a reply, ECF No. 21. 20 22 According to the Petitioner, he is a citizen of Afghanistan and “a member of the 23 Hazara ethnic minority.” ECF No. 8, pg. 8. Petitioner contends that he filed an application for 24 asylum. See id. Petitioner asserts that he has been in detention since June 24, 2025, and has not 25 been provided with a bond hearing throughout his detention. See id. Petitioner argues that such 26 detention therefore violates his due process rights. See id. generally. 27 Respondents contend that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory “pursuant to 8 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)” and Petitioner is therefore ineligible for bond hearing. ECF No. 20, pg. 1 1. According to Respondents, on May 22, 2024, Petitioner “applied for entry into the United 2 States at a designated port of entry.” Id. Respondents assert that Petitioner’s notice to appear, 3 issued on May 22, 2024, was dismissed on June 24, 2025, the same day Petitioner was detained 4 “based on the Petitioner not being entitled to regular removal proceedings.” Id. at 2 (citing 5 Respondent Exhibit 4 and 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c)). Respondents contend that Petitioner appealed 6 that decision and the decision remains pending. See id. 7 9 The undersigned finds that Petitioner has a protectable liberty interest in remaining 10 out of custody, and he was deprived of this liberty without due process when re-detained without 11 notice or a hearing. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend granting Petitioner’s petition 12 for writ of habeas corpus because his detention violates due process and recommend that 13 Petitioner be immediately released from Respondents’ custody under the same conditions he was 14 released previously. 15 As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds that, according to the Executive 16 Office for Immigration Review Automated Case Information website,1 Petitioner has no final 17 order of removal, pending appeals, nor hearing dates set. Additionally, Respondents state that 18 Petitioner’s notice to appear was dismissed “based on the Petitioner not being entitled to regular 19 removal proceedings.” Respondents provide Exhibit 4, the order granting the motion to dismiss, 20 which contains the following information:

21 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has represented that circumstances of the case have changed after the notice to appear was issued to such an extent that 22 continuation is no longer in the best interest of the government. The Department has further indicated that the Respondent is not entitled to removal proceedings. 8 23 C.F.R. 1239.2(c).

24 ECF No. 20-4, pg. 3. 25 The undersigned notes that there is no additional information provided by parties 26 about what the change in circumstances was nor the reason that Petitioner is not entitled to 27 1 The Court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of matters of 28 public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 530 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 removal proceedings. Respondents do not make any argument that this Court should consider this 2 dismissal, nor how such dismissal could be considered, within the scope of this habeas petition. 3 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 4 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 5 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 6 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 7 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 8 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 9 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. Courts examine procedural 10 due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest 11 under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any 12 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of 13 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 14 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is 15 due.”). The Court considers each step in turn. 16 A. Liberty Interest 17 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has shown he has a protectable 18 liberty interest. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government 19 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the 20 Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face 21 significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant 22 discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 23 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). “Although in some circumstances the initial decision to detain or 24 release an individual may be within the government’s discretion, the government’s decision to 25 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may 26 rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of 27 release].” Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a 28 noncitizen release from custody pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest 1 in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 2 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional 3 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific 4 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 5 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. 6 Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 7 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds unpersuasive the Respondents’ argument 8 that Petitioner cannot assert a liberty interest because he is an “applicant for admission” under § 9 1225 and therefore subject to mandatory detention, ineligible for release, parole, or a custody 10 redetermination hearing. First, Respondents claim Petitioner is inedible for release without 11 explaining how, if he is ineligible for release, Petitioner was previously released on his own 12 recognizance. Petitioner was initially detained upon his arrival to the United States at a port of 13 entry and found to be “inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of 14 the INA as amended.” ECF No. 20-1, pg. 2. That same day, Petitioner was “served an I-862 15 Notice to Appear and paroled into the United States pending 240 proceedings by the Immigration 16 Judge.” Id. None of the documents provided indicate what statute Petitioner was paroled under. 17 Neither party provides information about what the basis of Petitioner’s parole was. 18 Generally, parole is available for noncitizens pursuant to §1226 or §1182 19 (d)(5)(A). Thus, Respondents are either incorrect that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225 20 because his prior release indicates that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226, or 21 Petitioner’s detention is pursuant to §1225 and Petitioner was paroled under §1182 (d)(5)(A). The 22 undersigned finds that regardless of which statute Petitioner was afforded parole under, Petitioner 23 has a protected liberty interest. The Court finds Petitioner was released from immigration 24 detention, which created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his liberty 25 absent a material change in circumstances. Petitioner was initially released, on his own 26 recognizance. This language sets a clear and reasonable expectation that Petitioner would be 27 entitled to retain his liberty absent a material change in circumstances. Respondents do not allege 28 that Petitioner violated those conditions nor argue that any change circumstances gave rise to 1 Petitioner’s re-detention. Instead, Respondents merely rely on the claim that Petitioner is subject 2 to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). 3 Petitioner’s detention goes against United States Supreme Court precedent which 4 recognizes that individuals who have been released from custody, even where such release is 5 conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued release. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482. 6 Given this, the Court finds Petitioner has established his liberty interest in his continued release. 7 B. Procedure Due 8 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is 9 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 10 Constitution. To determine such, the Court considers three factors to determine the process due 11 prior to deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the 12 official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 13 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) 14 “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 15 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. 16 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has established 17 his due process rights were violated. 18 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. 19 Petitioner has lived in the United States for over a year and was released to a sponsor in 20 California. See ECF No. 20-1, pg. 2. Despite that, Petitioner has now been detained for over nine 21 months without any evidence of being afforded a bond hearing. Accordingly, this factor weighs in 22 favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez 23 v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 24 2025) (finding similarly); see also Colina-Meira v. Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-1716 CSK P, 2025 LX 25 673205 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). 26 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not 27 received any bond or custody redetermination hearing. “[T]he risk of erroneous deprivation is 28 high when, as here, parole is revoked without written notice or reason.” Chavarria, 2025 WL 1 3533606, at *3; see also A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) 2 (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received 3 any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”). Civil immigration detention, which is 4 “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only 5 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 6 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not contend 7 that Petitioner is or was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Indeed, Respondents appear to 8 concede this, arguing that “[e]ven if Petitioner specifically does not appear to be a danger or flight 9 risk, the Government has a strong interest in effectuating the ‘system Congress devised.’” ECF 10 No. 20, pg. 7 (internal citations omitted). Thus, Court finds there is a serious likelihood Petitioner 11 will be erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Moreover, without any procedural safeguards 12 to determine whether his re-detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional procedural 13 safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 14 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to 15 provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV- 16 01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). This Court finds the 17 government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws but Respondents’ interest in detaining 18 Petitioner without notice or a hearing here is low. See Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; 19 Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2025). Detention hearings in 20 immigration courts are routine and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Even 21 if Respondents believed they had a proper reason to detain Petitioner, such decision on their part 22 would warrant written notice and a pre-detention hearing rather than automatic detention. See 23 E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government 24 may believe it has a valid reason to detain petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate 25 the detention in a manner that comports with due process”). In addition, the government’s interest 26 is even lower because Petitioner was previously released after immigration officials determined 27 he was not a flight risk or danger to the community, and there is no evidence that he has a 28 criminal record. 1 On balance, the Court finds the Matthews factors weigh in favor of finding 2 Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond hearing, and Petitioner should have been provided such 3 notice and a hearing before he was re-detained. The Due Process Clause requires that, at a 4 minimum, “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity 5 for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 6 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In criminal cases, parolees 7 released on parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty 8 properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, 9 including a pre-deprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 10 480-86. “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of 11 immigration detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents identify 12 no reason why written notice was not provided or why a pre-deprivation hearing could not be 13 held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, “a pre-deprivation hearing is required 14 to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 15 Further, though the record is unclear as to under what statutory mechanism 16 Petitioner was granted parole, the undersigned finds Petitioner was denied due process, even if his 17 detention is governed by §1225. In that situation, Petitioner’s parole was pursuant to §1182 18 (d)(5)(A) and terminating such parole requires a determination that parole is accomplished or no 19 longer warranted. Given that purpose of parole itself is determined on a “case-by-case basis,” the 20 undersigned finds that revocation requires an individualized determination that Petitioner is no 21 longer suitable for parole. 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5). Moreover, 8 CFR 212.5 (e) prescribes a specific 22 process for revocation of §1182(d)(5) parole: 23 Termination of parole — (1) Automatic. Parole shall be automatically terminated without written 24 notice (i) upon the departure from the United States of the alien, or, 25 (ii) if not departed, at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized, and in the latter case the alien shall be processed in 26 accordance with paragraph (e)(2) of this section except that no written notice shall be required. 27 (2) (i) On notice. In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or 28 when in the opinion of one of the officials listed in paragraph (a) of this 1 section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be 2 terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. When a charging 3 document is served on the alien, the charging document will constitute written notice of termination of parole, unless otherwise specified. Any 4 further inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235 or 240 of the Act and this chapter, or any order of exclusion, deportation, or 5 removal previously entered shall be executed. If the exclusion, deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time, the alien 6 shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of the official listed in paragraph (a) of this section the public interest requires that the alien be 7 continued in custody.

8 8 CFR 212.5 (e).

9 Respondents do not claim that a change in circumstance resulted in the 10 determination by an official listed in 8 CFR 212.5 (a) that “neither humanitarian reasons nor 11 public benefit warrants” Petitioner’s continued parole, nor that Petitioner was provided notice of 12 such determination, as required by the statute. 8 CFR 212.5 (e). Absent a determination and 13 notice of such determination, Respondents failed to provide Petitioner with the process afforded 14 by 8 CFR 212.5 (e)(2), as required by 8 CFR 212.5 (e)(1)(ii). Accordingly, the undersigned finds 15 that, even if Petitioner is subject to § 1225(b)(2), Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole without 16 providing Petitioner the process due and will therefore recommend the petition be granted and 17 Petitioner be released immediately upon the same terms of his prior release. 18

19 III. CONCLUSION 20 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends: 21 1. It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, 22 ECF No. 1, be GRANTED as Petitioner’s detention violates due process; 23 2. It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Mohammad Yasin Rezaee, A-224- 24 547-174, be RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from Respondents’ custody upon the 25 same conditions as his prior release, with his belongings. Respondents shall not 26 impose any additional restriction on him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that 27 is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing; 28 1 3. It is RECOMMENDED that Respondents be ENJOINED and 2 RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with 3 8 CFR 212.5 (e)(1)(i1) or constitutional protections, including seven (7) day notice 4 and a hearing before a neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: (a) there are 5 material changed circumstances which demonstrate that there is a significant 6 likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) 7 Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a 8 danger to the community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be 9 allowed to have counsel present. 10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 11 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The undersigned 12 | finds that a shortened objection period is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at 13 || issue as well as the fact that the parties have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in 14 || written briefs. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) 15 || (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see 16 || also Local Rule 304(b). Thus, within 7 days after being served with these findings and 17 || recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court. Failure to file objections 18 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 19 | Cir. 1991). 20 | Dated: April 14, 2026 Co 21 DENNIS M. COTA 02 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28