Mohammad Mahashin v. Warden Northwest Detention Center, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MOHAMMAD MAHASHIN, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00579-JHC 8 Petitioner, ORDER 9 v. 10 WARDEN NORTHWEST DETENTION 11 CENTER, et al.,

12 Respondents. 13

14 I INTRODUCTION 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Mohammad Mahashin’s pro se Petition for Writ 17 of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. # 1. The Court has reviewed the materials filed in support of and in 18 opposition to the Petition, the rest of the record, and the governing law. Being fully advised, for 19 the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. Dkt. # 1. 20 21 22 23 24 1 II BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a non-U.S. citizen who is a native and citizen of Bangladesh. Dkt. # 6 at 2; 3 Dkt. # 1 at 2. He is also a citizen of St. Lucia.1 Dkt. # 6 at 2; Dkt. # 1 at 6. Petitioner entered 4 the U.S. on October 26, 2024, and was immediately taken into custody. Dkt. # 6 at 2. He was 5 soon after served a Notice to Appear charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 6 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Dkt. # 6 at 2. 7 Petitioner filed for asylum and related relief with the aid of counsel. Dkt. # 6 at 2; Dkt. # 8 1 at 6. On June 13, 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s asylum claim, but granted 9 withholding of removal to Bangladesh, and ordered Petitioner removed to St. Lucia. Dkt. # 6 at 10 3. Petitioner’s appeal of this decision is pending before the Ninth Circuit, and a temporary stay 11 of removal was granted.2 Dkt. # 6 at 3; Dkt. # 9 at 3-6; see Mahashin v. Bondi, No. 26-739 (9th 12 Cir. Feb. 12, 2026). 13 Petitioner twice requested a bond hearing: first on December 30, 2024, and second on 14 May 16, 2025, but both times the Executive Office for Immigration Review rejected the filing 15 because Petitioner was represented by counsel and counsel must submit the request. Dkt. # 6 at 16 2-3. Petitioner is detained at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (NWIPC). Dkt. # 6 at 2. 17 18 19 20

21 1 Petitioner’s briefing contains a few contradictions, including as to his citizenship. See Dkt. # 1 at ⁋⁋ 3-4 (claiming Bangladesh to be Petitioner’s only country of citizenship and on the next line claiming 22 to have citizenship in Bangladesh and St. Lucia). The Court resolves such conflicts in favor of the facts as stated in Respondents’ brief. On reply, Petitioner does not contradict Respondents’ statement of facts. See Dkt. # 8. 23 2 It is unclear from the briefing if Petitioner understands the nature of this appeal and the underlying order. For example, he claims the order became final when ICE failed to appeal and that he 24 “won” his immigration proceedings. See Dkt. # 1 at 2. 1 III DISCUSSION 2 Federal district courts have the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus if a person “is in 3 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 4 2241 (a), (c). “The petitioner carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 5 that [they are] entitled to habeas relief.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 Petitioner invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 7 Constitution, arguing his prolonged detention violates his right to adequate procedural 8 protections. Dkt. # 1 at 7. But before turning to the constitutional question, the Court must first 9 consider the statutory framework under which Petitioner is detained. 10 A. Statutory Framework 11 Respondents assert Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Dkt. # 5 at 4. To 12 support this position, Respondents cite a recent Fifth Circuit decision finding that noncitizens 13 who have not been admitted are “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 14 § 1225(b). Dkt. # 5 at 4 (citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 15 2026)). But that out-of-Circuit decision does not bind the Court, and a case posing a similar 16 question is pending before the Ninth Circuit. See Rodriguez-Vazquez v. Bostock, et al., No. 25- 17 6842 (9th Cir. argued and submitted March 3, 2026). Even so, because Petitioner does not 18 counter the assertion, the Court assumes without deciding that Petition is detained under 19 § 1225(b).3 See generally Dkt. # 1, 8. 20 21 3 Petitioner does not assert the specific statute under which he is detained, but he does cite a few 22 statues under which he could be detained. He primarily cites 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), but this provision applies to the detention of criminal noncitizens. Respondents do not say Petitioner is a criminal noncitizen nor does the record support such a conclusion, and therefore this statute apparently does not 23 apply to Petitioner. Petitioner also cites § 1226(a) but does not argue its application to his detention. At any rate, if § 1226(a) did apply to him, then he would be entitled to a bond hearing all the same. See 24 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2022). 1 B. Due Process 2 Petitioner invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 3 Constitution, which prohibits the federal government from depriving any person “of life liberty,

4 or property, without due process of law[.]”4 The right to due process “applies to all ‘persons’ 5 within the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, 6 unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (collecting 7 cases). 8 “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 9 individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of 10 the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). “The 11 fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and 12 in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); 13 see also Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We have grave doubts that any 14 statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that 15 16

17 4 Petitioner also asks this Court to prohibit the government from removing him to a third country. Dkt. # 1 at 2; Dkt. # 8 at 11-13. But Petitioner does not allege the government has informed him he will 18 be removed to a third country and nothing in the record appears to reflect such potential removal. See generally Dkt. ## 1, 6, 7, 8. Petitioner was granted withholding of removal to Bangladesh, but he was 19 denied that relief as to St. Lucia. Dkt. # 7-4 at 2. And thus, he has a removal order to St. Lucia where he is a citizen and has a valid passport. Id; Dkt. # 6. Petitioner has not alleged that St. Lucia will not accept 20 him. See generally Dkt. ## 1, 8. For these reasons, the Court need not consider this claim for relief. See Sanchez v. Bondi, No. C25-2573-KKE, 2026 WL 160882, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2026) (denying a 21 similar request where petitioner “provides no facts specific to [their] circumstances that support enjoining Respondents from removing him to ‘any third country,’ such as identifying a target third country where 22 he might suffer persecution or torture”); Duong v. Warden, Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25- CV-1771 DAD CSK P, 2026 WL 177767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Duong v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-01771-DAD-CSK, 23 2026 WL 330628 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026) (“Because nothing before the Court shows any basis for petitioner’s third country removal claims, this Court finds that petitioner lacks standing to raise his third 24 party removal claims at this time.”). 1 those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary 2 deprivation of liberty would have thought so.”). 3 While the standard test for evaluating due process claims is established in Mathews, 424

4 U.S. 319, district courts across the country and particularly in this jurisdiction consider due 5 process challenges to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b) under a multi-prong test 6 explained in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2019).5 The Court 7 considers: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) 8 the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) 9 delays in the removal proceedings cause by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the 10 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106 11 (quoting Report & Recommendation (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858-59 12 (D. Minn. 2019)).6 13 14 5 The Banda court declined to apply the Mathews factors because the Mathews test is to “resolve 15 the question of ‘whether the administrative procedures provided . . . are constitutionally sufficient’” but “[i]t does not resolve the more fundamental issue of whether any procedure—such as a bond hearing— 16 must be provided.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1006-07. And thus, the test would not be “particularly probative.” Id. This jurisdiction has regularly applied Banda, and this Court does the same. See Chekhovskii v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-02550-TLF, 2026 WL 353265 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2026); Andrei 17 Galkin v. Bruce Scott, No. 2:26-CV-00530-TLF, 2026 WL 632663 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2026); Kumar v. Hermosillo, No. 2:26-CV-00389-JNW, 2026 WL 523276 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2026); Tavurov v. Noem, 18 No. 2:26-CV-00138-TLF, 2026 WL 323054 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2026). 6 Petitioner—who is detained and pro se—makes his primary arguments applying the Mathews 19 factors and argues his detention is indefinite under Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, and at times references inapplicable statutes. Dkt. # 1 at 9-17. As explained, Mathews is inapplicable. Zadvydas is also 20 inapplicable as Petitioner is not subject to a final removal order. See 533 U.S. at 699. While Petitioner does not articulate the Banda factors, the Court still applies them. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 21 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”) 22 (internal citation, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted). Respondents have conducted the Banda analysis and Petitioner has made an adequate showing that can be applied to the Banda factors and requested a bond hearing as alternative relief. Dkt. # 5 at 6-7; see also Dkt. # 1 at 3, 8, 10-11 (requesting 23 a bond hearing under § 1226(a) in the alternative and requesting the application of German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2020), which required a bond hearing for a 24 noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)). 1 First, the length of detention “is the most important factor” and “[i]t is important to bear 2 in mind the context: [t]he detention that is being examined here is the detention of a human being 3 who has never been found to pose a danger to the community or to be likely to flee if released.’”

4 Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (quoting Jamal, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853 at 859). Petitioner has 5 been detained for about 16 months. Dkt. # 8 at 2. As Respondents concede, this factor favors 6 Petitioner, and the Court finds it strongly favors granting Petitioner a bond hearing. Dkt. # 5 at 7 5; see also Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (finding 17 months to be a “very long time” “strongly 8 favor[ing] granting” a bond hearing and collecting cases granting bond hearings after as short as 9 9 months detention). 10 Second, “the Court considers how long the detention is likely to continue absent judicial 11 intervention; in other words, the ‘anticipated duration of all removal proceedings—including 12 administrative and judicial appeals.’” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting Jamal, 358 F.

13 Supp. 3d 853 at 859). Petitioner asserts his “detention is likely to continue.” Dkt. # 1 at 16. 14 Respondents argue “all that remains” is Petitioner’s appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. # 5 at 15 5. While that is true, it does not speak to the length of his appeal. 16 Petitioner only recently filed his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and it can be a process 17 lasting months to years. Dkt. # 6 at 3 (Petition for Review filed February 6, 2026); see Banda, 18 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (Ninth Circuit appeals “may take up to two years or longer”); 19 Chekhovskii v. Scott, 2026 WL 353265, at *4 (“According to the Ninth Circuit’s public website, 20 it takes approximately 6 to 12 months from the date of the notice of appeal to oral argument and, 21 following argument, most cases take three months to a year for the Court of Appeals to decide 22 the case.”); see also Mahashin v. Bondi, No. 26-739 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (Opening Brief due

23 Apr. 27, 2026; Answering Brief due May 27, 2026; Optional Reply Brief due 21 days after 24 Answering Brief). The Ninth Circuit has granted a stay of removal, and so it is unlikely 1 Petitioner will be removed before the appeal concludes. See Mahashin v. Bondi, No. 26-739 (9th 2 Cir. Feb. 12, 2026). This factor also favors Petitioner. 3 Third, the Court considers conditions of confinement. “The more that the conditions

4 under which the [noncitizen] is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger [their] 5 argument that [they are] entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting 6 Jamal, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853 at 859). Petitioner says he “faces severe hardships while detained by 7 ICE. Petitioner is held in a locked down facility, with limited freedom of movement and access 8 to Petitioner’s family or support network.” Dkt. # 1 at 12 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 329 9 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing immigration detention conditions which in some cases “are 10 inappropriately poor”)). Petitioner says NWIPC is a facility operated by a private, for-profit 11 prison contractor, and thus his “conditions of confinement are not meaningfully different from 12 those of criminal punishment.” Dkt. # 1 at 16-17; Dkt. # 8 at 5.7 13 He adds that NWIPC has “unsafe conditions” and that he has been “assaulted by other 14 inmates while in custody.” Dkt. # 8 at 6, 9; see Dkt. # 9 at 24 (treated for hip pain after reporting 15 “another person hit him”). Petitioner also says he suffers from medical conditions that cannot be 16 adequately treated at the detention facility and submits his health records showing that he 17 suffered on and off respiratory problems and pain. Dkt. # 8 at 6, 9; see Dkt. # 9 at 14 (likely 18 suffered from an upper respiratory infection for nearly two months). In response, Respondents 19 only acknowledge that Petitioner is detained at NWIPC. Dkt. # 5 at 5. This factor favors 20 Petitioner. 21 22

23 7 To the extent Petitioner cites recent news articles and studies, the Court does not consider them as they are outside the scope of the Petition and primarily concern detention facilities where Petitioner is 24 not held. There has not been a request for judicial notice. 1 Fourth, Respondents concede there has been no delay on Petitioner’s part. Dkt. # 5 at 5. 2 This factor is neutral. See Chekhovskii, 2026 WL 353265, at *6 (finding no delay on Petitioner’s 3 part a neutral factor).

4 Fifth, Petitioner does not allege Respondents intentionally delayed his immigration 5 proceedings. See generally Dkt. ## 1, 8; but see Djelassi v. ICE Field Off. Dir., 434 F. Supp. 3d 6 917, 931 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (finding that the fifth factor favored Petitioner even when delays 7 were not intentional but “stemmed from the BIA’s and Ninth Circuit’s crowded dockets). Here, 8 Petitioner’s immigration proceedings, which are clearly legitimate as he was granted withholding 9 of removal to Bangladesh, have taken well over a year and only continue—all while he is 10 detained. This factor leans slightly towards Petitioner. See Chekhovskii, 2026 WL 353265, at 11 *6. 12 Finally, the Court considers the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a

13 final order of removal. “In other words, the Court considers whether the noncitizen has asserted 14 any defenses to removal.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. “[W]here a noncitizen has asserted a 15 good faith challenge to removal, ‘the categorical nature of the detention will become increasingly 16 unreasonable.’” Id. As in Banda, Petitioner applied for asylum and other relief. That relief, in 17 relevant part, was denied and Petitioner has appealed. And as in Banda, the Court “does not 18 have sufficient information to determine whether the appeal is nonfrivolous or whether petitioner 19 ultimately will prevail.” Id. This factor is therefore neutral. 20 In sum, four factors weigh in Petitioner favor and two are neutral. Petitioner has not had 21 a bond hearing, and his two tries to receive a hearing were rejected. See Dkt. 6 at 2-3. 22 Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably prolonged and due process

23 requires that he be granted an opportunity to be heard. 24 1 C. Remedy 2 “When the Court has determined that a detainee has been subjected to mandatory 3 detention under § 1225(b) for an unreasonably prolonged period in violation of due process, the

4 proper remedy is a bond hearing; under Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011) the 5 government bears the burden of proving the detainee is a danger or flight risk by clear and 6 convincing evidence.” Chekhovskii, 2026 WL 353265, at *6; see Singh, 638 F.3d 1196, 7 abrogation recognized on other grounds Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196, 1199 (explaining that 8 clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in Singh was based on general principles of due 9 process); see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1321, n.5 (W.D. Wash. 2025) 10 (explaining the present applicability of Singh). Additionally, under Singh, there must be a 11 contemporaneous record. Singh, 638 F.3d at 1200. As the Court finds Petitioner’s detention to 12 be unreasonably prolonged and in violation of due process, it finds that he is entitled to a bond

13 hearing with the procedural requirements laid out in Singh. 14 IV CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS the habeas petition (Dkt. # 1). The Court 16 further ORDERS: 17 1. Respondents must provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within 14 calendar days 18 of this order. This bond hearing shall comply with the procedural requirements of Singh 19 v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011)—there must be a contemporaneous record of 20 the hearing, and the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 21 evidence that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community; 22 23 24 1 2. Alternatively, or if the bond hearing does not occur within 14 calendar days of the 2 order, Respondents shall immediately release petitioner under appropriate conditions of 3 release: 4 3. Respondents must file a status report with the Court no later than 15 calendar days 5 from this order. The status report must detail if and when the bond hearing occurred, if 6 the bond was granted or denied and, if denied, the reasons for that denial. 7 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and g || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 9 Dated this 11th day of March, 2026. 10 1 Cfok 4. Char 12 John H. Chun United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24