Mohammad Asif Afghan v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 MOHAMMAD ASIF AFGHAN, Case No. 1:26-cv-01652-JLT-EPG-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF 13 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., PETITIONER WITH A BOND HEARING

15 Respondents.

16 17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 18 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated herein, the 19 undersigned recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus and directing 20 Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing. 21 I. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a noncitizen who was served a notice to appear and released on an order of 24 recognizance on January 2, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 2-3 at 4.1) On February 13, 2024, 25 Petitioner was enrolled in supervised release through Intensive Supervision Appearance Program 26 (“ISAP”) Case Management. (ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 2-3 at 7–9.) On December 2, 2025, 27 Petitioner was detained during a routine check-in with U.S. Immigrations and Customs 1 Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner was transferred to the California City Corrections Center 2 without a clear explanation for the detention. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) 3 On February 27, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion 4 for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The Court denied the motion for TRO 5 as untimely. (ECF No. 5.) On March 20, 2026, Respondents filed a response to the petition, and 6 Petitioner filed a reply on April 6, 2026. (ECF Nos. 7, 9.) 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 In the petition, Petitioner asserts that his detention violates due process and that as a 10 member of the Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration 11 for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (ECF No. 1 at 25–26.) 12 A. Procedural Due Process 13 “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there 14 exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second 15 examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 16 sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citations 17 omitted). 18 1. Liberty Interest 19 “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 20 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. 21 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 22 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 23 protects.” Zadvydas at 690. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court 24 addressed whether due process requires a parolee be afforded some opportunity to be heard prior 25 to revocation of parole. 408 U.S. at 472. In examining “the nature of the interest of the parolee in 26 his continued liberty,” the Supreme Court stated: 27 The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The 1 he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the 2 conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 3 attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition 4 is very different from that of confinement in a prison. . . . The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be 5 revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. 6 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although 7 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 8 a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others” and held that “the liberty is valuable and 9 must be seen as within the protection of” due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 10 Relying on Morrissey, courts in this district have consistently held that noncitizens who 11 have been released from immigration custody pending civil removal proceedings have a 12 protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 13 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025); J.A.E.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01380-KES-HBK 14 (HC), 2025 WL 3013377, at *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); J.C.L.A. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv- 15 01310-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2959250, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025); Qazi v. Albarran, 16 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-CSK, 2025 WL 3033713, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Martinez 17 Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 18 Aug. 28, 2025); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *8 19 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025); Maklad v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-00946 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2299376, 20 at *7–8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2025). 21 “Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 22 authority for all ‘applicants for admission,’ Respondents fail to contend with the liberty interest 23 created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance[.]” Garcia v. 24 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01907-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3771348, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). 25 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest 26 in remaining out of immigration custody. 27 /// /// 1 2. Mathews Test 2 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific dictates of due 3 process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: 4 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 5 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 6 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 7 requirements would entail. 8 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 9 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue is 10 fundamental. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it “is beyond dispute” an immigration 11 detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from imprisonment is at the 12 ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 13 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 14 With respect to the second factor, “‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is 15 high’ where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination 16 hearing.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, 17 No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 871334, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025)). “Civil 18 immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a 19 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.” Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25- 20 cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (alteration in 21 original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Petitioner’s release on recognizance necessarily 22 required a determination that he posed neither a flight risk nor a danger. Rocha Chavarria v. 23 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 24 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at 25 *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025)); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 26 (“The federal government sometimes releases noncitizens on bond or parole while their removal 27 proceedings are pending. Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen 1 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A]s there have been no procedural safeguards to determine if 2 petitioner’s re-detention is justified, ‘the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., 3 a bond hearing, is high.’” Sharan S. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01427-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 4 3167826, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5). 5 With respect to the third and final factor, “although the government has a strong interest 6 in enforcing the immigration laws, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a 7 hearing is ‘low.’” J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 8 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094). See Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22- 9 cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022) (“Although the Government 10 has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued 11 removal orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without 12 providing an individualized bond hearing is low.”). Courts generally have found that the cost of 13 providing a custody hearing is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this 14 Court demonstrating that providing Petitioner with a pre-deprivation hearing would be fiscally or 15 administratively burdensome. See J.A.E.M., 2025 WL 3013377, at *7 (“In immigration court, 16 custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” (citing Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 17 1094)). 18 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond 19 hearing and “[t]hat hearing should have occurred before petitioner was re-detained.” Carmen 20 G.C. v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01648-KES-HBK (HC), 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21 8, 2025). 22 “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is 23 deprived of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. 24 Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that 25 the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty ....”). Courts typically require evidence 26 of urgent concerns or an especially strong government interest to justify a post-deprivation hearing. See Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 27 1983677, at *9; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53, 59–61 (1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to 1 only in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after 2 the event[,]” such as “executive urgency.” (internal quotations omitted)). 3 4 Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7. 5 At such a pre-deprivation hearing, the government bears the burden of proving by clear 6 and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk such that re- 7 detention is warranted. See Carmen G.C., 2025 WL 3521304, at *7 (“On balance, the Mathews 8 factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing where the government must prove that 9 she is a flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence.”); J.E.H.G. v. 10 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01673-JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) 11 (“[T]he immigrant’s initial release reflected a determination by the government that the 12 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. Since it is the government that 13 initiated re-detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of 14 providing a justification for the re-detention.”). 15 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has demonstrated that he has a strong liberty interest in 16 remaining out of custody, that the risk of erroneous deprivation will be meaningfully reduced by 17 requiring notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and that the 18 governmental burden in providing such procedure is quite minimal. Accordingly, the 19 undersigned recommends granting the petition on Count One, the due process claim.2 20 B. Appropriate Relief 21 Courts in this district have taken differing approaches to the relief granted to petitioners 22 who have been released, subsequently re-detained, and denied bond hearings in violation of due 23 process. In some cases, the immediate release of the petitioner has been ordered. See, e.g., 24 Yurani Hortua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 25 2025) (ordering immediate release of petitioner who had been released from immigration 26 detention on parole, was arrested for theft but the case was resolved with community service and 27 did not result in a conviction, and was re-detained at a routine six-month check-in); Carmen 1 G.C., 2025 WL 3521304 (ordering immediate release of petitioner who allegedly violated 2 reporting requirements four times); Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606 (ordering immediate 3 release of petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not identified and 4 where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for petitioner’s re- 5 detention). 6 In other cases, bond hearings have been ordered rather than immediate release. See, e.g., 7 J.E.H.G., 2025 WL 3523108 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated 8 reporting requirements numerous times and was re-detained based on said violations); Paz 9 Aguilera v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-01619 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 3485016 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025) 10 (ordering bond hearing for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements one time and 11 was re-detained based on said violation); Sharan S., 2025 WL 3167826 (ordering bond hearing 12 for petitioner who allegedly violated reporting requirements eight times). 13 Here, the Form I-831 submitted by Respondents reflects multiple ATD violations. (ECF 14 No 7 at 11–12.) Accordingly, the undersigned recommends ordering a bond hearing rather than 15 immediate release. 16 III. 17 RECOMMENDATION & ORDER 18 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 19 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED on Count One. 20 2. Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with an individualized hearing before an 21 immigration judge where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence 22 that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify her detention. 23 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 24 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 25 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 26 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 27 written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and 1 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed 2 | within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District 3 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 4 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 5 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 6 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 7 g IT IS SO ORDERED.

9| Dated: _ April 8, 2026 [Jee hey 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28