Mohamed Turay v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States

405 F.3d 663, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7102, 2005 WL 946832
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 26, 2005
Docket04-2479
StatusPublished
Cited by82 cases

This text of 405 F.3d 663 (Mohamed Turay v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mohamed Turay v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, 405 F.3d 663, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7102, 2005 WL 946832 (8th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Mohamed Turay appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissal of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Turay argues that he suffered persecution based on his imputed political opinion and that the immigration judge (IJ) should not have discounted his credibility. We affirm.

I. Background

Turay is a citizen of Sierra Leone who came to the United States in 2001 and timely sought refugee status. Turay contends that he was a victim of past persecution for his political beliefs. In support, *666 Turay recounted the incidents that precipitated his departure from Sierra Leone during its civil war. Specifically, Turay was physically assaulted and kidnapped by the Kamajors, a pro-government rebel group that invaded his residence. At the time, Turay believed the Kamajors were anti-government. Turay stated “they want me to join in their fight ... but their fight [was] with the government and I don’t even know why they are fighting, but I don’t want to join them in that fight.” Turay tried to hide from the rebels but they captured him.

Once in Kamajor custody, Turay was questioned by the rebels about his political allegiance. Turay testified that he did not tell the rebels his political opinion because Turay believed the rebels would kill him due to his pro-government stance. The rebels tried to recruit Turay but he refused. The rebels, assuming that Turay opposed the government, repeatedly physically assaulted him, including the infliction of knife wounds 1 . The rebels also burned down Turay’s house and forced Turay to carry loads for them. Turay testified that the Kamajors “wanted to overthrow [President Kabbah] because they wanted to take over [ ] power.”

Turay initially fled to Guinea to escape persecution. In his asylum application, Turay indicated that he “managed to escape one night when everybody was asleep and everything was quiet.” However, in an interview before an asylum officer, Tu-ray stated that he was able to escape because government forces attacked and overpowered the rebels. Turay blamed the inconsistency on errors in his written application and insisted that his oral testimony was correct because the “person who filled [out] the form misunderstood.” The rest of Turay’s family also fled Sierra Leone. Turay’s parents went to Gambia but his siblings are still missing and presumed dead. Turay came to the United States from Guinea.

Turay applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. At Turay’s hearing, the IJ asked Turay whether he knew of Foday Sankoh. Turay replied that he did not. Turay’s application was denied in large measure based upon the IJ’s findings that Turay’s account and supporting evidence lacked credibility. 2 Turay appealed to the BIA. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Turay’s appeal finding that Turay failed to present credible evidence in support of his application. Turay now appeals from the BIA’s dismissal.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review questions of law de novo, Tang v. INS, 223 F.3d 713, 718-19 (8th Cir.2000); Ikenokwalu-White v. INS, 316 F.3d 798, 804 (8th Cir.2003), and we review an IJ’s fact determinations by applying the substantial evidence test. Melecio-Saquil v. Ashcroft, 337 F.3d 983, 986-87 (8th Cir.2003); Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir.2002). Under that test, we must affirm if the IJ’s decision is supported by reasonable, sub *667 stantial, and probative evidence. Melecio-Saquil, 337 F.3d at 986-97; Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 597. Fact determinations may be reversed only if the petitioner demonstrates that the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find in favor of the petitioner. Melecio-Saquil, 337 F.3d at 986; Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 597.

B. Law Governing Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Convention Against Torture

The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(1999). Refugee is defined as “any person who is outside of the country of his nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself [ ] of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well found fear of' persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(1999).

In resolving most asylum cases, “the critical inquiry is whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution upon return to his or her country.” Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 597-598 (citing Kratchmarov v. Heston, 172 F.3d 551, 553 (8th Cir.1999)). A well-founded fear must be both “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Id.; Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir.1997). “An alien may establish the subjective element with credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution.” Francois v. INS, 283 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir.2002) (citing Ghasemimehr v. INS, 7 F.3d 1389, 1390 (8th Cir.1993)). Objectively, the alien must show “credible, direct, and specific evidence that a reasonable person in the alien’s position would fear persecution if returned to the alien’s native country.” Id. This fear “must have [a] basis in reality and must be neither irrational nor so speculative or general as to lack credibility.” Perinpanathan, 310 F.3d at 598.

Where an alien establishes past persecution under one of the qualifying grounds, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution on the same ground. Francois, 283 F.3d at 930; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).

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405 F.3d 663, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7102, 2005 WL 946832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mohamed-turay-v-john-ashcroft-attorney-general-of-the-united-states-ca8-2005.