Modu v. Notorious B.I.G. LLC

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 16, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-02453·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CHI MODU, Plaintiff, -against- NOTORIOUS B.I.G., LLC; VOLETTA 20-CV-2453 (LLS) WALLACE; FAITH EVANS; RICK BARLOW; BYSTORM ENTERTAINMENT; ORDER TO AMEND WAYNE BARROW; TOM BENNET; REPUBLIC MERCHANDISING, INC; REMRYLIE LICENSE GROUP; JOHN AND JANE DOES, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Chi Modu brings this pro se action asserting claims in connection with a 1990s photograph that he took of Christopher Wallace, a rap artist known as “The Notorious B.I.G.” On April 10, 2020, the Court received Plaintiff’s payment of the filing fees to commence this action. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this order. STANDARDS The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine

whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from Plaintiff Chi Modu’s complaint. Plaintiff is a well-known photographer, and in the 1990s, he took pictures of Christopher Wallace, the rap artist known as “The Notorious B.I.G.,” including a photograph of Wallace in front of the World Trade Center (“the WTC photograph”). After Wallace died, his estate was probated in Bergen County, New Jersey, and Notorious B.I.G., LLC (“BIG”) is the successor-in-interest to Wallace’s estate. (Id. at ¶ 8). In 2006, Plaintiff copyrighted the WTC photograph of Wallace under registration number VAU690-814. Violetta Wallace, Faith Evans, Rick Barlowe, Wayne Barrow, and Tom Bennet, acting as agents for BIG, were “aware of this [2006] copyright, having licensed copyrighted material from [Plaintiff] CHI on multiple occasions,” including as recently as December 2018.

(Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff attempted to negotiate a licensing agreement that better reflected the profit that BIG earned from Plaintiff’s photographs, but “negotiations broke down.” (Id. at ¶ 26). BIG and its agents then “filed a malicious and baseless lawsuit” that “defamed CHI to ensure that he would not get any more work or projects,” not only for the WTC photograph but also for Plaintiff’s “entire catalog of copyrighted works.” (Id. at ¶ 27). This appears to be a reference to the trademark infringement suit, Notorious B.I.G., LLC v. Yes Snowboards, No. 2:19-CV-1946 (JAK) (C.D. Cal.), which BIG filed in March 2019, against Plaintiff, Yes Snowboards, and the Nidecker Group. In this still-pending action, BIG alleges that Plaintiff and his codefendants sold Biggie Snowboards, using words and images that infringed BIG’s trademarks. Plaintiff filed a counterclaim in that action, asserting causes of

action for defamation, unfair competition, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Notorious B.I.G., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-1946 (JAK) (C.D. Cal.) (ECF No. 21). In addition to bringing a counterclaim in the Central District of California against BIG, Plaintiff brought this separate suit against BIG and additional parties that he identifies as BIG’s agents (Violetta Wallace, Faith Evans, Rick Barlowe, Wayne Barrow, and Tom Bennet), Republic Merchandising, Inc., described as a “California entity,” and ByStorm Entertainment, described as a “New York record company.” Plaintiff asserts claims for defamation, unfair competition, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional interference with a contractual relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also makes passing references to federal trademark and copyright laws. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defamed him by falsely stating that he: (1) is a “usurper and parasite that attempt[s] to create profits through no WORK of his own”; and

(2) “intentionally and in bad faith gained access to a photograph,” even though Defendants knew that he had taken the photograph. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff invokes section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging that he and BIG are competitors and “operate in the same market.” (Id. at ¶ 38). He asserts that Defendants sued him for “not accepting an extorting offer to license CHI’s copyrighted material to BIG.” (Id. at ¶ 41). DISCUSSION A. Duplicative Suit in California Under the “first-filed rule,” where “there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority, absent the showing of balance of convenience or special circumstances giving priority to the second.” AEP Energy Svc. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., 626 F.3d 699, 722 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting First City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.

1989)). Deference to the first suit prevents courts from being “called upon to duplicate each other’s work in cases involving the same issues and the same parties.” Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197,1203 (2d Cir. 1970).

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Modu v. Notorious B.I.G. LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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