Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 522 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2021-07-21 11:32:25 DIVISION III Foxit PhantomPDF Version: No. CR-19-861 9.7.5
OPINION DELIVERED: NOVEMBER 18, 2020 MOCHARIEE KEWANNA WEST APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26CR-17-206] V. HONORABLE JOHN HOMER WRIGHT, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Mochariee Kewanna West was convicted in the Garland County Circuit Court of
manslaughter and robbery. On appeal, she argues that the circuit court erred in denying
her motion for directed verdict. We affirm.
I. Facts
West was charged by amended information with robbery, manslaughter, and
hindering apprehension or prosecution. The State alleged that on January 15, 2017, West,
acting with Malik Blevins and Quadryon Gipson, arranged to meet Dylan Carpenter and
steal marijuana from him. During the course of the robbery, Carpenter shot and killed
Gipson. West was alleged to have given false information to law enforcement during their
investigation.
At the jury trial held April 3 and 4, 2019, Hot Springs police officer Bryan Caldwell
testified that he was at work on the night of the shooting and was called to the scene after shots were fired at the Behind the Mall Cinema. While there, he was notified that a gunshot
victim had arrived at St. Vincent Hospital, and Officer Caldwell immediately went to the
hospital. He said that while at the hospital parking lot, he talked to Blevins and West. West
told him that she had been at the movie theater waiting in her vehicle to pick up her brother
when the incident took place, and she transported Gipson and Blevins to the hospital.
Officer Caldwell said that he took Blevins to the police department that night and that West
drove herself to the police department. He said that Blevins had a limp and that when
asked, Blevins said he has an old basketball injury. At the police department, Officer
Caldwell found that Blevins had been shot in the knee, and an ambulance was called to
evaluate him.
Kashmere Hall testified that she worked with Carpenter at Kroger from August 2016
to January 2017. She said that she had been friends with Gipson for years but that Carpenter
and Gipson did not know each other. At Carpenter’s request, she posted a picture of
Carpenter’s marijuana on Snapchat because Carpenter was looking for more people to buy
it. Gipson asked her who owned the marijuana, and she told him who owned it and how
much it would cost. Gipson asked her for Carpenter’s number, and she gave it to him. She
said that later, Gipson said he might take the marijuana from Carpenter instead of buying it.
She said she did not care at first “how it was gonna go.” She said that on the day of the
shooting, she called Gipson, and he told her he was going to buy it rather than steal it.
Malik Blevins testified that he had gone to high school with Gipson. In January
2017, Gipson texted him stating that he knew someone with a “lot of weed” and asked if
he wanted to “go take it.” Blevins told Gipson yes, and Gipson told him to find a female
2 “because we was gonna act like a female that was getting the weed.” Blevins then texted
West. Blevins testified,
Well, I had texted her and asked her if she would take me and [Gipson] to go take some weed from somebody. And so she came and picked me up and we went and got [Gipson] and went to the mall. And when we got to the mall, me and [Gipson] was talking about if we was gonna use the BB gun and stuff. And we decided no, we was just gonna beat him up and take it.
Blevins said that West’s brother, Donelle, was also in the car with them. He said that West
was driving, Donelle sat in the front passenger seat, Blevins sat in the back seat behind
Donelle, and Gipson sat in the back seat behind West. He said that he and Gipson had both
been texting Carpenter “like we was a female.” They had West call Carpenter and tell him
to meet them at the movie theater. Once they arrived in the theater parking lot, Carpenter
walked up to West’s window, and he was told to go to Blevins’s door on the back-passenger
side. Blevins said,
Well, I open my door and I leaned my legs out. And when I had leaned my legs out, [Gipson] had got out the car and walked around and that’s when I asked [Carpenter] to see the weed and that’s when [Gipson] reached for it and [Carpenter] shot.
Blevins said that after Carpenter shot Gipson, Carpenter ran back up to their car,
shot Blevins in the knee, and took off running. Blevins said that he got out of the car, put
Gipson in the car, and they took him to the hospital. When they arrived at the hospital,
people came out and took Gipson inside. Blevins did not tell anyone he had been injured,
and when he was questioned, he did not tell police the truth about what had happened. He
said that after he was taken to the police station to be interviewed, police realized he was
injured, and he was taken by ambulance to the hospital. He said that police kept his phone
that night. 3 On cross-examination, Blevins said that the BB gun they had in the car with them
must have fallen out of the car when he jumped out to get Gipson because they had decided
not to use it. He said that Gipson did not have the BB gun in his hand when Carpenter
shot him. He also said that the text from him to West about robbing someone came before
he asked her to pick them up so that they could go get some weed. He said that he and
West never had a conversation about her helping them rob someone.
During the course of the trial, a videotaped interview of West was admitted and
played for the jury. In the interview, West told police that she did not see what happened
at the theater parking lot and that she was there to pick up her brother from the movie. She
said she heard gunshots and saw somebody waving and saying they needed a ride to the
hospital. When the police interviewer told her that she needed to tell the truth and that he
already knew that Blevins and Gipson were in the car with her and had planned to meet
someone to sell him dope, West said that she did not see anything because she had her head
down and was on her phone while the incident occurred. She said she had picked Blevins
up near Walmart on Malvern Road and had picked Gipson up at his house. She said she
was only told that they were going to pick up some weed or “selling the weed.” She said,
“I just heard weed. That’s all I heard.”
After West was arrested, she was interviewed a second time, and that videotaped
interview was also played for the jury. In the second interview, West said that Blevins and
Gipson called her on a three-way call and asked her to take them to “get bud, but I really
didn’t know what it was. I just said yes ’cause I heard gas money. I’m not gonna turn down
no gas money.” She said she took her brother with her and picked them up. She said they
4 went to the movies and parked, then Carpenter came up to the truck. She said she did not
use Blevins’s phone to call Carpenter. Later in the interview, she admitted that she called
Carpenter and told him, “Hey, I’m at the movies.” However, she denied that she knew
Blevins and Gipson planned to rob Carpenter that night.
The State introduced a report from Sergeant Russ Rhodes of the Arkansas State
Police. Rhodes has been trained on downloading content from cell phones and other
electronic equipment. He was given three cell phones to download in this case—phones
belonging to Gipson, Blevins, and Carpenter. He prepared an extraction report of the
instant-message call logs and chats between Blevins and Gipson, and it was admitted into
evidence. He said that the two men discussed via text message a robbery to obtain
marijuana. Gipson explained via text that he had an application on his phone that made the
target believe he was talking to a female and that he needed a female driver. They discussed
whether the victim might be armed and whether to bring Gipson’s BB gun. A discussion
between the two on January 15, 2017, entailed whether to involve Kash, another woman,
or if West was on her way. When it was established via text that West was on the way,
Gipson instructed Blevins to have West call Carpenter and tell him her name was Kylie, to
say she was “almost there,” and to find out what car he was driving. Blevins texted back to
say that West just got off the phone with Carpenter.
Sergeant Rhodes also described chats between Blevins and West, and a second
exhibit was admitted that contained communication from Blevins’s phone. On January 12,
2017, Blevins sent West a message, “I’m about to rob somebody, though.” West responded,
“LMAO. Give me a minute.” Then she sent, “LMFAO. Who?” Blevins responded,
5 “Some little white boy.” Twelve to fourteen hours later, the next text between them is
from West, and she asked Blevins, “You get it?” On cross-examination, Rhodes testified
that it was his opinion that West could be asking about the robbery the night before.
Rhodes said that Blevins told West on January 12 that he was going to rob somebody.
Rhodes testified, “From that string forward, I didn’t see any text from [West] where she
asked who was going to be robbed, where they would get robbed, how they would get
robbed, and what they would get robbed of.”
After the State rested its case, the defense moved for a directed verdict, arguing that
the State did not prove West had knowledge that the robbery was going to take place. The
circuit court denied the motion. At the close of the trial, the jury returned with a guilty
verdict on both robbery and manslaughter. West was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment
for robbery and three years’ imprisonment for manslaughter, with the sentences to run
concurrently. This appeal timely followed.
II. Standard of Review
West argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict,
wherein she claimed that the State did not prove she had knowledge a robbery was going
to take place. A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence. Green v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 320, at 1–2, 601 S.W.3d 463, 465 (citing
Halliburton v. State, 2020 Ark. 101, 594 S.W.3d 856). In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a conviction if
substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient
6 force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or
the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. We do not weigh the evidence
presented at trial or assess the credibility of the witnesses because those are matters for the
finder of fact, which is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve
questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id. Further, circumstantial
evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the
defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id. Whether the
evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id.
III. Discussion
West argues the facts and contends that Blevins and Gipson approached her to take
them to a movie theater to “get some bud,” but she claims that they did not tell her about
their plan to rob Carpenter. She contends that Gipson had been communicating with
Carpenter via an application on his phone that allowed him to pretend to be a female.
When arranging the meeting with Carpenter, Gipson put West on the phone to tell
Carpenter where to meet. When they arrived at the parking lot, West was approached by
Carpenter, who asked if she was trying to buy some “weed.” She pointed to the back seat
as she was playing a game on her phone. She contends that she had her head down when
the events behind her took place.
West argues that the direct evidence of her involvement was Blevins’s testimony.
She asserts that Blevins denied West had any knowledge that a robbery was planned, and
the statement she gave to police also denied her involvement in a conspiracy to commit
robbery. Therefore, she claims the case against her was circumstantial.
7 West contends that the State mischaracterized the text messages between her and
Blevins, and the circuit court misunderstood them when it ruled on the motion for a
directed verdict. She argues that the first message between her and Blevins was on January
10, when Blevins asked, “You Kan (sic) take me to the house & I’ll give you gas money?”
She argues that this request is the key to understanding the next few exchanges. West
responded to Blevins, “You ready?” The next text is on January 12, when Blevins asked,
“You kall (sic) me lastnight (sic)?” West replied, “[Y]ea. I did for that 20 if you get it.”
She argues that she was asking for twenty dollars—the gas money mentioned on January 10.
Blevins replied that the “one” with the money got off work at 5:00 p.m. West asked for
assurance that she was going to get her money when she texted, “You still got me,” and
Blevins replied, “Yes Mam.” West then texted after 5:00 p.m., “You got that yet?” Blevins
replied, “Hell nah mane!! This n---- playing,” then, “I’m boatta rob somebody tho.” West
responded, “LMAO gimme a min.” When asked who he planned to rob, Blevins replied,
“Some lil white boy.”
On January 13 at 9:30 a.m., West asked, “You get it?” Blevins did not respond until
2:30 p.m., “My fault n---- my ass was bar’d & went to sleep!!1 But ask Djuan if they ever
got that last night.” West replied, “He said no dude was being scary.” West argues that
more texts were exchanged that afternoon regarding Blevins obtaining money for West. At
12:01 a.m. on January 14, West texted to Blevins, “U get it.” Blevins replied, “No n----
this n---- still bullsh----- n----! But N---- ain’t already got her!!” Around 2:00 a.m., West
1 Sergeant Rhodes testified that “bar’d” meant that he had taken a Xanax and fallen asleep. 8 texted, “Yeah, but it was for the gas so I can take her back tomorrow.” Around 4:00 p.m.,
West texted, “He still ain’t give it to you.” Blevins replied, “Mo . . . word to the 5 this n-
-- is playing w me dawg.” West contends that the conversations about the gas money ended
there. The texts on the day of the charged incident relate only to the logistics of picking
up Blevins; after he was in the car with West, they did not text anymore.
West contends that the State’s theory was that the text messages between her and
Blevins were discussions about a robbery, and West was asking Blevins if he had obtained
the marijuana. However, she argues that this theory overlooks the messages sent before
Blevins mentioned that he was going to rob someone. She claims that she was asking about
the gas money he had promised on January 10 and that she was not asking him about drugs.
She argues that she “didn’t seem to care” what the source of the funds were—from Blevins
himself, from him robbing a “lil white boy,” or getting it from someone else who had to
get it from his wife or girlfriend when she got off work—if it meant Blevins could finally
give her what she was owed. She argues that in the context of obtaining gas money, she
agreed to take Gipson and Blevins to get some “bud” because she heard there was gas
money.
Thus, she argues that the circumstantial evidence in this case is not consistent with
her guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. She claims that the only
reasonable conclusion is that the text messages show that she kept asking Blevins for the
money he had promised her on January 10. When that is added to the direct testimony of
the alleged accomplice, Blevins, that West did not know he and Gipson were going to
commit a robbery, and West’s statement to the police, there was not substantial evidence
9 that would compel a jury to reach a conclusion with reasonable certainty without resorting
to speculation that West had done any more than drive Blevins and Gipson to what she
thought was going to be a drug deal where she could finally get the money she had been
asking about for days.
We hold that substantial evidence supports West’s robbery conviction. West was an
active participant in, or an accomplice to, the robbery; thus, the circuit court did not err in
denying her directed-verdict motion. Review of the sufficiency of the evidence of West’s
accomplice liability begins with her concession on appeal that she voluntarily drove Blevins
and Gipson to the theater with the knowledge that she would be committing at least one
crime—to get marijuana. Her argument for reversal is limited to her lack of knowledge of
Blevins’s and Gipson’s plan to take the marijuana by force.
A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately after committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force
upon another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a) (Repl. 2013). A person is criminally
liable for the conduct of another person when he is the accomplice of another person in the
commission of an offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-402 (Repl. 2013); Davis v. State, 2013
Ark. App. 658, 430 S.W.3d 190. An accomplice is a person who, with the purpose of
promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, solicits, advises, encourages, or
coerces the other person to commit it; aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person
in planning or committing it; or having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the
10 offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403 (Repl. 2013);
Davis, supra.
When a theory of accomplice liability is implicated, we affirm the circuit court’s
order in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge if substantial evidence exists to show that
the defendant acted as an accomplice in the commission of the alleged offense. Price v. State,
2019 Ark. 323, at 5, 588 S.W.3d 1, 4–5 (citing Cook v. State, 350 Ark. 398, 86 S.W.3d 916
(2002)). We have said that there is no distinction between principals on the one hand and
accomplices on the other, insofar as criminal liability is concerned. Id. When two people
assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable
for the conduct of both. Id. One cannot disclaim accomplice liability simply because he or
she did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Id.
The presence of an accused in proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association
with a person involved in the crime are relevant facts in determining the connection of an
accomplice with the crime. Willis v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 199, at 3, 546 S.W.3d 550, 552
(citing Riley v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 613, 343 S.W.3d 327). Corroborating evidence need
not, however, be so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Smith v. State, 2012
Ark. App. 534, 423 S.W.3d 624. Rather, it need only, independently of the testimony of
the accomplice, tend in some degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the
crime. Procella v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 515, 504 S.W.3d 686.
West did not dispute that a robbery occurred. The jury heard testimony from Blevins
admitting that he and Gipson planned the robbery and enlisted West’s help in committing
it. The evidence was that on January 12, 2017, three days before the robbery, Blevins texted
11 West that he was planning to rob somebody, and on the day of the robbery, Blevins called
West and, as he testified, “asked her if she would take me and [Gipson] to go take some
weed from somebody.” Further, West told police that she had agreed to take Blevins and
Gipson to “get bud.”
On January 15, 2017, West and her brother picked up Blevins and Gipson and drove
to the theater parking lot in order to get the marijuana. Blevins and Gipson planned and
discussed the robbery from the back seat of West’s vehicle; the conversation included her
brother, who was in the front seat beside her. Part of the back-seat discussion was whether
to use a BB gun and the decision not to use it. Although she denied hearing the plan or
taking part in it, she told police that Blevins stated, “We just gonna take it.” When
Carpenter approached her vehicle, she directed him to talk to Blevins in the back seat.
Blevins and Gipson then robbed Carpenter of his marijuana.
Further, before the robbery, Blevins and Gipson used a smart-phone application to
lure Carpenter into believing that he was dealing with a female buyer. West aided in this
ruse not only by driving her car to meet Carpenter but also by talking to him on the phone
twice immediately before the robbery to complete arrangements to meet, including
changing the meeting place to avoid a police car that was behind her vehicle. After the
incident, West initially lied to police that she was not involved, telling two officers that she
was at the movie theater to pick up her brother and that she transported the two shooting
victims from the mall to the hospital. It is well settled that the acts, conduct, and declarations
of a defendant before or after the crime, including inconsistent statements to the police, may
12 be considered as corroborating evidence. E.g., MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d
676 (2006).
West’s argument that the text messages were mischaracterized by the prosecution
and misunderstood by the circuit court is a request for this court to reinterpret the substance
of the text messages in a light more favorable to her. This ignores that only evidence
supporting the verdict is to be considered on appeal. Green, supra. This court does not
reweigh the evidence presented at trial. Id. Accordingly, we hold that there was substantial
evidence presented to the jury to establish West as an accomplice to the robbery, and no
error was committed by the circuit court in denying West’s motion for a directed verdict.
Affirmed.
HIXSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Joseph C. Self, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.