M.J.S. v. C.S.S.

2025 Ohio 1062

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: 114151
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as M.J.S. v. C.S.S., 2025-Ohio-1062.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

M.J.S., :

Defendant-Appellant, : No. 114151 v. :

C.S.S., :

Plaintiff-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 27, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-15-359449

Appearances:

Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., and Nicole A. Cruz, for appellant.

Lisa A. Hahn, for appellee.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Appellant M.J.S. (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the trial court

finding him in contempt of court for failing to enroll his children in the Medina City

School District pursuant to the parties’ agreed judgment entry amending their

shared-parenting plan. He raises one assignment of error: The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by finding that the appellant was in contempt of the November 10, 2016 agreed judgment entry.

After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Appellee C.S.S. (“Mother”) and Father’s marriage was dissolved

pursuant to a judgment entry of dissolution filed December 2, 2015. Two children

were born as issue of the marriage. As a part of the dissolution, the parties entered

into a shared-parenting plan. Within this plan, Father was designated as the

residential parent for school purposes. The shared-parenting plan also stated that

if the parties could not agree regarding education-related matters, Father would

have final decision-making authority.

The shared-parenting plan was modified on November 10, 2016, via

agreed judgment entry (the “agreed judgment entry”). The entry stated that “the

children shall continue to attend school in the district Father resides.” At the time

of the agreed judgment entry, Father resided in the Medina City School District.

In August 2023, while still residing in the Medina City School District,

Father withdrew the children from the Medina City School District and began

homeschooling them; the children also received supplemental tutoring.

Mother filed a motion to show cause, arguing that Father had violated

the agreed judgment entry by withdrawing the children from the Medina City School District and homeschooling them instead. Mother also moved to modify the shared-

parenting plan.

Father filed a brief in opposition to the motion and moved to dismiss

the proceedings. He asserted that regardless of the agreed judgment entry, he

retained final decision-making authority regarding the children’s education.

In December 2023, the magistrate held a hearing on the motions,

where both Mother and Father appeared and testified.

The magistrate later issued a decision, granting Mother’s motion to

show cause and denying as moot Father’s motion to dismiss and Mother’s motion to

modify shared parenting. The magistrate found by clear and convincing evidence

that Father had violated the agreed judgment entry that stated that the children

“shall continue to attend school in the district Father resides.” The magistrate held

that this modified term restricted Father’s final decision-making authority

regarding the children’s education. The court further found that homeschooling

with tutor supplementation was not consistent with the terms of the agreed

judgment entry.

Father was found to be in contempt of court and sentenced to 30 days

in jail. The sentence was suspended, and Father was permitted to purge his

contempt by reenrolling the children back into the Medina City School District

within 15 days of the release of the magistrate’s decision.

Father filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the

magistrate incorrectly stated that the parties had intended in the agreed judgment entry for the children to “continue to attend” school in the school district in which

Father resided when, in reality, neither child had been old enough to attend school

at the time of the agreed judgment entry. In addition, Father asserted that the

children were enrolled in the Medina City School District but that they were exempt

from attending and were authorized to receive “home education.”

The court overruled Father’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s

decision. Father then filed the instant appeal.

II. Law and Analysis

In his sole assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court erred

as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it found that he was in contempt

of the November 10, 2016 agreed judgment entry.

“Contempt is defined as a disregard of, or disobedience to, an order or

command of judicial authority.” Palnik v. Crane, 2019-Ohio-3364, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.).

“The purpose of contempt proceedings is to secure the dignity of the courts and the

uninterrupted and unimpeded administration of justice.” Windham Bank v.

Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), paragraph two of the syllabus.

Contempt can be either direct or indirect. In re J.M., 2008-Ohio-

6763, ¶ 46 (12th Dist.). Direct contempt involves “misbehavior in the presence of or

so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice.” R.C. 2705.01.

Indirect contempt involves acts occurring outside the presence of the court that

demonstrate a lack of respect for the court or its lawful orders. R.C. 2705.02; In re

Lance, 2016-Ohio-2717, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). Contempt is further classified as either civil or criminal. Oak Hill

Banks v. Ison, 2003-Ohio-5547, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.). “This distinction depends largely

upon the character and purpose of the punishment imposed.” Id. Whereas criminal

contempt is solely punitive, civil contempt contemplates punishment that is

remedial or coercive and for the benefit of the complainant. Brown v. Executive

200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 253 (1980). Although a prison sentence may be

imposed in cases of civil contempt, the contemnor must be afforded the opportunity

to purge the contempt. Id. “‘Once the contemnor purges his contempt, any

sanctions will be discontinued because compliance has been achieved.’” In re Lance

at ¶ 13, quoting U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Golf Course Mgt., Inc., 2009-Ohio-2807,

¶ 16 (12th Dist.).

This case involves indirect civil contempt because the court

determined that Father violated a court order, imposed a suspended jail sentence,

and afforded Father an opportunity to purge the contempt. To establish civil

contempt, the complainant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the

existence of a valid court order, that the respondent had knowledge of the order, and

a violation of the order. In re K.B., 2012-Ohio-5507, ¶ 77 (8th Dist.). Once the prima

facie case of contempt has been established by clear and convincing evidence, the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to either rebut the initial showing of contempt

or establish an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. K.M.M. v.

A.J.T., 2021-Ohio-2452, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing Allen v. Allen, 2003-Ohio-954, ¶ 16

(10th Dist.). “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof . . .

which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to

the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus. However, the determination of contempt is within

the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 568, 573 (8th Dist. 1991). An abuse of

discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in

regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah,

2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

As a preliminary matter, Father first argues that the trial court

improperly determined that he violated the agreed judgment entry, while Mother’s

motion to show cause only asserted that he had violated the shared-parenting plan.

However, it does not appear that this issue was raised at the trial-court level, and

thus, was not properly presented for review in this appeal. A basic tenet of appellate

jurisdiction is that a party may not raise an argument on appeal that was not raised

below. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). “A party who fails to

raise an issue in the trial court waives the right to raise it on appeal.” Rimmer v.

CitiFinancial, Inc., 2020-Ohio-99, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.), citing Harding Pointe, Inc. v.

Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013-Ohio-4885, ¶ 43 (10th Dist.).

Turning to the prima facie case of contempt, there is no dispute that a

court order existed, to wit: the agreed judgment entry that amended the parties’

shared-parenting plan. There also does not appear to be any argument that Father was unaware of this order. Father testified that he was aware of “the prior order”

that stated that the children were to “continue to attend school” in the district in

which he resided. Accordingly, the only question to be determined is whether the

court abused its discretion in determining that there was clear and convincing

evidence that Father violated the agreed judgment entry.

“Ohio provides a home education exception to the requirement of

compulsory school attendance which recognizes the rights of parents to educate

their children at home.” Gatchel v. Gatchel, 2005-Ohio-148, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), citing

R.C. 3321.04(A)(2). The statute requires that the parent(s) obtain an excuse from

compulsory school attendance from the superintendent of the school district in

which the child resides. “The right of parents to educate their children at home is

qualified and subject to reasonable government regulations designed to [e]nsure

that minimum standards of education prescribed by the State are met, consistent

with the State’s compelling interest in [en]suring that all of its citizens receive a

quality basic education.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing State v. Schmidt, 29 Ohio St.3d 32 (1987).

Father argues that since the children were homeschooled within the

Medina City School District, he was in compliance with the agreed judgment entry.

We note that the agreed judgment entry does not specify whether the children are

to attend in-person school within the Medina City School District or if

homeschooling is permitted. As this court has noted:

“A trial court cannot impose contempt sanctions on a party if the party cannot know whether or not its actions violate the trial court’s order. Merely because the trial court knew what its order meant does not mean the parties knew what the order meant.” Contos v. Monroe Cty., 2004-Ohio-6380, ¶ 24 (7th Dist.). “Thus, although general arguments that the alleged contemnor lacked intent or misunderstood the court order are invalid defenses, where the trial court’s order is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, contempt is not the proper remedy.” Rohr v. Williams, 2007-Ohio-7207, ¶ 38 (7th Dist.).

(Emphasis in original.) Perkins v. Gorski, 2013-Ohio-265, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

This matter involves an agreed judgment entry that amended the

parties’ shared-parenting plan. “An agreed judgment entry is a contract that is

reduced to judgment by a court.” Sovak v. Spivey, 2003-Ohio-6717, ¶ 25 (7th Dist.),

citing Spercel v. Sterling Indus., Inc., 31 Ohio St.2d 36, 39 (1972). We, therefore,

apply the same rules of construction to an agreed judgment entry as we apply to

contracts. Dvorak v. Petronzio, 2007-Ohio-4957, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.), quoting Phillips

v. Phillips, 2007-Ohio-3368, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.). (“‘[A]n agreed judgment entry is

subject to the same rules of construction as a contract.’”)

In interpreting contracts, the court’s role is “to give effect to the intent

of the parties to the agreement.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 11,

citing Hamilton Ins. Servs. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 86 Ohio St.3d 270, 273 (1999).

Where the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, we may determine the parties’

rights and obligations from the plain language of the contract. Aultman Hosp. Assn.

v. Community Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ohio St.3d 51, 53 (1989). The interpretation of a

written contract is a matter of law. Saunders v. Mortensen, 2004-Ohio-24, ¶ 9.

The magistrate’s decision, which was adopted by the trial court,

erroneously stated that the children were attending elementary school within the Medina City School District at the time of the agreed judgment entry. As Father and

Mother both acknowledge, at the time of the agreed judgment entry, the children

had not yet reached kindergarten age and were therefore not attending school. It is

unclear why the parties stated in the agreed judgment entry that the children would

“continue to attend” school in the school district Father resides when they had not

yet started attending school.

Mother’s motion to show cause asserted that the children were to

“attend the school in the school system where [Father] resides”; however, the agreed

judgment entry did not mention “the school system.” Mother has essentially

advocated for what she would like the agreed judgment entry to mean today (that

the children should continue to attend the in-person public school that they had

been attending since kindergarten); however, there was no evidence presented as to

the intent of the parties at the time of the negotiation of the agreed judgment entry

— before the children began attending school.

Beyond the geographical limitation of the “school district Father

resides,” the agreed judgment entry is silent as to any parameters regarding the type

of school the children could attend. It does not specify whether the children could

be homeschooled within the Medina City School District or whether they were to

attend school in person. While it does seem apparent that at least Mother meant

“in-person school” in agreeing to that provision, we cannot say that the language of

the agreed judgment entry was clear enough to find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that Father violated the provision by homeschooling the children. We conclude that the parties’ use of the words “attend school in the

district Father resides,” without further specificity, was subject to dual

interpretations and, therefore, ambiguous. Accordingly, the trial court abused its

discretion in finding Father in contempt of the November 10, 2016 agreed judgment

entry.

Judgment reversed.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)