Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 12, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-03879-LLS
StatusUnknown

This text of Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District (Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JASMINE MITCHELL, on behalf of J.C.M., Plaintiff, 19-CV-3879 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND CITY OF POUGHKEEPSIE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant failed to provide her minor child (“JC”) with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. By order dated June 17, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff asserts that JC is a child on the autism spectrum. She alleges that the Defendant failed to conduct the necessary assessments and evaluations to identify him as a student with a

disability. Defendant failed to provide JC with the appropriate services and supports, therefore denying him a FAPE in violation of the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “mistreated, neglected, and discriminated against” JC. (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff and JC have both experienced mental and emotional stress. Plaintiff also alleges that JC was injured while on school property, although she provides no additional details. Plaintiff seeks $64,000 in lost wages, $2 million for her stress and $2 million for JC’s stress, $32,000 for obtaining transportation, $5,000 for relocation expenses, and $600,000 for current and future educational expenses. DISCUSSION A. Claims on behalf of JC Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of her son, JC. A parent, however, cannot proceed pro se to litigate a child’s claim under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, or § 1983. See Fauconier v. Comm. on Special Educ., Dist. 3, New York City Bd. of Educ., 112 F. App’x. 85 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t

is not in the interests of minors or incompetents that they be represented by non-attorneys. Where they have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected.”). Plaintiff may, however, pursue claims pro se on her own behalf under the IDEA because the IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007) (“We instead interpret the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean what they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims that she brings on behalf of JC. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Exhaustion of administrative remedies under IDEA Parents are required to exhaust state hearing and review procedures before bringing an

action in state or federal court under the IDEA. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). The exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the remedy that a plaintiff seeks, Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 488 (2d Cir. 2002), and applies to all of a plaintiff’s federal causes of action regardless of their statutory bases, Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983 claims due to plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies under IDEA). To exhaust administrative remedies in New York, a parent must first pursue his or her claim in a due process hearing before an Impartial Hearing Office (“IHO”), N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1), and may appeal an adverse ruling to a State Review Officer (“SRO”), id. § 4404(2). Either party may then seek review of the SRO’s decision in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 503 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2007)

(prospective plaintiffs must await a “final” agency decision before they have the right to sue). The federal action must be filed within four months of the date the SRO’s decision “becomes final and binding on the parties.” N.Y. Educ. Law. § 4404(3). Plaintiff does not allege that she has exhausted her administrative remedies.

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Related

Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City School District
503 F.3d 198 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Honig v. Doe
484 U.S. 305 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Cave v. East Meadow Union Free School District
514 F.3d 240 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Ziglar v. Abbasi
582 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Turkmen v. Hasty
789 F.3d 218 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Mitchell v. City of Poughkeepsie School District, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mitchell-v-city-of-poughkeepsie-school-district-nysd-2019.