Mitchell v. City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 22, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-04348
StatusUnknown

This text of Mitchell v. City of New York (Mitchell v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mitchell v. City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KAREEM MITCHELL, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-4348 (LTS) CITY OF NEW YORK; LOUIS MOLINA, ORDER TO AMEND COMMISSIONER; LYNELLE LIDDIE, FIRST DEPUTY COMMISSIONER; KAT THOMSON, CHIEF OF STAFF, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Elmira Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights at Rikers Island. By order dated May 25, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Taking all of these standards together, courts liberally construe pleadings prepared by pro se litigants and hold them “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings Section 1983 claims against Defendants for allegedly failing to protect him while he was detained at Rikers Island. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Named as Defendants are the City of New York; Louis Molina, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”); Lynelle Liddie, the First Deputy Commissioner of the DOC; and Kat Thomson, the

Chief of Staff of the DOC. (Id. at 3.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: I was placed in unit:3-Main Building #5 (A.M.K.C) In April by the Department of Corrections. On April 20, 2022 I was assaulted by a gang known to the D.O.C as the trinidos. I was assaulted because I was a black detainee. On said date I was cut on my back & stabbed a few times for about ten minutes. D.O.C officers did nothing in they’re power to make sure I was safe. On April 22, 2022 I was then placed in unit: Quad #4 upper building #5 (A.M.K.C) In which time another gang known to the D.O.C as the Mac Ballers. They also Jumped me & Cut me in the face for about 7 minutes. The Department of Corrections and their staff again did nothing to make sure I was safe. D.O.C staff are trained in inmate on inmate fights but in both situations failed to secure my safety. (Id. at 4.)2 In the section of the form complaint that asks Plaintiff to describe his injuries, Plaintiff writes: On April 20, 2022 I was stabbed twice & cut on my back three times with a razor. I was taken to an area hospital treatment was #24 sutures & Glue to my back. On April 22, 2022 I was cut in the face over my left eye an taken to Rikers Island area west facility for glue to close the cut. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages and would like the court to order retraining for all DOC staff. (Id.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right

2 The Court quotes the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar are as in the original. secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Claims Against Commissioner Molina and the City of New York The complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff is suing Commissioner Molina in his

personal capacity because he does not allege facts showing Molina’s direct and personal involvement in violating his constitutional rights. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Bluebook (online)
Mitchell v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mitchell-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-2023.