Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board

529 A.2d 585, 108 Pa. Commw. 113, 1987 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2343
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 30, 1987
DocketAppeals, Nos. 981 C.D. 1986 and 982 C.D. 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 529 A.2d 585 (Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board, 529 A.2d 585, 108 Pa. Commw. 113, 1987 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2343 (Pa. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judge Doyle,

These consolidated appeals arise out of the attempts by Mitchell Energy Corporation (MEC) to place an injection well in Summerhill Township (Township), Pennsylvania. MEC is a corporation engaged in exploration, drilling and production of oil and natural gas. It operates seventy-nine oil and gas wells in the Township, on land it either owns or leases.

On May 11, 1984, MEC applied for a zoning permit to install an injection well in the Township. An injection well is one used to inject brine into the ground.1 In this case the well would have been used to inject brine extracted from oil and gas. wells operating in the area, with the injection of brine into the ground from this well taking place at depths ranging between 7,286 feet and 7,326 feet and between 7,764 feet and 7,848 feet. At the site of the injection well, there would also, be a shed containing pumping equipment, two 42,000-gallon settling tanks and one 4,200-gallon skim oil tank, and a 7,500-gallon concrete pit, on 505 acres MEC owned in the Township. On May 12, 1984, the Township zoning officer denied the permit.

MEC appealed the denial to the Township Zoning Hearing Board (Board). MEC contended in front of the Board that the injection well was a permitted use in an [116]*116R-l district under Section 502.13 of the Township Zoning Ordinances.2 Section 502.13 provides:

Recovery of Subsurface Gas And Oil Deposits. All activities associated with the recovery of subsurface gas and oil deposits are permitted in all zoning districts, except the Flood Hazard Overlay District (in which district they are prohibited), subject to the following requirements.
a. All structures including wellhead casings shall comply with the yard requirements established for the zoning district in which they are located. A zoning permit shall be obtained before any activity is begun at a site.
b. The gas and oil well casing and tank structures normally used in drilling and recovery operations shall be a minimum of 200 feet from any habitable building, whether a residence, a commercial or an institutional building, and shall be a minimum of 100 feet from a stream with year-round flow.
c. The recovery of subsurface gas and oil deposits shall be conducted in such a way that brines, drilling muds and other refuse, which because of its chemical content may be injurious to the natural environment, resulting from the recovery operations shall not be deposited in the natural environment in a manner which would violate the states Clean Streams and Erosion Control legislation. The township is aware that any enforcement of this provision must he coordinated with PennDER which, in fact, is obliged to handle the enforcement. (Emphasis added.)

[117]*117On August 21, 1984, the Board, by a 3-2 vote, denied MECs appeal. The Board interpreted Section 502.13 as extending “no further than the actual extraction of gas and oil” and “not to extend to sanction the permanent storage of waste generated elsewhere.” The Board further opined that Section 502.13 may allow the disposal of brine generated by an oil or gas well, but only on the property where the brine is generated.3 MEC then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County.

Meanwhile, on September 27, 1984, MEC tried to gain municipal approval of the injection well by filing an application with the Township Board of Supervisors (Supervisors) for a conditional use permit under Sections 8004 and 8025 of the Township Zoning Ordinance. [118]*118After a hearing, the Supervisors rejected MECs application. The Supervisors first held that their power to issue a conditional use permit was limited only to those conditional uses listed in Section 504.2 of the Township [119]*119Zoning Ordinance.6 The Supervisors further found that the injection well was not harmonious with the character of the R-l district and that the well constituted a solid waste disposal facility that did not comply with the [120]*120provision of the Township Zoning Ordinance7 regulating such facilities.8 Accordingly, the Supervisors denied the permit and MEC again appealed to the court of common pleas.

[121]*121The court consolidated MECs appeals and rendered its decision without taking additional evidence. The trial court upheld the Boards interpretation of Section 502.13 and ruled that the injection well was not a permitted use in the Townships R-l district. In the appeal from the denial of the conditional use permit, the court agreed with MECs contention that Section 800 gives the Supervisors discretion to grant conditional uses beyond those enumerated in Section 504.2, provided that the use is not specifically forbidden by Section 502.9.9 [122]*122The court found, however, that the injection well was not harmonious with an R-l district and that the well constituted a solid waste disposal facility. Since solid waste disposal facilities are permitted as a conditional use in an A-l (Agricultural) district by the Township Zoning Ordinance, the court found that the use was excluded by implication from the R-l district. This appeal followed.10

MEC’s first contention is that an injection well is a permitted use in an R-l zone because it is one associated with the recovery of natural gas and oil. We agree. In interpreting provisions of a zoning ordinance, undefined terms, such as the word “associated” in this case, must be given their plain, ordinary meaning. Appeal of Mount Laurel Racing Association, 73 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 531, 458 A.2d 1043 (1983). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the term “associate” to mean: “1: closely connected, joined or united with another (as in interest, function, activity, or office); sharing in responsibility or authority. ... 2: closely related in the mind.” Id. at 132 (1961). And it is clear that absent a limiting legislative definition, a term permitting a use must be presumed to have been employed in its broadest sense. R. Anderson, Law of Zoning in Pennsylvania §15.05 (1982). Moreover, words in a zoning ordinance should be given their common meanings, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the landowner. Abington Township v. Dunkin Donuts [123]*123Franchising Corp., 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 399, 291 A.2d 322 (1972). See also Gilden Appeal, 406 Pa. 484, 178 A.2d 562 (1962).

We have also stated that when appropriate definitions are lacking, we will not attach strained meanings to the words used or find a prohibition by implication. Appeal of Mount Laurel Racing Association. Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that, in construing zoning ordinances, to permit the widest use of land is the rule and not the exception, unless the use is specifically restrained in a valid and reasonable exercise of the police power.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Valley Forge Plaza Associates v. Upper Merion Township Zoning Hearing Board
596 A.2d 1201 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1991)
Appeal of R.C. Maxwell Co. from Decision of Warminster Township Zoning Hearing Board
548 A.2d 1300 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)
Mitchell En. C. v. Zhb, Summerhill T.
529 A.2d 585 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
529 A.2d 585, 108 Pa. Commw. 113, 1987 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mitchell-energy-corp-v-zoning-hearing-board-pacommwct-1987.