Missouri Pacific Railroad v. United States

271 U.S. 603, 46 S. Ct. 598, 70 L. Ed. 1109, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 914
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJune 7, 1926
Docket280
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 271 U.S. 603 (Missouri Pacific Railroad v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. United States, 271 U.S. 603, 46 S. Ct. 598, 70 L. Ed. 1109, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 914 (1926).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Sutherland

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant operates and, since June, 1917, has operated, a system of railroads which includes a number of land-grant lines in Missouri and other states. These lines received land grants in aid of their construction and are bound to carry the United States mails, under the provisions of land-grant acts, passed in 1852 and 1853, § 6, c. 45, 10 Stat. 8, 10; § 6, c. 59, 10 Stat. 155, 156, both of which provide that the United States mails shall be transported on the railroads receiving the grants at all times “ under the direction of the Post-Office Department, at such price as Congress may by law direct.”

By the Act of July 28, 1916, § 5, c. 261, 39 Stat. 412, 425-431, the Interstate Commerce Commission was directed “ to fix and determine from time to time the fair ■and reasonable rates and compensation for the transportation of . . . mail matter by railway common carriers and the service connected therewith, prescribing the method or methods by weight, or space, or both, or otherwise, for ascertaining such rate or compensation, 7 . .”

In respect of land-grant lines, the act provides:

“ The Interstate Commerce Commission shall allow to railroad companies whose railroads were constructed in *605 whole or in part by a- land grant made by Congress on condition that the mails should be transported over their roads at such price as Congress should by law direct only eighty per centum of the compensation paid other railroads for transporting the mails and all service by the railroads in connection therewith.”

The act confers upon the Postmaster General the power .to state railroad mail routes and authorizes mail service thereon of four classes, the first two of which are: (1) full railway post-office car service, (2) apartment railway post-office car .service. For the first class, service is to be “ by cars forty feet or more in length, constructed, fitted up, and maintained for the distribution of mails on trains.” For the second class, the service is the same “ by apartments less than forty feet in length,” etc. The servicé is to include the carriage of mail matter, equipment, and supplies for the mail service and the employees of the Postal Service or Post Office Department, as the Postmaster General shall direct to be carried. AH cars and parts of cars used for the service are to be of such construction, style, length, and chrracter, and furnished in such manner as the Postmaster General shall require, and are to be constructed, fitted up, maintained, heated, lighted, and cleaned by and at the expense of the railroad companies. The railroad companies are required to furnish all necessary facilities for caring for and handling the mails while in their.custody.- Thé act further provides that all railway common carriers are required to transport such mail matter as may be offered for transportation, etc., and shall be entitled to receive fair and reasonable compensation “ for such transportation and for the service connected therewith.”

The Interstate Commerce Commission, after a hearing, made an exhaustive report and determined that mail should be carried upon the basis of space, instead of weight. Upon that basis, the Commission fixed rates for *606 all services required to be performed by the act and declared that the land-grant railroads were entitled to eighty per cent, thereof under the law. It was urged before the Commission on behalf of these railroads that this provision of the law “ should not apply to the distributing space in R. P. O. and apartment cars, because the service of carrying distributing facilities cannot properly be construed as transportation of the mails as defined in the law.” But the Commission held otherwise. Railway-Mail Pay, 56 I. C. C. 1, 77. Thereupon, appellant filed its petition in the court below alleging the facts and praying judgment against the United States for $189,880.54 as compensation for the use of the distributing space upon the same ground as that urged before the Commission. The amount of the demand was arrived at by separating the car space said to be used for mail distributing purposes from the space devoted to storage purposes, and adding twenty per cent, to that portion of the eighty per cent, allowance which was claimed to be assignable to the distributing space. The Court of Claims sustained a demurrer to the petition and entered judgment of dismissal. 59 C. Cls. 524; 60 C. Cls. 183.

That the Commission is authorized by the act of 1916 to fix rates for the transportation of the mails, that the rates fixed by the Commission are reasonable, and that Congress has plenary power to determine the price at which the land-grant roads shall transport the mail, are propositions, which are not here in dispute. The contention is that this power does not enable Congress to fix the pay of the land-grant roads for furnishing distributing space and facilities; but That these items under the requirement of the land-grant acts are separable from and in addition to transportation, and should be paid for at the same rates accorded other railroads.

Unmistakably, the act of 1916 authorized the Commission to do precisely what it did, namely, to determine the *607 fair and reasonable rates and compensation to be paid, ■upon a space-basis, for the transportation of mail matter “ and the service connected therewith ”; and, thereupon, to allow the land-grant roads eighty per cent, of those rates and compensation for like transportation and all service ... in connection therewith.” It would do manifest violence to these plain words to say that Congress intended, in the one case, that the Commission should fix the compensation to be paid railroáds generally for transportation, including service connected therewith, but did not intend, in the other case, although it used almost the same words, that eighty per cent, of that compensation, and no more, should be allowed the land-grant roads for like transportation and service.

But, it is urged that thus to construe the act of 1916 is to enlarge the authority of Congress under the land-grant" acts so as to permit that body to require the land-grant roads, without compensation, to perform service ,in addition to that embraced within the word “ transportation.” It is said that railway postal cars originated after the passage of the land-grant acts. But it does not follow that such cars are not fairly within the meaning of those acts as essentially incident to transportation. The provision reaches into the future; and, while its meaning does not change, its application may well embrace new conditions and new instrumentalities which come within the scope of the terms employed. This is in accordance with the universal law of language. In a sense, words do not change their meaning; but the application of words grows and expands with the growth, and expansion of society. Compare South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 448-449.

To transport any article involves, as a necessary incident, furnishing facilities for its transportation; and the character and extent of these facilities will depend upon the nature of the thing transported.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
271 U.S. 603, 46 S. Ct. 598, 70 L. Ed. 1109, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 914, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/missouri-pacific-railroad-v-united-states-scotus-1926.