GREEN, Chief Justice.
This suit involves a perishable freight loss and damage claim arising out of a carlot interstate shipment of lettuce. The fact that the shipment was damaged in transit through negligence of the carriers is not in dispute on this appeal. Appellant’s two points allege error in the trial court not entering judgment for the appellant due to the failure of the appellee to meet its burden of proving fair market value of the lettuce at destination at the time and in the condition in which the shipment (1) actually arrived, and (2) should have arrived if properly transported.
It is agreed that the measure of damages in such a claim is the difference between the [428]*428market value at destination of the commodity had it arrived in the condition it should have been if properly transported, and the market value at destination of the commodity in the condition it actually was delivered, not to exceed indemnity for actual loss; and the burden is on the shipper to show such difference by a preponderance of the evidence. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. H. Rouw Company, Fifth Cir., 258 F.2d 445, cert. den., 358 U.S. 929, 79 S.Ct. 315, 3 L.Ed.2d 302; 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 255Z(2), p. 572, et seq. The cited case holds that, while the general rule is as stated, it is subject to qualifications depending on the fact situation; and the trial court’s judgment was reversed because it failed to take into account items of necessary expense, including selling expenses, in arriving at the true actual loss.
An important defect in appellee’s testimony on value is that he relies on inconsistent and conflicting theories to establish the market value of the commodity in the condition in which the produce did reach destination, and the value in which it should have got there if properly transported. For the former, he introduced evidence that ap-pellee actually received $1,056.00 from the consignee, after allowing consignee $800.00 off of the F.O.B. Pharr, Texas, purchase price due to the damage, and a stipulation that the consignee, if present in court, would testify that the price received for the commodity was the reasonable market value of that commodity at the time and in its condition upon arrival at destination. It will be noticed that the stipulation does not say by whom the price should be received, and each party places a different interpretation on that language, appellee contending it means the price received by him for the sale, and the appellant construing it to mean the price received by consignee on resale at destination. There was no evidence of consignee’s sales, or any prices received by him.
This being an F.O.B. sale at Pharr, Texas, with appellee not liable to pay any freight charges or other expenses after the car was loaded at Pharr, and there being no evidence of what such freight and other expenses amounted to, if we accept ap-pellee’s construction of the stipulation as correct, and hold the evidence above mentioned sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of $1056.00 as the value of the shipment as it arrived at destination, we are permitting appellee a market value at destination which does not include expenses that, according to appellee’s own witness, Palmer, necessarily are included within the value of the produce at destination.
On the other hand, the evidence on which appellee depended to establish market value at destination of’ the produce in the condition it should have arrived if properly transported did include the freight charges, which appellee did not pay, and was not liable to pay, and selling expenses which appellee did not incur. It was to appellee’s benefit to secure a low finding on value as the shipment did arrive, and a high finding on value as the shipment should have arrived, in order that the difference would fully cover his alleged- loss. As evidence of this last mentioned value, appellee placed in evidence a copy of the U. S. Department of Agriculture Philadelphia (destination point) Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Daily Market Report for February 8, 1960, (date of arrival) which gave the following quotation for Texas lettuce received on the wholesale market to 9:30 A.M. in less than carlot or truck loads: “Texas 24S ord-fair qual. cond. 4.00-4.50 poor 3.00”. Such market reports are admissible as evidence of value, when they are relevant to the facts. Art. 3731, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Tex.St.; Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. John B. Hardwicke Co., Tex.Civ.App., 380 S.W.2d 706; Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Duncan, Tex.Civ.App., 353 S.W.2d 315; 23 Tex.Jur.2d Evidence, § 321, p. 463. Upon the basis of such report Palmer, appellee’s office manager and salesman, testified that lettuce of the grade and condition as was in this ship[429]*429ment should have brought four to four and a half, or five dollars even, because the market report quotation was based on ordinary to fair quality.
But on cross-examination, Palmer admitted that the market quotations he had used could not be compared with the F. O. B. sale for several reasons. He said that freight charges were included in both his opinion and the market report, although ap-pellee was not liable for and did not pay them. He testified that the quotations in the market report included selling expenses, particularly a 10% commission, which was not true as to the F. O. B. sale. The quotations in the market report used as a basis for Palmer's values were for sales in less than carlot quantities. The F.O.B. sale was for a carlot quantity, and Palmer stated that as a general rule the price for produce bought in carlot quantities is lower. According to Palmer’s testimony, comparing F.O.B. sale with the values as quoted in the market report was like comparing an apple with a banana.
Obviously, $1056.00 could not be the market value of the lettuce as it actually arrived at destination if the same standard is applied to the term market value as appellee set in introducing in evidence the market report which included the matter of freight charges (amount not proved) and other expenses ; such figure would be more, though we are unable to state how much. On the other hand, if we find that the value at destination of the shipment in the condition in which it should have arrived is to be fixed by some standard that does not include the fixed, unproved expenses named, as ap-pellee would calculate the “as it did arrive” market value, there is no evidence by which such value could be calculated. There is not any consistent, probative evidence in the record by which the court, on consistent jury findings, could determine the difference between the reasonable market value of the shipment at destination in the condition that it should have arrived if properly transported, and such market value of the shipment as it did arrive.
The stipulation as to what consignee would testify as to value of the shipment as it did arrive relied on by appellee must be construed consistently with the rule of measure of damages as declared in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. H. Rouw Company, Fifth Cir., supra. The F.O.B.
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GREEN, Chief Justice.
This suit involves a perishable freight loss and damage claim arising out of a carlot interstate shipment of lettuce. The fact that the shipment was damaged in transit through negligence of the carriers is not in dispute on this appeal. Appellant’s two points allege error in the trial court not entering judgment for the appellant due to the failure of the appellee to meet its burden of proving fair market value of the lettuce at destination at the time and in the condition in which the shipment (1) actually arrived, and (2) should have arrived if properly transported.
It is agreed that the measure of damages in such a claim is the difference between the [428]*428market value at destination of the commodity had it arrived in the condition it should have been if properly transported, and the market value at destination of the commodity in the condition it actually was delivered, not to exceed indemnity for actual loss; and the burden is on the shipper to show such difference by a preponderance of the evidence. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. H. Rouw Company, Fifth Cir., 258 F.2d 445, cert. den., 358 U.S. 929, 79 S.Ct. 315, 3 L.Ed.2d 302; 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 255Z(2), p. 572, et seq. The cited case holds that, while the general rule is as stated, it is subject to qualifications depending on the fact situation; and the trial court’s judgment was reversed because it failed to take into account items of necessary expense, including selling expenses, in arriving at the true actual loss.
An important defect in appellee’s testimony on value is that he relies on inconsistent and conflicting theories to establish the market value of the commodity in the condition in which the produce did reach destination, and the value in which it should have got there if properly transported. For the former, he introduced evidence that ap-pellee actually received $1,056.00 from the consignee, after allowing consignee $800.00 off of the F.O.B. Pharr, Texas, purchase price due to the damage, and a stipulation that the consignee, if present in court, would testify that the price received for the commodity was the reasonable market value of that commodity at the time and in its condition upon arrival at destination. It will be noticed that the stipulation does not say by whom the price should be received, and each party places a different interpretation on that language, appellee contending it means the price received by him for the sale, and the appellant construing it to mean the price received by consignee on resale at destination. There was no evidence of consignee’s sales, or any prices received by him.
This being an F.O.B. sale at Pharr, Texas, with appellee not liable to pay any freight charges or other expenses after the car was loaded at Pharr, and there being no evidence of what such freight and other expenses amounted to, if we accept ap-pellee’s construction of the stipulation as correct, and hold the evidence above mentioned sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of $1056.00 as the value of the shipment as it arrived at destination, we are permitting appellee a market value at destination which does not include expenses that, according to appellee’s own witness, Palmer, necessarily are included within the value of the produce at destination.
On the other hand, the evidence on which appellee depended to establish market value at destination of’ the produce in the condition it should have arrived if properly transported did include the freight charges, which appellee did not pay, and was not liable to pay, and selling expenses which appellee did not incur. It was to appellee’s benefit to secure a low finding on value as the shipment did arrive, and a high finding on value as the shipment should have arrived, in order that the difference would fully cover his alleged- loss. As evidence of this last mentioned value, appellee placed in evidence a copy of the U. S. Department of Agriculture Philadelphia (destination point) Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Daily Market Report for February 8, 1960, (date of arrival) which gave the following quotation for Texas lettuce received on the wholesale market to 9:30 A.M. in less than carlot or truck loads: “Texas 24S ord-fair qual. cond. 4.00-4.50 poor 3.00”. Such market reports are admissible as evidence of value, when they are relevant to the facts. Art. 3731, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Tex.St.; Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. John B. Hardwicke Co., Tex.Civ.App., 380 S.W.2d 706; Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Duncan, Tex.Civ.App., 353 S.W.2d 315; 23 Tex.Jur.2d Evidence, § 321, p. 463. Upon the basis of such report Palmer, appellee’s office manager and salesman, testified that lettuce of the grade and condition as was in this ship[429]*429ment should have brought four to four and a half, or five dollars even, because the market report quotation was based on ordinary to fair quality.
But on cross-examination, Palmer admitted that the market quotations he had used could not be compared with the F. O. B. sale for several reasons. He said that freight charges were included in both his opinion and the market report, although ap-pellee was not liable for and did not pay them. He testified that the quotations in the market report included selling expenses, particularly a 10% commission, which was not true as to the F. O. B. sale. The quotations in the market report used as a basis for Palmer's values were for sales in less than carlot quantities. The F.O.B. sale was for a carlot quantity, and Palmer stated that as a general rule the price for produce bought in carlot quantities is lower. According to Palmer’s testimony, comparing F.O.B. sale with the values as quoted in the market report was like comparing an apple with a banana.
Obviously, $1056.00 could not be the market value of the lettuce as it actually arrived at destination if the same standard is applied to the term market value as appellee set in introducing in evidence the market report which included the matter of freight charges (amount not proved) and other expenses ; such figure would be more, though we are unable to state how much. On the other hand, if we find that the value at destination of the shipment in the condition in which it should have arrived is to be fixed by some standard that does not include the fixed, unproved expenses named, as ap-pellee would calculate the “as it did arrive” market value, there is no evidence by which such value could be calculated. There is not any consistent, probative evidence in the record by which the court, on consistent jury findings, could determine the difference between the reasonable market value of the shipment at destination in the condition that it should have arrived if properly transported, and such market value of the shipment as it did arrive.
The stipulation as to what consignee would testify as to value of the shipment as it did arrive relied on by appellee must be construed consistently with the rule of measure of damages as declared in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. H. Rouw Company, Fifth Cir., supra. The F.O.B. selling price at point of origin, which resulted from a private sale between consignor and consignee, of which appellant in so far as the record reflects, had no notice, and which did not include freight and selling expenses, cannot be compared with the market report at destination which, according to Palmer’s testimony, did include them, especially where there is no evidence of the amount of such expenses, and such F.O.B. price is not admissible as evidence of such value. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Duncan, supra.
Since the $1056.00 received by shipper from consignee was based on the Pharr, Texas, selling price less the $800.00 allowance privately agreed upon by appellee and consignee, and included no freight charges or selling expenses, it could not constitute evidence of the market value of the produce as it arrived at destination, and we feel confident that the parties, in entering into the stipulation, did not intend that it should constitute such evidence. Appellant’s contention as to the meaning of the stipulation is consistent with the market value at destination rule, while appellee’s contention is not.
We find that the stipulation of the parties was not applicable to the testimony offered by appellee concerning the value as the shipment did arrive, and sustain appellant’s first point.
In addition to other portions of Palmer’s testimony, we call attention to his evidence that the market report was concerned only with sales in less than carlot shipments, and that as to carlot shipments, the prices were generally lower. We do not believe the report was relevant to the shipment in question and Palmer’s opinion based thereon has [430]*430no probative value. Appellant’s second point is sustained.
Having determined that the judgment below should be reversed, we are met with the issue whether to remand for new trial, or render judgment for appellant. The power of the Court of Civil Appeals with respect to this question is defined by Rule 434, T.R.C.P., as follows :
“When the judgment or decree of the court below shall be reversed, the court shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained or the damage to be assessed or the matter to be decreed is uncertain, in either of which cases the cause shall be remanded for a new trial.”
In this appeal appellant does not dispute the fact that the lettuce was damaged due to carrier’s negligence en route from shipping point to destination. The reversal of the judgment is due to the failure of ap-pellee to meet its burden of proving by competent evidence the amount of damages to be assessed. On that issue the case has not been fully developed. It appears to us that for such reason, and because the justice of the case requires another trial the case should be remanded. Aetna Insurance Company v. Klein, 160 Tex. 61, 325 S.W.2d 376; Williams v. Safety Casualty Co., 129 Tex. 184, 102 S.W.2d 178; Dahlberg v. Holden, 150 Tex. 179, 238 S.W.2d 699, on rehearing; Hicks v. Matthews, 153 Tex. 177, 266 S.W.2d 846; Minneapolis-Moline Company v. Purser, Tex.Civ.App., 361 S.W.2d 239, writ ref., n. r. e.
The following is from the opinion in Davis v. Gale, 160 Tex. 309, 330 S.W.2d 610, on page 613:
“Where a judgment has been reversed, it is the rule to remand to the trial court for a new trial rather than to render, where the ends of justice will be better subserved thereby. See Rule 505, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Hicks v. Matthews, 153 Tex. 177, 266 S.W.2d 846. It appears that the justice of this case demands another trial. This court has often remanded a cause to give parties an opportunity to supply additional evidence and to amend pleadings. See Hicks v. Matthews, supra; Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, Tex.Com. App., 277 S.W. 1043.”
As stated in Pelham Manufacturing Company v. Ridlehuber, Tex.Civ.App., 356 S.W. 2d 502, writ ref., n. r. e.:
“ * ' * * the fact ‘that a peremptory instruction would have been justified’ does not preclude remand. Hicks v. Matthews (supra); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Klein (supra). Remand, rather than rendition, has been consistent where the ends of justice are subserved, and deficiency of proof is obviously the result of a case not having been fully developed. Davis v. Gale, 160 Tex. 309, 330 S.W.2d 610, 613; Hall v. O. C. Whitaker Co., 143 Tex. 397, 185 S.W.2d 720, 724.”
Reversed and remanded.