DIXON, Chief Justice.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company has appealed from a judgment for $25,-000 awarded to appellee H. T. Shelton, a switchman employed by appellant. The suit was brought for damages for personal injuries. Recovery was sought under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Title 45, §§ 51 and 53, U.S.C.A.
Appellee alleges that he sustained serious injuries while alighting from a moving train not only as a result' of being struck by a caboose on the train from which he alighted but also as a result of being struck by an engine coming from an opposite direction upon an .adjacent track. ‘ ■
Sixty-seven special issues were submitted to a jury. In answering these issues the jury in effect acquitted appellant in all particulars except in its answers to Special Issues Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 65, which four issues were answered as follows:
(8) Appellant permitted chatt, gravel, rocks, mounds of earth or debris to remain in the area of the hump where appellee alighted;
(9) said act was negligence;
(10) appellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from such negligence;
(65) appellee’s injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident.
The jury did not find that any act of appellee contributed to cause his injuries.
Appellant’s points on appeal, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13/ 14, 16, 17 and 18, all involve appellant’s main contention: that the court erred in requiring the jury to apply different standards to appellant than to appellee in matters of causal relationship. The court submitted issues and definitions which permitted answers favorable to ap-pellee if the jury found that appellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from appellant’s negligence. But as to contributory negligence the court submitted issues and definitions which permitted answers favorable to appellant only if the jury found that appellee’s injuries were proximately caused by his own negligence.
Appellant not only objected to the issues as submitted but objected to the court’s refusal to submit requested issues and definitions which would have required the jury to apply the same standards to appellant and appellee in matters of causal relationship.
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act Title 45, § 51 expressly provides that every common carrier by railroad while engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages to any employee suffering injury resulting “in whole or-in part” from the negligence of the railroad. This provision [845]*845has been upheld in numerous decisions, Federal and State.
We quote from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493:
“Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee’s contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay damages for injury or ■death due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence. (Emphasis added.)
“The law was enacted because the Congress was dissatisfied with the common-law duty of the master to his servant. The statute supplants that duty with the far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury or death at work due in whole or in part to the employer’s negligence. The employer is stripped of his common-law defenses and for practical purposes the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more than the single question whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit. The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with reason make that inference.”
See also Dennis v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 375 U.S. 208, 84 S.Ct. 291, 11 L.Ed.2d 256; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208; Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 312 F.2d 84; and Campbell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 36 Ill.App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736.
There are .also numerous opinions, some of them by Texas courts, in which it is held that the Federal Statute is controlling over the common-law Or statute of a state. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Younger, Tex. Civ.App., 262 S.W.2d 557; Rio Grande, E. P. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dupree, (Comm.App.) 55 S.W.2d 522; and see the annotations under Note No. 54 of Title 45, § 51, U.S.C.A.
Title 45, § 53, U.S.C.A. expressly provides that in actions for personal injuries to an employee or for injuries resulting in death, 'the fact that the employee may have been • guilty of contributory negligence shall not 'bar a recovery, but the damages shall be •diminished bythe jury in proportion to the .amount of negligence attributable to such 'employee. There are many cases upholding .this provision, the latest being Dennis v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, supra. See also Wantland v. Ill. Central R. Co., 7 Cir., 237 F.2d 921; Sears v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 313 F.2d 498; and the numerous annotations under Notes Nos. 41-44, of Title 45, § 53, U.S.C.A. .
In applying this statute a definition -of contributory negligence has been approved which definition includes the proximate cause theory as applied to the alleged contributory negligence of the employee. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Richardson (1941), 116 F.2d 860, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, 61 S.Ct. 961, 85 L.Ed. 1531. See also [846]*846Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Seamas, 9 Cir., 201 F.2d 140.
We are convinced that under the Federal Statutes, Title 45, §§ 51 and 53, U. S.C.A., it was not error for the trial court to submit issues to the jury inquiring whether appellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from appellant’s negligence.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
DIXON, Chief Justice.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company has appealed from a judgment for $25,-000 awarded to appellee H. T. Shelton, a switchman employed by appellant. The suit was brought for damages for personal injuries. Recovery was sought under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Title 45, §§ 51 and 53, U.S.C.A.
Appellee alleges that he sustained serious injuries while alighting from a moving train not only as a result' of being struck by a caboose on the train from which he alighted but also as a result of being struck by an engine coming from an opposite direction upon an .adjacent track. ‘ ■
Sixty-seven special issues were submitted to a jury. In answering these issues the jury in effect acquitted appellant in all particulars except in its answers to Special Issues Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 65, which four issues were answered as follows:
(8) Appellant permitted chatt, gravel, rocks, mounds of earth or debris to remain in the area of the hump where appellee alighted;
(9) said act was negligence;
(10) appellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from such negligence;
(65) appellee’s injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident.
The jury did not find that any act of appellee contributed to cause his injuries.
Appellant’s points on appeal, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13/ 14, 16, 17 and 18, all involve appellant’s main contention: that the court erred in requiring the jury to apply different standards to appellant than to appellee in matters of causal relationship. The court submitted issues and definitions which permitted answers favorable to ap-pellee if the jury found that appellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from appellant’s negligence. But as to contributory negligence the court submitted issues and definitions which permitted answers favorable to appellant only if the jury found that appellee’s injuries were proximately caused by his own negligence.
Appellant not only objected to the issues as submitted but objected to the court’s refusal to submit requested issues and definitions which would have required the jury to apply the same standards to appellant and appellee in matters of causal relationship.
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act Title 45, § 51 expressly provides that every common carrier by railroad while engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages to any employee suffering injury resulting “in whole or-in part” from the negligence of the railroad. This provision [845]*845has been upheld in numerous decisions, Federal and State.
We quote from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493:
“Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee’s contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay damages for injury or ■death due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence. (Emphasis added.)
“The law was enacted because the Congress was dissatisfied with the common-law duty of the master to his servant. The statute supplants that duty with the far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury or death at work due in whole or in part to the employer’s negligence. The employer is stripped of his common-law defenses and for practical purposes the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more than the single question whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit. The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with reason make that inference.”
See also Dennis v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 375 U.S. 208, 84 S.Ct. 291, 11 L.Ed.2d 256; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208; Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 312 F.2d 84; and Campbell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 36 Ill.App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736.
There are .also numerous opinions, some of them by Texas courts, in which it is held that the Federal Statute is controlling over the common-law Or statute of a state. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Younger, Tex. Civ.App., 262 S.W.2d 557; Rio Grande, E. P. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dupree, (Comm.App.) 55 S.W.2d 522; and see the annotations under Note No. 54 of Title 45, § 51, U.S.C.A.
Title 45, § 53, U.S.C.A. expressly provides that in actions for personal injuries to an employee or for injuries resulting in death, 'the fact that the employee may have been • guilty of contributory negligence shall not 'bar a recovery, but the damages shall be •diminished bythe jury in proportion to the .amount of negligence attributable to such 'employee. There are many cases upholding .this provision, the latest being Dennis v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, supra. See also Wantland v. Ill. Central R. Co., 7 Cir., 237 F.2d 921; Sears v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 313 F.2d 498; and the numerous annotations under Notes Nos. 41-44, of Title 45, § 53, U.S.C.A. .
In applying this statute a definition -of contributory negligence has been approved which definition includes the proximate cause theory as applied to the alleged contributory negligence of the employee. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Richardson (1941), 116 F.2d 860, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, 61 S.Ct. 961, 85 L.Ed. 1531. See also [846]*846Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Seamas, 9 Cir., 201 F.2d 140.
We are convinced that under the Federal Statutes, Title 45, §§ 51 and 53, U. S.C.A., it was not error for the trial court to submit issues to the jury inquiring whether appellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from appellant’s negligence. We have been impelled to this conclusion by the plain wording of the statute itself and by the interpretation put thereon by numerous judicial opinions, especially by the strong language used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific RR. Co., supra, from which opinion we quoted earlier in this opinion.
We are also convinced that it was not reversible error for the court to submit the contributory negligence issues in such manner as to inquire of the jury whether appellee’s negligence was, in any of the alleged instances, a proximate cause of his injuries. The Congress has seen fit by statute to supplant the common-law duty of railroads to employees by the more drastic duty of the “In-whole-or-in-part” causation concept. But the Congress has not seen fit by statutory enactment to change the common-law concept of proximate cause with reference to contributory negligence of the employee. And in the absence of such a statutory enactment the common-law rule must prevail. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 273; Smith v. J. Weingarten, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 878, 880; City of Corpus Christi v. Coffin, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 202; State v. Anderson, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174, 69 A.L.R. 233; 15 C.J.S. Common Law § 12a, p. 619.
The common law prevails in Texas unless inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the state or the United States, Art. 1, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. The common law prevails with reference to causal relationship in contributory negligence. It is a long established rule that the Federal courts enforce the common law of the state in which a. cause arises and L tried when such common law is not in conflict with the Constitution and statutes. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487; United States v. Swierzbenski, 2 Cir., 18 F.2d 685; The West Jester (Wagstaff v. United States, et al.), 9 Cir., 281 F. 877; 15 C.J.S. Common Law § 16, p. 630.
No cases exactly in point on the issue raised by appellant have been cited to us and we have found none. But there are cases which seem to us to point in the direction of our holding in regard to the employee’s liability for his own negligence under Title 45, § 53, U.S.C.A. Sears v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 313 F.2d 498 (Syl. 3); Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Seamas, 9 Cir., 201 F. 2d 140. We overrule appellant’s Points Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18.
In its Point No. 5 appellant says that it was error for the court to base its judgment on the jury’s findings to Special Issue No. 9. The issue was submitted as follows t
“SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 9
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such act in permitting either chatt, gravel, rocks, mounds of dirt, or debris to remain in the area of the hump where Plaintiff alighted from said caboose, if you have so found in answer to the preceding special issue, was negligence, as defined herein ?
“Answer Yes or No.”
The answer of the jury was “Yes”. In answering Issue No. 10 the jury found that ap-pellee’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from said negligence.
In answering Special Issue No. 2 the jury had found that appellant had not failed to furnish appellee a reasonably safe place in which to work.
Appellant contends (1) that Special Issue No. 9 is multifarious and (2) that the jury’s answer to the issue is in conflict with the answer to Special Issue No. 2.
[847]*847The first of the above contentions raises the question, often vexing of whether an issue as framed is defective because it submits more than one ultimate issue. We have concluded that the issue is not defective in that regard. It has often been held that an issue is not multifarious because it groups several evidentiary or subsidiary facts together, so long as it involves only one ultimate issue. Duff v. Mathews, Tex. Civ.App., 300 S.W.2d 679; Jones v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W.2d 534; Gray County Gas Co. v. Oldham, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 596; Howell v. Howell, 147 Tex. 14, 210 S.W.2d 978; Service Mutual Ins. Co. of Texas v. Territo, et al, Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 846. Really only one ultimate issue was inquired about in Special Issue No. 9: whether appellant was negligent in permitting foreign substances to remain in the area in question.
As to the second of appellant’s contentions under its Point No. 5 we must give an affirmative answer. The jury’s findings in response to Special Issues Nos. 2 and 9 are in conflict.
In Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, 1 L.Ed.2d 889, the jury acquitted the railroad on eight specific acts of negligence, but found that the railroad had not furnished Arnold a reasonably safe place in which to work. In holding that the answers were not in conflict the Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that the specific findings were not exhaustive or all-inclusive of the acts which might have constituted negligence, while the unsafe-place-to-work finding was exhaustive and all-encompassing. In other words, the unsafe-place-to-work negligence may have resulted from an act not named or included among the specific acts submitted.
The reverse of the above situation is presented here. In this case the jury answered “No” to an inquiry whether the railroad had failed to furnish appellee a reasonably safe place to work, then found from a preponderance of the evidence that the railroad was negligent in permitting chatt, gravel, rocks, mounds of dirt, or debris to remain in the area where appellee alighted from the caboose. Since the safe-place-to-work finding is exhaustive and all-encompassing it cannot be reconciled with the finding in regard to chatt, gravel, etc. The Arnold case is really authority for holding that the answers here are in conflict.
In support of its view that there is no conflict between the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 2 and 9 appellee seeks to invoke the rule that a negative answer to a negligence issue submitted in a negative form is not the same as an affirmative answer of negligence. It merely means that the party having the burden of proof did not establish the non-existence of the condition. Hill v. Leschber, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 236; Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Grubbs, Tex.Civ.App., 44 S.W.2d 1001; 41-B Tex. Jur. 780.
As we view the situation the rule relied on by appellee is not applicable here. In answering Special Issue No. 2 “No” the jury in effect found that appellee had not discharged his burden of showing that appellant had furnished appellee an unsafe place in which to work. In answering Special Issue No. 9 “Yes” the jury in effect found that appellee had discharged his burden of showing that appellant had furnished appellee an unsafe place in which to work. Both answers cannot be correct. We think the test quoted in Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453, (Syl. 2) is applicable here. The two findings are in conflict. We sustain appellant’s Point No. 5.
In its sixth and seventh points appellant complains of the submission of Special Issues Nos. 8 and 9 on various grounds. Since we have held that the jury’s answer to Issue No. 9 cannot stand we shall not pass upon the question whether these two related issues were technically defective in the form in which they were submitted.
In its fifteenth point appellant as- , serts that the court was in error in over[848]*848ruling appellant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. The court could properly have sustained the motion only if there was no evidence to sustain-the jury’s verdict. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660; Calvert, “‘No Evidence’ and ‘Insufficient Evidence’ Points of Error,” 38 Texas Law Review 361.
Appellee testified that in alighting from the caboose he stepped on an object that “felt like it was about 'as big as your two fists or bigger.” He had earlier signed a statement (which he said he did not know his wife had made out) in which statement he made no mention of a rock or something “about as big as your two fists.”
Appellee also testified that his “purpose in getting off on that side of the train was a safe place and a proper place to get off at.” He further testified “I selected to get off there, because it the safe place to get off.” These last two statements by appel-lee if taken out of their context would appear to be in conflict with appellee’s statement that he stepped on an object as big as both fists. But when appellee’s testimony is considered in connection with its context and in connection with his testimony as a whole and with the testimony of other witnesses, the apparent conflict can be reconciled. It was while appellee was being cross-examined as to whether he was negligent in alighting between two moving trains that he said that he had selected “a safe and proper place to get off at.” We quote further from his testimony:
“Mr. Freels: You got off out there without guarding against moving equipment on an adjacent track, did you not ?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. You say you did not?
“A. I got off guarding myself.
“Q. All right, sir. You got off without guarding yourself against unsafe footing, did you not? 1$ that what.you are saying here? t .
“A. Got off on what I knew to be cleanest place for footing.
“Q. All right, sir. And it is clean out there, isn’t it?
“A. The cleanest place. No, sir, it’s not clean.”
There was ample testimony from other witnesses that the place where appellee alighted was not clear of debris including various substances.
Even if we were to say that appellee’s own testimony is conflicting on the question of a safe place to alight, such conflict would raise a fact issue. Overton Refining Co. v. Harmon, 81 S.W.2d 207 (Rev. on other grounds, 130 Tex. 365, 109 S.W.2d 457); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McCollum, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 751; Hatley v. Hatcher, Tex.Civ.App., 376 S.W.2d 943; 41-B Tex.Jur. 489; 24 Tex.Jur.2d 369. Appellant’s fifteenth point is overruled.
In its Point No. 19 appellant alleges error of the court in permitting appellee to show notice of conditions at the place he alighted by means of complaints as to the railroad yard generally as well as the taking of a strike vote with reference to the whole railroad yard.
Evidence concerning the above matters was first objected to on the ground that the questions did not limit the inquiry to the area and time involved. This objection was sustained. Later appellant objected to more limited questions on the ground that the questions were “irrelevant and immaterial,” “no proper predicate” and “prejudice”. Still later appellant itself brought out the questioned evidence on cross examination. Under the circumstances no reversible error is shown. Medina Electric Coop., Inc. v. Ball, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W. 2d 227; Bales v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 362 S.W.2d 388; Hooten v. Dunbar, Tex.Civ.App., 347 S.W.2d 775; Withers v. Tyler County Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 326 S.W.2d 173; Marsh v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 276 S.W.2d 852. Appellant’s Boinf No. 19 is overruled.
[849]*849In its Points Nos. 20 and 21 appellant talses the position that (20) there was no evidence to support the submission of Special Issue No. 8 and (21) there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of the issue. Without going into further detail in regard to the evidence, we cannot say that there was no evidence in support of the submission of the issue. And the “no evidence” rule is applicable in weighing these points.
In its Point No. 22 appellant says that the answer of the jury to Special Issue No. 8 is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. We see no merit in this point. There was ample evidence to support the jury’s answer, some of which evidence we have pointed out. Point No. 22 is overruled.
The court submitted Special Issue No. 67 as follows:
“What per cent, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence does the negligence, if any, of the plaintiff bear to the entire negligence, if any, of both the plaintiff and defendant ?”
This issue was accompanied by an instruction that the issue was to be answered only in the event the jury found that contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff proximately caused his own injuries and that negligence on the part of defendant resulted in whole or in part in defendant’s injuries. We think the issue was properly submitted. Thompson v. Robbins, 157 Tex. 463, 304 S.W.2d 111, 116-117. Notwithstanding the instruction the jury answered the issue “75% Plaintiff.” In doing so the jury plainly went contrary to the instruction, for none of the contributory negligence issues was answered in the affirmative. Therefore, the answer to Special Issue No. 67 can have no significance. In the absence of any finding of contributory negligence the comparative- negligence doctrine, or the diminution of- the damages rule can have no application. Thompson v. Robbins, supra.
Because of the conflict in the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 2 and 9 the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.
Reversed and remanded.