Missouri Alliance for Retired Americans v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations

277 S.W.3d 670, 28 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1430, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 18, 2009 WL 454282

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: February 24, 2009
• Docket: SC 88368
• Status: Published

Opinions

PLURALITY OPINION

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the plaintiff labor organizations do not have standing to raise eight of the claims they assert in an attempt to strike down the 2005 amendments to the state workers’ compensation law because those claims are not yet ripe for review. Six of these claims argue that specific provisions of the workers’ compensation act, as amended in 2005, are unconstitutional because the application of those particular provisions deprives workers of due process, violates the open courts provision of the Missouri constitution or violates several other constitutional rights of the workers.

But, no individual injured person or group of persons are joined in this action, and the claims that these provisions unfairly will deprive any particular person of the person’s constitutional rights are, at this point, completely hypothetical. Any opinion this Court would offer, therefore, would be purely advisory, and it is premature to address whether there may be constitutional problems with application of these provisions to particular individuals. State ex rel. State Bd. of Mediation v. Pigg, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75, 79 (1951).

The Court also finds that the claim that the legislature must provide a quid pro quo to workers that is at least substantially equivalent to or greater than that provided in the original workers’ compensation act is not properly raised or justiciable at this time. Likewise, the claims that the amendments to the act impair workers’ constitutional rights and have no rational basis are hypothetical and, hence, not jus-ticiable.

Separate and apart from their constitutional challenges, however, the plaintiff labor organizations have presented this Court with a ripe and justiciable issue in their request for a declaratory judgment as to the scope of the exclusivity clause in section 287.120 after the amendments.¹ The amendments narrow the definition of the type of “injury” that falls within the definition of an “accident,” which limits the scope of the act. The removal of certain injuries and accidents from the scope of the act places workers who have suffered those injuries outside the workers’ compensation system. Those workers now can recover under the common law as they no longer fall within the exclusivity provision of the act as set out in section 287.120.

The Court addresses the constitutional claims, the ripeness issue and the sole justiciable controversy below, after providing a brief factual framework for this analysis.

I. Factual and Procedural History

In 2005, the legislature made significant changes to the workers’ compensation system. Senate Bills Nos. 1 and 130 amended 30 sections of chapter 287, RSMo 2000, the Missouri’s workers’ compensation law (“amendments”). In response, a consortium of 71 organizations — including 66 labor unions, four labor councils and one not-for-profit corporation — filed a nine-count petition against the division of workers’ compensation in the Cole County circuit court challenging the constitutional validity of the amendments. The labor organizations assert that the primary import of the amendments was to reduce the scope of benefits available to workers injured on the job.

The labor organizations challenge the amended workers’ compensation law as a whole in counts I and III, challenge specific statutory provisions in six other counts, and seek a declaratory judgment as to the rights of injured workers whose accidents no longer are within the scope of the act. The parties filed cross-motions for a judgment on the pleadings with respect to counts I and III, the due process challenges to all the amendments. The division also filed for summary judgment on all counts for lack of justiciability. The trial court held that the division was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, on counts I and III, and granted the division’s motion for summary judgment holding that all the other counts, including count IV, were not justiciable. The labor organizations appeal, arguing that the workers’ compensation law as a whole is unconstitutional and that all the rest of the claims in their petition are justiciable.

II. Constitutional Challenges

The constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law, the review of which is de novo. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 210 (Mo. banc 2006). A statute’s validity is presumed, and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 2006).

A. Nature of Due Process and Open Courts Violation Challenges to the Act as a Whole

The labor organizations challenge the constitutional validity of the act as a whole on the ground that in the original “workers’ compensation bargain,” workers surrendered the right to sue them employers at common law in exchange for lower but certain compensation, without regard to fault, in all cases of accidental work-related injury. The labor organizations maintain that the reduction of workers’ rights in the 2005 amendments is not permitted because it is below the standard set in the initial legislation by the workers and their employers. They allege that the rights then set out were the quid pro quo for workers giving up them rights to sue at common law for them claims and, if those rights are diminished in a substantial way, the bargain has been breached. They further assert that the law as a whole, in its current form, contains such substantial modifications of the original bargain that it is no longer a quid pro quo and, therefore, violates workers’ due process and open courts rights.

Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In this case, the labor organizations ask this Court to review the substantive content of the legislation and find that because the amendments substantially affect the bargain that formed the basis of the workers’ compensation system, the act unconstitutionally deprives workers of their right to certain compensation for a work-related injury without regard to fault. Alternatively, the labor organizations assert that the amendments violate the workers’ due process rights because the amendments are arbitrary and lack a rational relationship to legitimate legislative goals. See Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 844-45.

For the same reasons, the labor organizations argue, the amendments violate procedural due process and the “open courts” provision of the Missouri Constitution, which states: “That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.” Mo. Const, art I, sec. 14.² “Put most simply, article I, section 14 prohibits any law that arbitrarily or unreasonably bars individuals or classes of individuals from accessing our courts in oi’der to enforce recognized causes of action for personal injury.” Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotation omitted). The open courts provision does not itself grant substantive rights but, rather, is a procedural safeguard that ensures a person has access to the courts when that person has a legitimate claim recognized by law. Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Sera, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. banc 2003). The analysis employed to determine the constitutional validity of a statute on open courts grounds, then, is the same as the analysis used for procedural due process claims, as article I, section 14 is “a second due process clause to the state constitution.” Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo. banc 1992).

The division argues that, while workers who are covered by the workers’ compensation act did give up their right to sue at common law in return for their right to recover, regardless of fault or negligence, from the employer, that bargain was not a “take it or leave it” or quid pro quo proposition that could not be changed. It points to the fact that Missouri has changed its workers’ compensation laws dozens of times over the years, usually making them more favorable to the employee, although sometimes making them more favorable to the employer. The issue, the division argues, is whether the current law passes constitutional muster under a rational basis analysis, not whether the law has changed from what it was in 1926 when the act was first enacted. The division further argues that the changes are not arbitrary and capricious, but have a rational basis, and further that these claims are not ripe for determination at this time because the plaintiff labor organizations have no standing to raise them and because the claims as to specific provisions cannot be resolved except in the context of deciding a specific workers’ compensation case involving those provisions.

B. Justiciability and Ripeness Analysis

The plaintiff labor organizations can sue on behalf of them constituent members if those members could have sued individually. Whether individual members of the unions “would have standing to bring this suit in their own right depends upon whether they are able to satisfy the requirements for bringing a declaratory judgment action.” Missouri Health Care Association v. Attorney General of the State of Missouri, 953 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. banc 1997).

A declaratory judgment action requires a justiciable controversy. Akin v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. banc 1996). A case presents a justiciable controversy if: (1) the plaintiff has a legally protectable interest at stake; (2) a substantial controversy exists with genuinely adverse interests; and (3) the controversy is ripe for judicial determination. See State ex rel. Chilcutt v. Thatch, 359 Mo. 122, 221 S.W.2d 172,176 (1949).

1. Legally Protectable Interest

Proof that the plaintiff has a “legally protectable interest at stake” requires a showing “of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief.” Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotation omitted). There is no litmus test for determining whether a legally protectable interest exists; it is determined on a case-by-case basis. Mager v. City of St. Louis, 699 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo.App.1985). Here, the plaintiffs allege that they are affected by being required to operate under an act they contend is illegal and unconstitutional and hence is invalid, and under the declaratory judgment act, “any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” Section 527.020.

In Missouri Health, this Court applied this standard to an organization representing a majority of long-term care facilities bringing a declaratory judgment to have a bill declared invalid under Missouri’s constitution. 953 S.W.2d at 620. The organization alleged it had standing because the amendment, which had yet to be enforced, injured its members in that it restrained them from making representations in the course of them business for fear of triggering the disclosure requirements of the statute. Id. This Court held that “[t]he interest in doing business free from the constraints of an unconstitutional law is entitled to legal protection.” Id.

The holding in Missouri Health is consistent with the nature of declaratory relief in that “although accomplished injury is not alleged, where a dispute as to legal rights is otherwise shown, a violation of those rights is not a precondition to the availability of declaratory adjudication.” Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 868 (Mo.App.1971). In fact, Higday noted that a plaintiff has standing to obtain declaratory relief, and to assert a legally protected interest, unless “it appears that it may be said with certainty that no possible basis exists for [their] contention that they are entitled to a declaration of rights and duties under the facts alleged....” Id. at 864.

Applying these principles, here, the labor organizations’ quid pro quo and constitutional arguments about the act as a whole, as well as their argument seeking a determination as to how the act applies to those excluded from receiving benefits under the new amendments, present justicia-ble controversies as to whether the act, as amended, deprives those now excluded from it from all right to recovery under either the act or the common law, and as to whether it provides an adequate substitute for the common law rights of action that workers have given up. Their arguments about the unfairness of individual provisions and the unfairness of excluding additional workers from coming within the act under the narrowed definition of “accidental injury” also present justiciable controversies. To the extent that the labor organizations ask this Court to hold that specific provisions of the act as amended are unconstitutional because they are so narrow and restrictive that they provide no adequate remedy for an injured worker, they have developed no facts to support these claims, for no individual workers’ compensation claims are before this Court. Rather, the attack is a general one, on the effect of the changes as a whole on the act as a whole in a hypothetical sense, without application to any particular injured worker; therefore, there is no justiciable claim as to these provisions at this time.

2. Substantial Controversy

The second requirement for standing, that a “substantial controversy exists with genuinely adverse interests,” clearly is met. A genuine disagreement exists between the parties about the extent of coverage provided under the revised workers’ compensation law and whether the revised law violates the workers’ substantive due process guarantees by not providing them an adequate substitute remedy for work-related injuries without regard to fault, either individually or as a whole. This disagreement meets the demands of the second requirement as to those claims. See Levinson v. State, 104 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Mo. banc 2003); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc. v. Nixon, 26 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Mo.App.2000).

3. Ripeness

Whether any aspects of the current controversy are ripe for review at the present time presents a more difficult issue. “A ripe controversy exists if the parties’ dispute is developed sufficiently to allow the court to make an accurate determination of the facts, to resolve a conflict that is presently existing, and to grant specific relief of a conclusive character.” Missouri Health, 953 S.W.2d at 621. “In the context of a constitutional challenge to a statute, a ripe controversy generally exists when the state attempts to enforce the statute. In some situations, however, a ripe controversy also may exist before the statute is enforced.” Id. The particular-circumstance where this Court has allowed a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to laws occurred “when the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claims were fully developed and the laws at issue were affecting the plaintiff in a manner that gave rise to an immediate, concrete dispute.” Id., citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982). See also Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735, 741 (Mo. banc 1962); and Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 222 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1949).

Again, as noted in regard to justiciability, in the absence of individual facts it is impossible to adjudicate the underlying claims that these provisions will be applied unfairly in such as manner as to be unconstitutional. Indeed, nothing in this record shows how they are being interpreted or applied or whether they have been given the draconian meaning ascribed to many of the provisions by the labor organizations. Under this Court’s cases, it simply is premature to address the constitutional validity of these provisions individually, in the absence of such facts, for whether any decision in any particular case is a fan- one will necessarily depend on the particular circumstance and showing made. Those issues simply are not ripe for review at the present time.

Similarly, absent judicial interpretation of the individual provisions being attacked, this Court cannot compare the effect of those provisions as a whole to the act as a whole as initially enacted as an alleged fixed quid pro quo for giving up covered workers’ common law claims or the claim that, considered as a whole, it violates the open courts or due process provisions of the constitution. These claims, therefore, are not ripe for review until the meaning of the provisions in question is determined in individual cases.³

III. Request for a Declaratory Judgment as to the Scope of the Exclusivity Clause

The same ripeness objections cannot be made with respect to the labor organizations’ request for a declaratory judgment as to the scope of the exclusivity clause. In their petition, the labor organizations assert that, as a result of the amendments’ narrowing the definitions of “accident” and “injury” in section 287.020.2 and 287.020.3, a substantial number of employees with work-related injuries are excluded from compensation. They seek a declaratory judgment to address whether the exclusivity provision in section 287.120 bars those workers’ ability to pursue negligence tort actions against their employers.

No factual development is necessary to address this legal question, which requires only that the Court review the changes in the scope of the act’s exclusivity provisions as applied to “injuries” resulting from an “accident.” Accordingly, the bar to ripeness that is applicable to the other claims raised by the labor organizations does not apply to this issue.

The definitions for “accident” and “injury” are utilized in the exclusivity clause and amendment of those definitions impacts the scope of the workers’ compensation laws. By limiting those definitions, the scope of the act is limited. Any removal of certain injuries and accidents from the scope of the act also places the workers who have suffered those injuries outside the workers’ compensation system, and they are no longer governed by the act.

This is evident from a simple reading of the statute itself. Section 287.120 sets out the exclusivity provisions of the act in relevant part as follows:

1. Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefore whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person ....

2. The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.

Section 287.120 (emphasis added). This section makes the act the exclusive remedy for the employee only on account of “such accidental injury or death.” Id. In other words, it is the exclusive remedy only for those “injuries” that come within the definition of the term “accident” under the act. As section 287.120.2 itself states, other such rights and remedies that are not provided for in the act are not subject to these exclusivity provisions — that is, they still can be sued for at common law.

What, then, is the definition of “accident” under the act as amended? An accident is defined by section 287.020.2 as follows:

2. The word “accident” as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift....

Section 287.020.2.

Read together, this means that if an “injury” comes within the definition of the term “accident” as defined in section 287.020.2, then it is included within the exclusivity provisions of the act, and recovery can be had, if at all, only under the terms set out in the act. If the “injury” is one that is not included within the term “accident” as defined in the act, however, then under section 287.120.1 an employer shall not be liable to the employee under the act and the injury, therefore, is not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the act, as section 287.120.2 makes quite clear in stating “the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies” only “on account of such accidental injury or death,” and that it does not apply to “rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.”

Workers excluded from the act by the narrower definition of “accidental injury” have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act. This Court is not asked to decide what injuries fall within the definition of “accident” in section 287.020.2 and, therefore, no opinion is expressed. The question of whether certain employees have remedies under the current workers’ compensation laws or under common law will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on individual facts. There is no such specific case in front of the Court in this proceeding.

For the reasons noted above, the plaintiff labor organizations’ other claims about specific exclusions from coverage under the act and the constitutionality of those provisions is premature.

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings with respect to counts I and III is reversed, as those claims are not ripe. The trial court’s summary judgment based on lack of justiciability is reversed with respect to count VI, and this Court enters declaratory judgment pursuant to section 512.160(3). It therefore is adjudged, decreed and declared that workers excluded from the act by the narrower definitions of “accident” and “injury” have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act, because they no longer fall within the exclusivity provision of the act as set out in section 287.120. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We apologize to the parties for the delay in announcing the decision in this appeal and recognize our collective responsibility to ensure that our cases are decided promptly. While there are reasons for the delay, there is no justification for it.

STITH, C.J., RUSSELL and BRECKENRIDGE, JJ., concur; WOLFF, J., concurs in separate opinion filed; PRICE and RUSSELL, JJ., concur in opinion of WOLFF, J.; TEITELMAN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. FISCHER, J., not participating.

1 . All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2008 unless otherwise noted.

2 . An employee’s right to certain compensation for work-related injuries, without regard to fault, afforded to employees by the prior statutory scheme is not, in and of itself, a right protected by Missouri’s open courts provision. See DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640, 645-46 (1931).

3 . Even were this not the case and a quid pro quo analysis were applicable, an issue the Court does not reach, the labor organizations do not actually ask this Court to compare the current version of the act to the initial bargain made in the 1926 act. To the contrary, while they compare some provisions of the current act to those in the original act, they compare other provisions in the current act to various amendments enacted over the years. As the assertion is that the quid pro quo pact was agreed to at the time of initial adoption in 1926, a comparison to these later enactments simply does not further the labor organizations' analysis. Neither is it furthered by noting that specific provisions have been changed. Rather, inasmuch as the argument is that the bargain, as a whole, has lost so much of its meaning and benefits to workers that it no longer can serve as a quid pro quo for giving up common law rights, a proper determination by this Court as to whether the amendments continue to provide an adequate substitute remedy requires consideration of both the increased and decreased benefits and coverage since adoption of the workmen’s compensation law, an analysis that the labor organizations have not undertaken in this case.