Missoula Rural Fire District v. City of Missoula

950 P.2d 758, 286 Mont. 387, 54 State Rptr. 1459, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 292, 1997 WL 795841
Montana Supreme Court·Decided December 23, 1997·No. 97-473·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

*389 JUSTICE REGNIER

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In February 1996, the Missoula Rural Fire District and a number of private property owners (appellants) filed an action in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County against the City of Missoula to challenge the validity of three municipal annexation resolutions adopted on January 22, 1996. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 30, 1997, following review of the record, the District Court issued an order granting the City of Missoula’s motion for summary judgment, and denying appellants’. Appellants timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied by way of a June 16,1997, order. It is from these two District Court orders that appellants appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the City of Missoula’s motion for summary judgment, and correspondingly denying appellants’ cross-motion for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 22, 1996, the City of Missoula adopted Municipal Annexation Resolutions 5816, 5817, and 5818 pursuant to which it annexed land, commonly known as the East Reserve area, located to the east of Reserve Street and west of pre-existing city limits. More specifically, Resolution 5816 annexed that portion of the East Reserve area generally bounded by Brooks Street, Paxson Street, Reserve Street, and South Avenue. Resolution 5817 incorporated within the City of Missoula’s limits neighboring land generally bounded by South Third Street West, South Avenue, Garfield Street, and Reserve Street. Finally, Resolution 5818 annexed northern land generally bounded by Mullan Road, Russell Street, South Third Street West, and Reserve Street.

Segments of Reserve Street, South Avenue, and South Third Street West, standing in isolation from any other city property, thus border portions of the land annexed by these resolutions. Indeed, in certain places, the perimeter surrounding the annexed land is only as wide as the street itself. For example, a long stretch of Reserve Street, annexed by the City of Missoula in 1993, bounds the western edge of land annexed by Resolution 5818. Relying in part upon the narrow boundaries formed by these roadways, the Missoula City Council adopted each of the three Resolutions at issue in the present case *390 pursuant to the “wholly surround” method of annexation as provided for by § 7-2-4501, MCA.

On February 16, 1996, appellants filed suit to challenge the City of Missoula’s use of the “wholly surround” method of annexation in this case and to challenge the validity of Municipal Annexation Resolutions 5816, 5817, and 5818. By way of their complaint, appellants sought a preliminary injunction, a writ of mandate, a permanent injunction, and a declaration by the court voiding Resolutions 5816, 5817, and 5818. On March 18, 1996, the City of Missoula filed a motion for summary judgment, which, except with respect to the issue of notice, the court denied in an October 16, 1996, order. The court determined the record contained insufficient facts upon which it could premise a grant of summary judgment and, on that basis, additionally denied appellants’ request for a temporary injunction, writ of mandamus, and declaration voiding the annexation Resolutions.

The parties subsequently supplemented the record and filed cross-motions for summary judgment, agreeing that the issues presented were ripe for determination as a matter of law. On April 30,1997, the District Court issued an order granting the City of Missoula’s motion for summary judgment, and denying appellants’. Appellants accordingly filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on June 16, 1997. On June 20, 1997, appellants filed their notice of appeal from these two orders by the District Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de novo. Treichel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1997), 280 Mont. 443, 446, 930 P.2d 661, 663. (citing Motarie v. Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785). This Court reviews a summary judgment order entered pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., based on the same criteria applied by the district court. Treichel, 280 Mont. at 446, 930 P.2d at 663 (citing Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903).

In proving that summary judgment is appropriate:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove by more than mere denial and speculation that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact do not exist, the court must *391 then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [This Court] reviews the legal determinations made by the district court as to whether the court erred.

Bruner, 272 Mont. at 264-65, 900 P.2d at 903.

Moreover, the “moving party has the burden of showing a complete absence of any genuine issue as to all facts considered material in light of the substantive principles that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Kolar v. Bergo (1996), 280 Mont. 262, 266, 929 P.2d 867, 869.

DISCUSSION

Did the District Court err in granting the City of Missoula’s motion for summary judgment, and correspondingly denying appellants’ cross-motion for summary judgment?

The Missoula City Counsel passed Resolutions 5816, 5817, and 5818 pursuant to § 7-2-4501, MCA, which provides for the annexation of wholly surrounded land. Specifically, § 7-2-4501, MCA, provides that:

A city may include as part of the city any platted or unplatted tract or parcel of land that is wholly surrounded by the city upon passing a resolution of intent, giving notice, and passing a resolution of annexation. Except as provided in 7-2-4502, the provisions of 7-2-4312 through 7-2-4314 apply to these resolutions and the notice requirement.

Appellants argue those portions of the East Reserve area incorporated into Missoula’s city limits by Resolutions 5816, 5817, and 5818, were not, in fact, wholly surrounded, and that the court accordingly erred in upholding the annexations.

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Missoula Rural Fire District v. City of Missoula, 950 P.2d 758, 286 Mont. 387, 54 State Rptr. 1459, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 292, 1997 WL 795841 (Mo. 1997).

950 P.2d 758 (Missoula Rural Fire District v. City of Missoula) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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