Mirian Carcamo-Medrano v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 13, 2023
• Docket: 20-71084
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 13 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIRIAN CARCAMO-MEDRANO, AKA No. 20-71084 Miriam S. Carcamo, Agency No. A072-988-342 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 11, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Mirian Carcamo-Medrano, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for

review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her

motion to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny in part

and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA denied Carcamo-Medrano’s untimely and numerically barred

motion to reopen, concluding that Carcamo-Medrano’s new same-sex relationship

was a change in personal circumstances and not a change in country conditions. In

reaching that conclusion, the BIA reasoned that Carcamo-Medrano had not shown

that country conditions in Honduras had materially worsened for gay people since

her original deportation hearing in 1993. Because the record lacks evidence

showing that country conditions for gay people in Honduras materially worsened

between 1993 and 2019, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Carcamo-

Medrano’s untimely and numerically barred motion to reopen. See Salim v. Lynch,

831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he changed country conditions exception

[to the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen] is concerned with two points

in time: the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s previous

hearing, and those at the time of the motion to reopen.”); Chandra v. Holder, 751

F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that to qualify for the country-

conditions exception to the deadline for a motion to reopen, a noncitizen may not

“rel[y] solely on a change in personal circumstances”) (emphasis in original).

To the extent Carcamo-Medrano argues that the BIA erred in not equitably

tolling the deadline for filing her motion to reopen, Carcamo-Medrano did not

2 meaningfully present an equitable tolling argument to the BIA, so we lack

jurisdiction to consider this argument. Amaya v. Garland, 15 F.4th 976, 986 (9th

Cir. 2021) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review conclusory

arguments not meaningfully presented to the BIA). To the extent Carcamo-

Medrano is attempting to assert a due process argument, her argument is not raised

with enough specificity for us to address it. See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123,

1125 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a claim that is not addressed with any

specificity in a brief is deemed abandoned); see also Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d

1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a successful due process challenge

requires establishing error and substantial prejudice).

Petition DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.