Miranda v. United States

330 F. Supp. 1002, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 27, 1971
DocketNo. 69 Civ. 1575
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 330 F. Supp. 1002 (Miranda v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miranda v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 1002, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

Opinion

WYATT, District Judge.

This is the decision, after a hearing, of a motion by Miranda to vacate and set aside a sentence imposed on him on September 26, 1968. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The sentence was imposed after a plea of guilty to a one count indictment charging movant and Antonio Rivera with the receipt, concealment, etc. of some 64 grams of heroin. The sentence was imprisonment for 6 years.

The ground for this motion is that Miranda was mentally incompetent at the time of plea and sentence and was under “heavy narcotic medication”.

Miranda is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

A hearing was required, because the earlier denial of the motion without a hearing (325 F.Supp. 217) was reversed by the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1971 (Lumbard, Moore and Smith, C. JJ.). 437 F.2d 1255

The motion is again denied. The claims made are false and the movant, under oath, wholly unworthy of belief.

Miranda is a parasite with a long and vicious criminal record. In this proceeding he has wasted the time and energy of many persons and has caused public funds in a substantial amount to be squandered. This depressing example suggests that the procedure permitting free and easy collateral attack on crimi[1003]*1003nal convictions is in urgent need of reform. One possibility is an amendment to the statute (28 U.S.C. § 2255) in respect of the necessity for hearings on such motions as this. Another possibility is to require a movant such as Miranda to supplement “his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence”. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142 (1970). It may be noted that Miranda has never claimed to be innocent of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. Indeed, he could not do so because he and Rivera were arrested while in the act of making a sale of the heroin in hand to an undercover agent. Miranda admitted his guilt at the time of his plea and later to the probation officer; in his testimony at the hearing he again specifically admitted his guilt, confessing that he had asked Rivera for “heroin” (SM 47) which in fact was procured by Rivera for the sale; Miranda more than once recognized that he was in fact guilty (SM 48, 243). Rivera was tried by me without a jury and was convicted; the evidence fully established the guilt of Miranda as well.

After the earlier denial of the present motion, Miranda filed a notice of appeal which was submitted to me for decision, whether to certify that the appeal was not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); F.R.A.P. 24(a). This presented a close question. On the one hand, the records in my view showed conclusively that Miranda was entitled to no relief and that no more time, effort and money should be wasted in further considering his frivolous claims. On the other hand, it had become the rule in the Tenth Circuit that a hearing is required whenever there is a claim of mental incompetency at time of plea or sentence. Butler v. United States, 361 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1966). I decided not to obstruct the appeal by making the certificate ; it was my hope, not realized in the event, that our Court of Appeals would adopt a rule for this Circuit that no hearing need be held where the records clearly refute the claim of incompetence made by movant.

While the reversing opinion of the Court of Appeals recognizes that the broad claim for movant was mental incompetence, the specific fact issue directed to be determined was whether Miranda was under the influence of narcotics when he pleaded guilty. The opinion states (437 F.2d at 1259):

“* * * we are not convinced that it is possible to negate the claim of heavy sedation at the time of plea on the record available to the court on the motion.”

The opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals accepted the claim of Miranda as to his suicide attempts: “He had twice attempted suicide while in withdrawal” (437 F.2d at 1258). As later shown herein, the so-called suicide attempts were not real but faked. Moreover, the further evidence confirms the conclusion from the records that neither at time of plea nor at sentence was Miranda under any “narcotic sedation”, heavy or otherwise.

After the reversal by the Court of Appeals, arrangements were made for the required hearing. Counsel who had represented Miranda by appointment in the Court of Appeals kindly consented to represent him in this Court.

By order filed March 29, 1971, and on application of counsel for movant, preparation of a stenographic transcript at government expense was authorized. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f).

By order filed April 14, 1971, counsel for Miranda was authorized (under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A) to obtain the services of Dr. Stanley L. Portnow of Bellevue Hospital for a psychiatric examination of Miranda.

Hearings were held on March 24, April 16, 22 and 23 and May 5, 14 and 18, 1971.

Miranda himself testified at length and also called to testify three of his sisters, Dr. Portnow (a psychiatrist), and Dr. Frantz (a psychiatrist who was employed in August 1968 at the New York [1004]*1004City Correctional Institution for Men on Rikers Island (“Rikers”, for convenience) ).

The government called Dr. Sherman (a physician at Rikers in August 1968), Ricks (a deputy United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York), Pallatroni (a special agent of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs), Demos (the probation officer who prepared the presentence report on Miranda), Judge Moldow (who as a lawyer represented Miranda at plea and sentence), and Leisure (who as an Assistant United States Attorney prosecuted Miranda).

The Court called as witnesses Caldwood, Edwards, and Walls (correction officers at Rikers in August 1968); and Reed, Mills, and Richardson (nurses at Rikers in 1968).

Extensive medical records and other documents were received in evidence.

The findings which follow are based on the testimony and on the documentary evidence. Wherever the testimony of Miranda differs in any respect from other evidence, I have rejected the testimony of Miranda as a fabrication designed simply to manipulate the judicial process to secure his liberty so as to be able to resume his career in crime. The rejection of Miranda’s testimony is based, among other things, on observation of him and his demeanor while testifying.

All the evidence from state institutions for the period prior to 1968 shows Miranda to have been competent.

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Related

Raymond Miranda v. United States
458 F.2d 1179 (Second Circuit, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
330 F. Supp. 1002, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miranda-v-united-states-nysd-1971.