Miranda Haigler-King v. Giuseppe R. Miserendino

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: A26A0627
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 18, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0627. HAIGLER-KING v. MISERENDINO.

HODGES, Judge.

Giuseppe Miserendino petitioned the Superior Court of Towns County for a

protective order under OCGA § 16-5-94 to enjoin Miranda Haigler-King, his

neighbor, from stalking him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued

a 12-month protective order, which it subsequently amended. Haigler-King appeals

from that order, arguing that the court abused its discretion in issuing the order

because (1) there was insufficient evidence of stalking, and (2) the order included an

overly broad restriction infringing on her ability to reside in her own home. For the

reasons explained below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case with

direction.

It is well settled that [t]he grant or denial of a motion for protective order generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. The trial court is in the best position to make determinations on these issues, and we will not overrule its judgment if there is any reasonable evidence to support it. In other words, it is not this Court’s function to second-guess the trial court in cases such as this, which turn largely on questions of credibility and judgments.

Hayward v. Wisner, 369 Ga. App. 100 (892 SE2d 398) (2023) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

Viewed in this light, the record shows that Haigler-King and Miserendino live

five or six houses apart in a Towns County subdivision. On June 24, 2025,

Miserendino petitioned for a stalking temporary protective order, alleging that

Haigler-King, while in a vehicle, “sped up and veer[ed] toward” him while he was on

a golf cart. He claimed Haigler-King “continu[ed]” to exhibit “harassing and

intimidating behavior” towards him. The petition did not describe any other acts of

harassing or intimidating behavior. The trial court entered a stalking ex parte

temporary protective order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for July 10, 2025.

Specifically, the order enjoined Haigler-King from (a) harassing and/or intimidating

2 Miserendino or his immediate family, (b) approaching within 500 yards of

Miserendino, and (c) having any contact with Miserendino or his immediate family.

At the evidentiary hearing, Miserendino testified as to various stalking incidents

by Haigler-King. First, Miserendino described an encounter on June 19, 2025, where

he was driving his golf cart and Haigler-King, who was driving a car from the opposite

direction, saw him, crossed the yellow line on the road, “veered over towards [him,]

and ran [him] off the road ... very close to the point that [he] feared for [his] life or

damage or [that he] was going to get hurt.” Miserendino had a video of the incident

taken by a neighbor, and that video was played for the court.

On another occasion, Haigler-King, in violation of the ex parte protective order,

came within 500 yards of Miserendino while he was trying to rescue a puppy running

down the road in front of his house. Miserendino testified that Haigler-King came

within feet of him, “sitting ... in her vehicle, laughing and carrying on and videoing

[Miserendino and another neighbor.]” According to both Miserendino and the

neighbor who testified, Miserendino was in fear for his life on that occasion; the

witness also “was concerned” for her life. Both also testified that Haigler-King could

have taken an alternate road to exit the neighborhood and did not need to pass in front

3 of Miserendino’s house. According to Miserendino, Haigler-King “could have stayed

a couple hundred feet away from us, but she persisted, as she always does, pushing us

to put me in harm’s way[.]” He filed a police report concerning this incident. A

videotape of the incident was played for the court. According to Miserendino, he “just

want[s] to be left alone. [He] want[s] [his] property to be protected. [He] want[s] [his]

life to be protected. [He] fear[s] for [his] life.”

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found Haigler-King in contempt of

violating the ex parte stalking protective order. The court based this decision on the

“testimony of the plaintiff and independent witness and video” evidence from both

the plaintiff and defendant. The trial court further expanded the ex parte order to a 12-

month protective order, which would expire on July 9, 2026.

Haigler-King filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.

Specifically, the court found, “upon viewing of evidence presented and consideration

of testimony from the parties[,]” that Haigler-King committed a knowing and willful

violation of the stalking statute, OCGA § 16-5-90. The court further found, “[b]ased

upon the facts and arguments presented to the [c]ourt,” that although Haigler-King

“would be inconvenienced by the restrictions of the order[, including the 500-yard

4 restriction,] it would not prevent entry and egress to her property.” That said, the

court did find that its previous order unlawfully restricted Haigler-King from

accessing firearms, and it issued an amended protective order. Haigler-King appeals

from this order.

1. Haigler-King first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

a 12-month stalking protective order without sufficient evidence of predicate acts of

stalking as required by OCGA § 16-5-94(a). We disagree.

Under OCGA § 16-5-94 (a), a person “may seek a restraining order by filing a

petition alleging conduct constituting stalking as defined in Code Section 16-5-90.”

That Code section provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the offense of

stalking when he or she follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person

at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose

of harassing and intimidating the other person.” OCGA § 16-5-90(a)(1). For purposes

of the statute, the term “contact” includes any communication, including

communication in person, and the term “harassing and intimidating” means “a

knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes

emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear for such person’s safety

5 ... by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, and which serves

no legitimate purpose.” Id. “In order to obtain a protective order based on stalking,

the petitioner must establish the elements of the offense by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Pilcher v. Stribling, 282 Ga. 166, 167 (647 SE2d 8) (2007).

Haigler-King asserts, without any supporting authority, that the evidence did

not support the trial court’s finding that she committed an act of stalking against

Miserendino because, according to her, the interactions were not “anything more than

happenstance encounters by neighbors lawfully traveling on the subdivision

roadways.” She further asserts, again without any supporting authority, that even if

the first incident amounted to harassing and intimidating behavior, one incident alone

does not establish a pattern of stalking, and she “did not do any act which caused

[Miserendino] to be in reasonable fear for his safety.” Both her arguments, however,

disregard the trial court’s discretion to gauge the credibility of the parties. Hayward,

369 Ga. App. at 100.

Here, based on the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, there was

reasonable evidence to support a finding, under a preponderance of the evidence

standard, that Haigler-King knowingly and purposefully stalked Miserendino by first

6 running him off the road and subsequently failing to comply with the trial court’s ex

parte protective order, contacting him on at least one other occasion in a harassing

manner that put him in fear for his personal safety. Based on these confrontational

acts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Miserendino had

established the elements of stalking and entering the protective order against Haigler-

King. See, e.g., Hayward, 369 Ga. App. at 101-02 (holding that a trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding a pattern of harassing and intimidating conduct

justifying a protective order against a neighbor where neighbor had screamed at

petitioner and other individuals on multiple occasions and petitioner testified she did

not feel safe to go outside). Although Haigler-King attempted to present a different

version of events as to both incidents, the outcome of this appeal does not change, as

“we do not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, and we construe the

evidence in favor of the findings of the trier of fact.” Thornton v. Hemphill, 300 Ga.

App. 647 (686 SE2d 263) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Hayward,

369 Ga. App. at 100. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of Haigler-King’s motion for

new trial on this ground is affirmed.

7 2. Haigler-King next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

prohibiting her “from approaching within 500 yards of [Miserendino] and/or

[Miserendino’s] immediate family, and/or residence[.]” According to Haigler-King,

this restriction “effectively ousts [her] from her home[.]” We agree.

While a superior court is vested with broad discretion to “fashion appropriate

relief from conduct designated as stalking[,]” that relief may not include “a

prohibition against residing in one’s own home.” Bruno v. Light, 344 Ga. App. 799,

802(1)(c) (811 SE2d 500) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted). In Bruno, the

trial court enjoined the respondent from “approaching within one mile of [the

petitioner] and/or [the petitioner’s] immediate family, and/or residence, place of

employment, or school or subsequent residence, place of employment or school.” Id.

at 800 (punctuation and emphasis omitted). The court then added the following

language to the otherwise pre-typed form-order: “This restriction includes his own

property.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 800, 800 n.1. The respondent argued, as

Haigler-King does here, that the restriction banning him from his own residence was

overbroad. Id. at 802-04(1)(c). This Court agreed, specifically reasoning that although

the protective order “may have incidentally kept [the respondent] from face-to-face

8 contact with [the petitioner] while she was at home, significantly, [the respondent]

would violate the order even if he went to his residence when [the petitioner] was not

at hers.” Id. at 803(1)(c) (citation and punctuation omitted). We concluded that the

superior court exceeded its authority in banning the respondent from his own

residence. Id.

Given the circumstances in this case, we likewise conclude that the trial court’s

500-yard restriction effectively ousts Haigler-King from her home, which Miserendino

admits is within 500 yards of his home. Compare Sullivan v. Kubanyi, 361 Ga. App.

255, 258-59(4) (863 SE2d 727) (2021) (concluding that a respondent living in the same

condo building as a petitioner could not demonstrate that the protective order

language banned him from his residence because the record did not include a

transcript of the evidentiary hearing and it appeared the respondent had moved).

Accordingly, this case is remanded to allow the superior court the opportunity to

fashion appropriate relief from Haigler-King’s stalking conduct. See Bruno, 344 Ga.

App. at 504(1)(c).

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded with direction.

Barnes, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.