Mirabelli v. Olson

District Court, S.D. California·Decided November 14, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-00768·Unknown

Opinion

ELIZABETH MIRABELLI, an Case No.: 3:23-cv-00768-BEN-VET individual, et al., SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING Plaintiffs, v. DISCOVERY AND OTHER PRE- TRIAL PROCEEDINGS MARK OLSON, in his official capacity as President of the EUSD Board of Education, et al., [Doc. No. 176] Defendants. Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Modify the First Amended Scheduling Order and Request for Status Conference Before Magistrate Judge (“Joint Motion”). Doc. No. 176. Therein, the parties jointly seek to extend the fact discovery cutoff and subsequent deadlines but disagree on the appropriate length of an extension. Id. at 2. Since the parties do not agree on this point, Defendants request a status conference to discuss the matter. Id. The parties each separately propose new dates for remaining deadlines, ranging in extensions of four (4) weeks to twenty-five (25) weeks. Id. at 4–8. In support of the extension, the parties represent that new Plaintiffs proceeding pseudonymously present a hurdle to discovery and that a protective order is necessary. Id. at 2. The parties further represent that they are engaged in meet and confer efforts to draft such a protective order. Id. The parties also reference a pending motion to dismiss and upcoming holidays. Id. at 2. Finally, counsel for each party submitted a declaration in support of their proposed dates. Doc. Nos. 176-1, 176-2, 177, 178. This is the parties’ second request to extend fact discovery. See Doc. No. 131. In determining whether to modify a scheduling order, the Court considers the “good cause” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4), a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Id. (emphasis added); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the pretrial scheduling order can only be modified upon a showing of good cause”). Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Learjet, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc. (In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.), 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013). “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes on the 1983 amendment); see also Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087; 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990) (“good cause” means scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite party’s diligence). “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. The focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. Id.; Adrian v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 686 F. App’x 403, 405 (9th Cir. 2017) (applied to joint motions); Neidermeyer v. Caldwell, 718 F. App’x 485, 489 (9th Cir. 2017) (moving party did not show good cause when he “offered no explanation for his undue delay”). Further, the required showing of diligence is measured by conduct displayed throughout the period of time already allowed. See, e.g., Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Krohne Fund, LP v. Simonsen, 681 F. App’x 635, 638 (9th Cir. 2017); Lyles v. Dollar Rent a Car, Inc., 849 F. App’x 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2021). “If [the moving] party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609; Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 764 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). Civil Local Rule 16.1(b) also requires that all counsel “proceed with diligence to take all steps necessary to bring an action to readiness for trial.” CivLR 16.1(b). Similarly, this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules require that any motion to continue a scheduling order deadline include a showing of good cause, supported by a “declaration from counsel that details steps taken by the parties to meet current deadlines and reasons why the parties can no longer meet those deadlines.” J. Torres Civ. Chambers R. VI.D. The Court agrees that an extension of fact discovery and other case deadlines is appropriate given the challenges associated with newly joined parties, including Plaintiffs proceeding pseudonymously. However, the Court does not agree that an extension of more than three (3) months is presently necessary. Counsel for Defendant Rob Bonta, advocating for a roughly six (6) month extension, does not describe any efforts to pursue discovery and suggests that the lack of a Rule 26(f) conference with Plaintiffs and a pending motion to dismiss prevent discovery. Doc. No. 178 at 2. The Court disagrees—neither justifies, at this time, extending all case deadlines by six months. Moreover, potential discovery delays due to upcoming holidays similarly do not justify such a lengthy extension. Id. at 3. Other defendants propose a four (4) month extension. Id. at 4–6. In addition to challenges regarding discovery from pseudonymous Plaintiffs, they also generally reference upcoming holidays as a hurdle to discovery. Doc. No. 176-1 at 2–3. Again, holidays occurring during the discovery period do not warrant delaying the case for several months, particularly when the discovery period will include over two months in the new calendar year. Therefore, based on a review of the Joint Motion and record, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Joint Motion. The Court will provide an approximately three-month extension for all remaining case deadlines. The request for a Status Conference is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties should continue to move this case forward, and if the deadlines require further adjustment based on future events, the parties may move for relief at that time. The Court hereby ORDERS the following: 1. All remaining dates and deadlines set forth in the Court’s First Amended Scheduling Order, dated October 9, 2024, are hereby VACATED. See Doc. No. 161. 2. Defendant Bonta shall meet and confer with Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) no later than November 27, 2024; 3. All fact discovery shall be completed by all parties by February 14, 2025. “Completed” means that all discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30-36, and discovery subpoenas under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, must be initiated a sufficient period of time in advance of the cut-off date, so that it may be completed by the cut-off date, taking into account the times for service, notice, and response as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel shall promptly and in good faith meet and confer regarding all discovery disputes in compliance with Local Rule 26.1(a). The Court expects counsel to make every effort to resolve all disputes without court intervention through the meet and confer process. If the parties

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