Minter v. King

27 Colo. App. 233
CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 15, 1915
DocketNo. 4021
StatusPublished

This text of 27 Colo. App. 233 (Minter v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Minter v. King, 27 Colo. App. 233 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

Bell, J.

This action was brought in the District Court of Baca County, Colorado, April 7th, 1910, by David B. Nowel against James F. Berger, John Minturn and others, for the purpose of quieting the title to lots 3 and 4', and the south half of the northwest quarter of Section 1, Township 29 S., Range 44 W., in said Baca County. After the issues were formed, it was substantially admitted between the contesting parties that Minter, plaintiff in error, received from the County .Treasurer of Baca County a tax deed for the lands in question; that the same was duly recorded August 22nd, ' 1900; that on February 19th, 1901, Minter paid the 1900 taxes'on said lands; that each year thereafter he duly paid the taxes for the preceding year, including the taxes for the years from 1900 to 1909, both inclusive, before this suit was brought; that all of said taxes were paid in good faith under said tax deed, and during all of said period the lands in dispute were vacant and unoccupied. Said County Treasurer duly signed said tax deed for the premises, and, seemingly, endeavored to acknowledge the same before the County Clerk of said County, who certified that, before him, personally appeared W. M. Stewart, Treasurer of said County, personally known to him to be the Treasurer at the date of the execution of the conveyance, and to be the identicaf person whose name was affixed to and who executed the same as treasurer of the county for the purpose therein expressed; but did not anywhere certify that said Stewart acknowledged the execution of the same. This left the attempted acknowledgment a nullity.

[235]*235It is said to be a universal requirement that the certificate of acknowledgment shall recite the fact of acknowledgment, and where such recital is omitted the lapse of time will not raise any presumption of acknowledgment: Sec. 202, page 855, volume 1, Corpus Juris, citing, among many other cases, Henderson v. Grewell, 8 Cal., 581; Bryan v. Ramirez, 8 Cal., 461; Heintz v. O’Donnell, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 21, 42 S. W. 797. See also 1 Ruling Case Law, 286, Sec. 66, citing note to Terise v. Bottego, 108 Am. St. Rep., 521, 531.

' Acknowledgment in its technical, legal sense means a formal declaration or admission before an authorized court or public officer, by a person who has executed an instrument, that such instrument is his act and deed: Corpus Juris.-, supra, 745. There is'neither a declaration nor. an admission of the grantor, in the certificate under consideration, that the tax deed was his act and deed; hence, no acknowledgment at all.

Sec. 3902, Mill’s Ann. Stats., provides that the tax deed shall be signed by the treasurer in his official capacity, and attested by his official or private seal, and acknowledged by him before some officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds, and when substantially thus executed and recorded in the proper record of titles to real estate, shall vest in the purchaser all the right, title, interest and estate of the former owner in and to the land conveyed, and also all the right, title, interest and claim of the state and county thereto, and shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of this state in all controversies and suits in relation to the rights of .the purchaser;- his heirs or assigns, to the land thereby conveyed, that said land or property was subject 'to taxation; that the taxes were not paid prior to sale; that said property had not been redeemed; that it had been listed and assessed legally'; that the levy was properly made; that the property was legally advertised and sold for taxes as therein stated; that the grantee named was the purchaser m sUe¡[236]*236cessor in interest of such purchaser; and that the sale was conducted in the manner required by law.

The trial court held, in effect, that the failure of the treasurer to acknowledge the tax deed left the same inoperative, and that the same does not purport to convey title to the real estate described therein, and until a tax deed is acknowledged substantially as required by statute, it cannot become a colorable title.

A deed between private parties may be executed and delivered and made effective without acknowledgment or record; but it has been frequently held that a tax deed, under our statutes, not acknowledged substantially in the manner prescribed by statute, is void: Sayre v. Sage, 47 Colo. 559, 108 Pac. 160; Empire Co. v. Bender, 49 Colo. 522, 113 Pac. 494; Little v. Howell, 24 Colo. App., 128, 130, 124 Pac. 743.

In Sayre v. Sage, supra, the tax deed there in controversy was issued in 1893 and delivered to the purchaser, but was not recorded until September, 1898. The action was not commenced until December, 1902, or less than seven years after the tax deed was recorded. Gabbert, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, said :

“The deed in question had neither seal (official or private) . The general assembly has the authority to prescribe the form and requisites of a tax deed. The treasurer, in executing such deed, acts under a naked statutory power, and in order that it shall be valid, it must comply substantially with the provisions of the statute prescribing its form. .That it must be attested by the official or private seal of the treasurer is a positive requirement of the statute, and is as necessary to its validity as any other. Without one or the other of the seals specified, it is void. Sutton v. Young, 4 Neb., 319; Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S., 241, 33 L. Ed. 923, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539; Gue v. Jones, 25 Neb. 634, 41 N. W. 555; Reed v. Merriam, 15 Neb. 324, 18 N. W. 137; Gage v. Starkweather, 103 Ill. 559; Reed v. Morse, 51 Kan. 141, 32 Pac. 900.
[237]*237“* * * By virtue of the provisions of sec. 3902, 2 Mills’ Stats.', Which recites, in substance, that when a tax deed is recorded in the proper record of titles to. real estate it vests in the grantee all the right, title and interest of the former owner in and to the land thereby conveyed, a tax deed does not purport to convey any title to real estate until it has been filed for record in the proper office. Hence, it follows, that neither Sec. 2923-e nor Sec. 2924, supra, (Mills’ Stats., Rev. Supp.), operates to give the grantee in a tax deed color of title until it has been filed for record. Morris & Thombs v. St. Louis Nat’l Bank, 17 Colo. 231, 29 Pac. 802; Wason v. Major, 10 Colo. App., 181, 50 Pac., 741.”

Further, he held that “color of title can only arise out of a conveyance purporting to convey title to real estate,” citing in support thereof Omaha & Grant S. & R. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 21 Pac. 925, 5 L. R. A. 236, 16 Am. St. 185; Warren v. Adams, 19 Colo. 515, 36 Pac. 604.

The conclusions thus expressed in Sayre v. Sage, supra, to the effect that, until a tax deed is executed in substantial conformity" with the requirements of the statute, and recorded, it does not purport to convey any title to the real estate described therein, and cannot operate as color of title, have been adhered to in many subsequent decisions of this and the Supreme Court. In Empire Co. v. Bender, supra, Bailey, J., speaking for the court, said:

“The tax deed offered in evidence, to support of defendant’s adverse claim, was unacknowledged. Without acknowledgement it is a nullity, and was not competent in evidence for any purpose.

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Related

Deputron v. Young
134 U.S. 241 (Supreme Court, 1890)
Fuller v. Knights of Pythias.
40 S.E. 65 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1901)
Heintz v. O'Donnell
42 S.W. 797 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1897)
Bryan v. Ramirez
8 Cal. 461 (California Supreme Court, 1857)
Henderson v. Grewell
8 Cal. 581 (California Supreme Court, 1857)
Omaha & Grant Smelting & Refining Co. v. Tabor
13 Colo. 41 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1889)
Morris & Thombs v. St. Louis National Bank
17 Colo. 231 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1892)
Warren v. Adams
19 Colo. 515 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1894)
Saybe v. Sage
47 Colo. 559 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1910)
Empire Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Bender
49 Colo. 522 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1911)
Matthews v. Blake
92 P. 242 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1907)
Sutton v. Stone
4 Neb. 319 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1876)
Reed v. Merriam
15 Neb. 323 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1883)
Gue v. Jones
25 Neb. 634 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1889)
Leftwich v. City of Richmond
40 S.E. 651 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1902)
Gage v. Starkweather
103 Ill. 559 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1882)
Jackson v. Neal
35 N.E. 1021 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1894)
Wason v. Major
10 Colo. App. 181 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1897)
Little v. Howell
24 Colo. App. 128 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1913)
Reed v. Morse
51 Kan. 141 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1893)

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Bluebook (online)
27 Colo. App. 233, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/minter-v-king-coloctapp-1915.