Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Roberson

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 2, 2019
• Docket: 2:18-cv-01058
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 10 MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE Case No. 2:18-cv-01058-RAJ 11 COMPANY, 12 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT Plaintiff, ROBERSON’S MOTION FOR 13 SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 14

15 WENDY ROBERSON, an individual; A. R., a minor, by and through her guardian, 16 CHRISTINE RIGGENBERG,

17 Defendants.

19 A. R., a minor, by and through her guardian, CHRISTINE RIGGENBERG, 20 Crossclaim 21 Plaintiff, 22 v. 23

24 WENDY ROBERSON, an individual

25 Crossclaim 26 Defendant.

28 1 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Wendy Roberson’s Motion for 2 Summary Judgment (Dkt. #27). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the 3 Motion. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiff Minnesota Life Insurance Company (“Minnesota Life” or “Plaintiff”) is a 6 life insurance company based in Minnesota. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 1. John Marcel Miller (“Mr. 7 Miller”) was covered for supplemental life insurance under a group universal life 8 insurance policy (the “Policy”), issued by Minnesota Life to Mr. Miller’s employer, 9 Honeywell International, Inc.. Id. at ¶ 6; Dkt. #16 at ¶ 30. In addition to his coverage 10 under the Policy, Mr. Miller also received other benefits including basic life insurance 11 and retirement benefits (“the Benefits”). Dkt. #16 at ¶ 32. 12 On December 30, 2010 Mr. Miller designated his daughter, A.R., a minor, (“A.R.” 13 or “Defendant A. R.”) and his “domestic partner,” Wendy Roberson (“Defendant 14 Roberson” or “Ms. Roberson”), as 50% beneficiaries under the Policy. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 38; 15 Dkt. #28 at ¶ 2. On January 6, 2011, Mr. Miller also updated his Benefits designations, 16 listing Defendant A.R. and Defendant Roberson as 50% beneficiaries. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 37. 17 Mr. Miller and Ms. Roberson’s romantic relationship terminated at some point in 2011. 18 Dkt. #16 at ¶ 39; Dkt. #28 at ¶ 4. On May 20, 2012, Mr. Miller updated his Benefits 19 beneficiary designations, removing Ms. Roberson as a beneficiary and designating 20 Defendant A.R. as the sole, 100% beneficiary. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 40; Dkt. #27 at 6. Mr. 21 Miller did not make any changes to his beneficiary designations under the Policy. Dkt. 22 #27 at 6. 23 On April 4, 2016, Mr. Miller died. Dkt. #15 at ¶ 7; Dkt. #27 at ¶ 5. At the time of 24 his death, the total life insurance benefits due under the Policy was $135,149.69. Id. Ms. 25 Roberson and A.R. were both named as 50% beneficiaries under the Policy. Dkt. #16 at 26 ¶ 38; Dkt. #28 at ¶ 2. Following Mr. Miller’s death, A.R., through her guardian, 27 Christine Riggenberg, submitted a claim for her portion of the coverage and received her 28 50% distribution (totaling approximately $69,205.05) under the Policy. Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 8-9. 1 On October 30, 2017, Ms. Roberson also submitted a claim for the remaining 50% under 2 the Policy. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 11. Shortly after Ms. Roberson submitted her claim, Plaintiff 3 was notified by counsel for A.R. and her guardian, that they were disputing Ms. 4 Roberson’s status as a beneficiary under the Policy. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 11. According to 5 Plaintiff, counsel for A.R. argued that Mr. Miller had failed to remove Ms. Roberson as a 6 beneficiary under the Policy due to “mistake or oversight” and that under Washington 7 statute RCW 11.07.010(2), which provides for the revocation of prior beneficiary 8 designations upon termination of a marriage or state registered domestic partnership, Ms. 9 Roberson was not entitled to recover under the Policy. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 11. 10 On July 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint for interpleader. Dkt. #1. 11 Defendant A.R. subsequently filed her answer and crossclaim for declaratory judgment 12 under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Dkt. #16. On March 11, 2019, this Court issued an order 13 granting Plaintiff’s motion for judgment in interpleader and discharging Plaintiff from 14 this action. Dkt. # 22. Ms. Roberson filed this motion for summary judgment against 15 Defendant A.R. on June 4, 2019. Dkt. #27. Defendant A.R. has not submitted an 16 opposition to Ms. Roberson’s motion. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material 19 fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 21 genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 22 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 23 demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 24 Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where 25 the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail 26 merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support 27 the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets 28 the initial burden, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 1 genuine issue of fact for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 2 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most 3 favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. 4 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). 5 However, the court need not, and will not, “scour the record in search of a genuine 6 issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 7 White v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 904 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1990) (the court need 8 not “speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obliged 9 to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support 10 the nonmoving party’s claim”). The opposing party must present significant and 11 probative evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & 12 Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 For reasons not apparent from the record, Defendant A. R. does not oppose Ms. 14 Roberson’s motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) authorizes a court 15 considering an unopposed summary judgment motion to treat an assertion of fact from 16 the moving party as undisputed. Under Local Rule CR 7(b)(2) the court may treat a 17 party’s failure to oppose a motion “as an admission that the motion has merit.” A court 18 cannot, however, grant a summary judgment motion merely because it is unopposed, 19 even where its local rules might permit it. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 949– 20 50 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court may only grant summary judgment if “the motion and 21 supporting materials ... show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 In her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Roberson argues that Defendant A.R. has 24 failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Dkt. #27 at 7. Ms. Roberson first 25 contends that the Washington statute, RCW 11.07.010(2), referenced in Minnesota Life’s 26 complaint for interpleader, does not extend beyond formal marriages or state registered 27 domestic partnerships. Dkt. #27 at 4-5. Ms. Roberson also argues that she is entitled to 28 summary judgment on Defendant A.R.’s crossclaim because Defendant A.R. has 1 provided no admissible evidence to support her allegation that Mr. Miller intended to 2 disinherit Ms. Roberson. Dkt. #27 at 5-7. 3 A. Applicability of RCW 11.07.010(2) 4 The Court will first consider the applicability of RCW 11.07.010(2), a Washington 5 statute which provides for the revocation of prior beneficiary designations upon 6 termination of a marriage or state registered domestic partnership. RCW 11.07.010(2) 7 provides in relevant part: 8 If a marriage or state registered domestic partnership is dissolved or invalidated, or a state registered domestic partnership 9 terminated, a provision made prior to that event that relates to the 10 payment or transfer at death of the decedent’s interest in a nonprobate asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the 11 decedent's former spouse or state registered domestic partner, is revoked. 12 RCW § 11.07.010(2). In its complaint for interpleader, Plaintiff alleged that this 13 interpleader action was initiated after Defendant A.R.’s counsel contacted Plaintiff and 14 disputed Ms. Roberson’s status as a beneficiary under RCW 11.07.010(2). Dkt. #1 at ¶ 15 11. Ms. Roberson argues that RCW 11.07.010(2) does not preclude her from recovering 16 her portion of the Policy because the statute only applies to marriages and state registered 17 domestic partnerships, not the “less formal boyfriend/girlfriend relationship.” Dkt. #27 at 18 2. 19 Under Washington law, if a “statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court 20 must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” State, Dep't 21 of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9-10 (2002). Here, the plain 22 language of the statute expressly limits its application to “decree[s] of dissolution of 23 marriage” or “declaration[s] of invalidity or certification[s] of termination of a state 24 registered domestic partnership.” RCW § 11.07.010(1). The text of the provision is 25 neither ambiguous or unclear. The statute references only the termination or dissolution 26 of “marriages” or “state registered domestic partnerships.” Id. The Court will not read 27 into the statute that which the legislature omitted. Auto. Drivers & Demonstrators Union 28 1 Local No. 882 v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 92 Wash. 2d 415, 421 (1979) (“This court cannot read 2 into a statute that which it may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or 3 inadvertent omission.”). The parties do not dispute that Mr. Miller and Ms. Roberson 4 were never married or in a state registered domestic partnership. Dkt. #15 at ¶ 2; Dkt. 5 #16 at ¶ 36. As a result, the Court finds that RCW 11.07.010(2) does not apply. 6 B. Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact 7 The Court must apply the law of the forum state in interpleader actions filed under 8 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Davis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1960). It is 9 well-established that the interpretation of insurance policies is a question of law. Kitsap 10 County v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 Wash.2d 567, 575 (1998). An insurance policy is a 11 contract, and courts shall determine the contracting parties’ intent by resorting to a fair, 12 reasonable, and sensible construction of the contract’s language, as the average purchaser 13 would understand. See Sharbono v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 139 Wash. App. 14 383, 394 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Courts will enforce an insurance contract as 15 written if the contact is clear and unambiguous, regardless of the parties’ intent. See 16 Sharbono, at 394 (“If an insurance contract’s language is neither ambiguous nor difficult 17 to comprehend, we will enforce the intent expressed in the policy[.]”). 18 Here, the parties do not dispute that Ms. Roberson is a designated beneficiary 19 under the policy. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 38; Dkt. #28 at ¶ 2. Instead, Defendant A.R., in her 20 crossclaim for declaratory judgment, seeks a declaration that Mr. Miller intended to 21 remove Ms. Roberson from the Policy. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 47. Specifically, A.R. alleges that 22 in 2011, Mr. Miller made changes to his beneficiary designations, for both the Policy and 23 Benefits, listing Ms. Roberson and A.R. as 50% beneficiaries. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 37. Later, in 24 May 2012, after Mr. Miller and Ms. Roberson ended their relationship, A.R. alleges that 25 Mr. Miller made changes to his Benefits, removing Roberson as a beneficiary. Dkt. #16 26 at ¶ 40. According to A.R., Mr. Miller was unaware that changes he made to his Benefits 27 designations did not translate to the Policy at issue. Id. at ¶ 35. Ms. Roberson argues 28 that Defendant A.R.’s speculation regarding Mr. Miller’s intent is insufficient to create a 1 factual dispute for the purposes of summary judgment. Dkt. #27 at 7. The Court is 2 inclined to agree. 3 Ms. Roberson, for her part, has presented evidence that she is a named beneficiary 4 under the Policy. Dkt. #27 at ¶ 2; Dkt. 28, Ex. A.. Defendant A.R. has not presented any 5 evidence to support for her allegation that Mr. Miller also intended to remove Ms. 6 Roberson as a beneficiary under the Policy. Dkt. #16 at ¶ 47. Under Rule 56(e) “a party 7 opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere 8 allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is 9 a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 10 Defendant A.R. has opted not to respond to Roberson’s motion for summary judgment or 11 provide any evidence beyond the allegations in her cross-claim. Dkt. #16. Without 12 more, Defendant A.R.’s allegations are just that, allegations. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island 13 Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding uncorroborated and self-serving 14 testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact). The Court finds that 15 Defendant A.R.’s uncorroborated allegations regarding Mr. Miller’s changes to the 16 Benefits and Policy and her speculation regarding his motives are insufficient to create a 17 factual dispute under Rule 56. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1995) 18 (“speculation does not create a factual dispute.”). 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 27) is 21 GRANTED. 22 23 DATED this the 2nd day of August, 2019. A 24

25 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 26 United States District Judge 27 28