Underwood, Judge.
The appellant, Minis, who was in the lock and safe business, was indicted for burglary involving a Pizza Hut restaurant in Douglas County. During a lengthy trial the state presented evidence that Minis planned the Pizza Hut burglary, instructed his accomplices on how to get into the building and gain entrance to a safe, provided tools and transportation to and from the Pizza Hut and shared money taken from a cash register after the safe on the burglarized premises was found open and empty. The state also presented testimony alleging that Minis had a similar role in a series of additional burglaries carried out with the same modus operandi for which he was not on trial. He was convicted and received a sentence of twenty years with nine of those years to be served on probation. [672]*672He appeals and enumerates six errors.
1. Appellant Minis’ first contention is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to preclude the use of state witnesses whose names were not given to him on a timely demand, prior to trial. He contends this deprived him of sufficient time to interview the witnesses prior to trial. However, he requested a one-day continuance to interview the unlisted witnesses, and the court granted him two weeks for this purpose. Code Ann. § 27-1403 provides that "[wjithout the consent of the defendant, no witness shall be permitted to testify for the State whose name does not appear upon the list of witnesses as furnished to the defendant unless the ... prosecuting attorney shall state in his place that the evidence sought to be presented is newly-discovered evidence which the State was not aware of at the time of its furnishing the defendant with a list of the witnesses.” In construing this statute, this court has held that the trial judge can use his discretion to determine if the defendant can be protected by some other form of appropriate relief, such as a motion for mistrial or continuance. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 203 (217 SE2d 343) (1975). As the trial judge granted defendant’s motion for a continuance of one day by allowing him a two-week continuance, it is clear the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, and this enumeration is without merit.
2. Defendant’s second contention is that the trial court erred by permitting, over his objection, testimony concerning additional and subsequent crimes allegedly committed by him. Both our Supreme Court and this court have held that testimony of this nature is admissible if there is evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime, and if there is sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. French v. State, 237 Ga. 620, 621 (229 SE2d 410) (1976); Collins v. State, 145 Ga. App. 341 (243 SE2d 716) (1978). The testimony clearly satisfied both of the requirements of the French and Collins cases, viz., the identification of Minis as the perpetrator of the independent crimes, and his use of the same or similar modus operandi.
3. The appellant’s third contention is that the trial [673]*673court erred in allowing certain tape recordings and a recorder to be provided to the jury. However, defense counsel explicitly agreed to this action by the trial court and stated that he had no objection to the jury making any use of the tapes, and no objection to the jury listening to the tapes in the jury room. This was a clear waiver of objection to such procedure. Appellant cannot obtain reversal of a conviction for alleged errors which he committed or induced. Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (221 SE2d 28) (1975); Whitten v. State, 143 Ga. App. 768 (240 SE2d 107) (1978).
4. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon the general grounds. The question on appeal is whether there is any evidence authorizing the verdict. Lowe v. State, 143 Ga. App. 415 (238 SE2d 716) (1977). The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict, and no error was committed by the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial.
5. Finally, the appellant contends that the trial court committed error at the sentencing phase of the proceeding by considering the various alleged crimes as to which testimony was given at the trial, but of which appellant has not been convicted.
Code Ann. § 27-2503 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that "Except in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, upon the return of a verdict of'guilty’ by the jury in any felony case, the judge . . . shall conduct a presentence hearing at which the only issue shall be the determination of punishment to be imposed. In such hearing the judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions . . . of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas ... If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment.”
In Division 2 of this opinion we held that it was proper in the trial of this case to admit evidence relating to other alleged offenses. Ordinarily, under the laws of evidence, it is not permissible to present at trial evidence [674]*674of other offenses or incidents of a criminal nature. Harris v. State, 118 Ga. App. 848 (166 SE2d 94) (1968); McMillon v. State, 140 Ga. App. 137 (230 SE2d 110) (1976).
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge made reference to the evidence which had been admitted concerning "crimes other than for which he [the defendant] is on trial.” He instructed the jury as follows:
"Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of allowing you to determine if it tends to show the identity of the person who committed the crime, or crimes, if any, of which the defendant is accused or that it tends to connect the accused with the crime charged, or of determining if it tends to show his knowledge, motive, intent, identity, or a state of mind evidenced by a characteristic method, or a common scheme, or plan in the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan, or scheme used in the commission of any offense you may find in this case. For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose, and if you determine that it is not useful to you for the above purpose you are instructed to disregard it entirely(Emphasis supplied.)
After the trial judge dismissed the jury following the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence he inquired as to whether there was anything that he needed to hear before imposing sentence. A brief colloquy was held in which the appellant, his counsel, the district attorney and the judge participated. The court articulated the following: "It’s an unusual case. It’s disturbing, the number of other cases... I know they’re only admissible for the jury [to] determine any course of conduct, scheme, or pattern, and yet in sentencing I think I have to . . . look at them at least, I certainly wouldn’t consider them as a conviction, but they are disturbing to me in number . . .
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Underwood, Judge.
The appellant, Minis, who was in the lock and safe business, was indicted for burglary involving a Pizza Hut restaurant in Douglas County. During a lengthy trial the state presented evidence that Minis planned the Pizza Hut burglary, instructed his accomplices on how to get into the building and gain entrance to a safe, provided tools and transportation to and from the Pizza Hut and shared money taken from a cash register after the safe on the burglarized premises was found open and empty. The state also presented testimony alleging that Minis had a similar role in a series of additional burglaries carried out with the same modus operandi for which he was not on trial. He was convicted and received a sentence of twenty years with nine of those years to be served on probation. [672]*672He appeals and enumerates six errors.
1. Appellant Minis’ first contention is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to preclude the use of state witnesses whose names were not given to him on a timely demand, prior to trial. He contends this deprived him of sufficient time to interview the witnesses prior to trial. However, he requested a one-day continuance to interview the unlisted witnesses, and the court granted him two weeks for this purpose. Code Ann. § 27-1403 provides that "[wjithout the consent of the defendant, no witness shall be permitted to testify for the State whose name does not appear upon the list of witnesses as furnished to the defendant unless the ... prosecuting attorney shall state in his place that the evidence sought to be presented is newly-discovered evidence which the State was not aware of at the time of its furnishing the defendant with a list of the witnesses.” In construing this statute, this court has held that the trial judge can use his discretion to determine if the defendant can be protected by some other form of appropriate relief, such as a motion for mistrial or continuance. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 203 (217 SE2d 343) (1975). As the trial judge granted defendant’s motion for a continuance of one day by allowing him a two-week continuance, it is clear the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, and this enumeration is without merit.
2. Defendant’s second contention is that the trial court erred by permitting, over his objection, testimony concerning additional and subsequent crimes allegedly committed by him. Both our Supreme Court and this court have held that testimony of this nature is admissible if there is evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime, and if there is sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. French v. State, 237 Ga. 620, 621 (229 SE2d 410) (1976); Collins v. State, 145 Ga. App. 341 (243 SE2d 716) (1978). The testimony clearly satisfied both of the requirements of the French and Collins cases, viz., the identification of Minis as the perpetrator of the independent crimes, and his use of the same or similar modus operandi.
3. The appellant’s third contention is that the trial [673]*673court erred in allowing certain tape recordings and a recorder to be provided to the jury. However, defense counsel explicitly agreed to this action by the trial court and stated that he had no objection to the jury making any use of the tapes, and no objection to the jury listening to the tapes in the jury room. This was a clear waiver of objection to such procedure. Appellant cannot obtain reversal of a conviction for alleged errors which he committed or induced. Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (221 SE2d 28) (1975); Whitten v. State, 143 Ga. App. 768 (240 SE2d 107) (1978).
4. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon the general grounds. The question on appeal is whether there is any evidence authorizing the verdict. Lowe v. State, 143 Ga. App. 415 (238 SE2d 716) (1977). The evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict, and no error was committed by the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial.
5. Finally, the appellant contends that the trial court committed error at the sentencing phase of the proceeding by considering the various alleged crimes as to which testimony was given at the trial, but of which appellant has not been convicted.
Code Ann. § 27-2503 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that "Except in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, upon the return of a verdict of'guilty’ by the jury in any felony case, the judge . . . shall conduct a presentence hearing at which the only issue shall be the determination of punishment to be imposed. In such hearing the judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions . . . of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas ... If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment.”
In Division 2 of this opinion we held that it was proper in the trial of this case to admit evidence relating to other alleged offenses. Ordinarily, under the laws of evidence, it is not permissible to present at trial evidence [674]*674of other offenses or incidents of a criminal nature. Harris v. State, 118 Ga. App. 848 (166 SE2d 94) (1968); McMillon v. State, 140 Ga. App. 137 (230 SE2d 110) (1976).
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge made reference to the evidence which had been admitted concerning "crimes other than for which he [the defendant] is on trial.” He instructed the jury as follows:
"Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of allowing you to determine if it tends to show the identity of the person who committed the crime, or crimes, if any, of which the defendant is accused or that it tends to connect the accused with the crime charged, or of determining if it tends to show his knowledge, motive, intent, identity, or a state of mind evidenced by a characteristic method, or a common scheme, or plan in the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan, or scheme used in the commission of any offense you may find in this case. For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose, and if you determine that it is not useful to you for the above purpose you are instructed to disregard it entirely(Emphasis supplied.)
After the trial judge dismissed the jury following the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence he inquired as to whether there was anything that he needed to hear before imposing sentence. A brief colloquy was held in which the appellant, his counsel, the district attorney and the judge participated. The court articulated the following: "It’s an unusual case. It’s disturbing, the number of other cases... I know they’re only admissible for the jury [to] determine any course of conduct, scheme, or pattern, and yet in sentencing I think I have to . . . look at them at least, I certainly wouldn’t consider them as a conviction, but they are disturbing to me in number . . . The Walton County [incident] looked bad on him but I couldn’t make his punishment more because of the Walton County incident, for instance, I can’t consider that as a conviction. It would concern me some, but some of the other incidents I think I need to consider because they are in evidence before the [675]*675court as a part of the case . . .”
This court fully appreciates the dilemma in which a trial court finds itself in imposing sentence following a trial in which there was proper testimony as to alleged offenses other than that for which the defendant was charged, tried and convicted. It is entirely reasonable, proper and necessary in rational sentencing for the trial court to look to the circumstances and context in which the offense was committed, but a sentence based in part upon articulated consideration of other offenses, as yet untried, amounts to prescribing punishment for conduct for which there has been no conviction.
The charge by the trial court to the jury in this case, set forth above, is an excellent statement of the applicable law with respect to evidence of "other offenses.”
The "limited purpose” of evidence concerning other offenses as described in the court’s charge imposes a delicate and difficult burden on the trial court during the sentencing phase of the case. In imposing sentence, the court has the responsibility of considering matters presented on the issue of guilt or innocence plus "additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment.” However, evidence of other offenses admitted for a limited purpose on the issue of guilt or innocence may not properly be an articulate premise upon which sentence is partially based. The record of the pre-sentence hearing in this case is subject to the interpretation that the evidence of other offenses properly admitted for a "limited purpose” had a direct impact upon the imposition of sentence. We are not able to dismiss this as harmless error.
We have frequently applied a presumption that the trial court did not consider improper matters in fixing sentence. In Clark v. State, 138 Ga. App. 266 (226 SE2d 89) (1976) we held that "while we specifically disapprove of the trial judge’s permitting questioning as to an offense for which the defendant was known to have been acquitted, we shall adopt the presumption that the judge did not consider the improper matter in fixing his sentence, even though this presumption is weakened somewhat by his failure to disavow any reliance thereon.”
In the instant case we are unable to entertain this [676]*676presumption due to the trial court’s comment that "some of the other incidents I think I need to consider because they are in evidence before the court as a part of the case...”
Argued February 5, 1979
Decided July 12, 1979
Posey & Associates, William G. Posey, Richard J. Turreski, for appellant.
W. A. Foster, III, District Attorney, Barbara V. Tinsley, Frank C. Winn, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Normally a sentence fixed in the exercise of discretion within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal, and we express no opinion on the propriety of the particular sentence imposed on the appellant in this case. But for the foregoing reasons we find it necessary to remand for resentencing.
6. Appellant initiated a separate appeal on the issue of the trial court’s denial of his motion for a supersedeas bond. The issues in the separate appeal are the same as those disposed of when this court denied a motion for supersedeas bond on December 15, 1978 and this enumeration of error is without merit.
Judgment affirmed in part; remanded for resentencing.
Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur. Banke, J., concurs specially. Smith, J., concurs in the judgment only. Deen, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Shulman and Carley, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.