Mindiola v. State of Arizona

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-1842
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AARON JACOB MINDIOLA, No. 24-1842 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01008-SB v. MEMORANDUM* STATE OF ARIZONA, Kris Mayes, Arizona State Attorney General; COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Jennifer Pokorski (C/O County Attorney Rachel Mitchell), County Manager for Maricopa County; BERGIN, Retired Honorable Judge, (C/O Jeff Fine AZ Clerk); ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Angie Rodgers (C/O Jeff Fine AZ Clerk), Director of Arizona Department of Economic Security,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 15, 2025**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Aaron Jacob Mindiola appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from alleged errors in Mindiola’s

state-court divorce proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Garity v. APWU Nat’l

Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed with prejudice Mindiola’s damages

claims against the State of Arizona, the Arizona Department of Economic Security

– Division of Child Support Services, and Mayes and Rodgers in their official

capacities as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Jensen v. Brown, 131

F.4th 677, 696 (9th Cir. 2025) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the

State or its agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the

state.” (citation omitted)); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.

1982) (explaining that “Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to actions against

state officers sued in their official capacities,” unless the plaintiff seeks “only a

declaratory judgment or injunctive relief”).

The district court properly dismissed with prejudice Mindiola’s claims

against Judge Bergin arising from her decisions regarding discovery, custody,

spousal support, and child support as barred by judicial immunity. See Lund v.

Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that judges are immune from

2 24-1842 suit for damages for their judicial acts and setting forth factors to determine

whether an act is judicial).

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Mindiola’s claims

against Maricopa County and Pokorski and any remaining claims against Mayes

and Rodgers because Mindiola failed to allege facts sufficient to show personal

jurisdiction over these defendants. See Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th

Cir. 2015) (describing the “three-part test to assess whether a defendant has

sufficient contacts with the forum state to be subject to specific personal

jurisdiction”).

The district court properly declined to address Mindiola’s purported claims

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because his complaint does

not contain any allegations regarding the ADA. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety of a

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s

moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to

dismiss.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

because amendment would be futile. See Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1139

(9th Cir. 2015) (denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where no

amendment would cure the complaint’s deficiencies); see also Boquist v. Courtney,

3 24-1842 32 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[W]here, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se,

[the court] must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the [plaintiff] the

benefit of any doubt. A liberal construction of a pro se complaint, however, does

not mean that the court will supply essential elements of a claim that are absent

from the complaint.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Scafidi v.

Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 966 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2020).

AFFIRMED.

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