[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 99-1493
MICHAEL T. MIMS,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
PAUL DIPAOLO,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Dana A. Curhan for appellant. Annette C. Benedetto, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with whom Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, and Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellee.
January 11, 2000
*Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. SELYA, Circuit Judge. Invoking our habeas corpus jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. 2241-2254, petitioner-appellant Michael T. Mims invites us to set aside his state court conviction for murder in the first degree. Like the district court, we decline the invitation. For the nonce, it suffices to say that after the brutally mistreated body of Belinda Miscioscia was discovered in an alley in Chelsea, Massachusetts, on June 27, 1993, the authorities charged Mims and a compatriot, Michael Cowels, with her slaying. A jury found each of them guilty of first-degree murder, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed their convictions. See Commonwealth v. Cowels, 680 N.E.2d 924 (Mass. 1997). The petitioner then filed an application for habeas relief in the federal district court, but to no avail. See Mims v. DiPaolo, No. 98-CV-11203-MEL (D. Mass. Apr. 1, 1999) (unpublished mem. op.). The district court did, however, grant a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); see also Grant-Chase v. Commissioner, N.H. Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 431, 435 (1st Cir. 1998). On appeal, the petitioner asseverates that (1) the evidence against him was inadequate to permit a jury to convict him, and (2) certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Mindful of the limits that attach to the federal courts' power to review state convictions in habeas proceedings, see, e.g., O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20-25 (1st Cir. 1998), the petitioner wraps both asseverations in the trappings of due process. The facts of the case have been canvassed methodically by the SJC, and we refer the reader who thirsts for greater detail to that court's lucid opinion. See Cowels, 680 N.E.2d at 926-28. Under current law (applicable to this case), our review of habeas petitions brought by state prisoners is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The AEDPA significantly alters the treatment of such petitions. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 20-25. Among other things, it brings the state court's decision to center stage and requires the performance of a bifurcated analysis. See id. at 20. First, the reviewing (federal) court must ask whether the United States Supreme Court has prescribed a rule that governs the petitioner's claim and, if so, whether the state court decision is contrary to that rule. If such a rule exists, and if the state court decision contravenes it, relief may be granted. If, however, the state court correctly apprehended the rule (or, alternatively, correctly apprehended the absence of a governing rule), the habeas court proceeds to the second step of the analysis and determines whether the state court's resolution resulted in an unreasonable application of existing Supreme Court case law. See id. at 24. Against this backdrop, we turn initially to the petitioner's insufficiency-of-evidence claim. The parties agree, as they must, that a landmark Supreme Court precedent directly governs this aspect of the case. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The core holding of Jackson is that the Due Process Clause precludes a valid criminal conviction unless the evidence admitted at trial, taken as a whole and interpreted in the light most favorable to the prosecution, suffices to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 319. Because the SJC identified and articulated this tenet, see Cowels, 680 N.E.2d at 929 & n.6 (citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Mass. 1979), and noting that it incorporates the Jackson criterion), we move to the second tier of the AEDPA test. The petitioner argues vociferously that although the SJC paid lip service to the Jackson standard, it unreasonably (mis)applied that standard. Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, his argument boils down to the assertion that, even after taking the evidence in the aspect most congenial to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, no responsible jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Inasmuch as the district court already has addressed (and, in our view, successfully rebutted) this same assertion, we need not tarry. The short of it is that the SJC's careful analysis of the evidence belies the petitioner's argument. See id. at 928- 29. As that court noted, multiple witnesses placed Mims and Cowels in the decedent's company on the night of her murder; indeed, they were the last people seen with her. The evidence further established that Mims and Cowels each had a prior sexual relationship with the decedent; that she had voiced fears about being with them; that both Mims and Cowels attempted to dispose of clothing which they had been wearing on the night in question; and that each of them lied to the police when questioned about their activities. The jury also heard testimony that Mims and Cowels threatened others in what reasonably could be construed as a concerted effort to procure the silence of prospective witnesses. Last but far from least a percipient witness testified that, on the night of the slaying, Cowels, in the petitioner's presence and within his earshot, declared that "we killed her" and the petitioner offered no disclaimer. We think that this evidence more than suffices to allow a rational finder of fact to deem the petitioner's guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus to ground the petitioner's conviction under Jackson. That this case arises on habeas review cinches the matter. After all, under the AEDPA, the key question is not whether we, if sitting as a jury or as a court of first instance, would conclude that the Commonwealth had proved its case, but, rather, whether the state court decision is "so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes." O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 25; accord Vieux v. Pepe, 184 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 18, 1999) (No. 99-6629); Bui v.
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[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 99-1493
MICHAEL T. MIMS,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
PAUL DIPAOLO,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Dana A. Curhan for appellant. Annette C. Benedetto, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with whom Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, and Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellee.
January 11, 2000
*Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. SELYA, Circuit Judge. Invoking our habeas corpus jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. 2241-2254, petitioner-appellant Michael T. Mims invites us to set aside his state court conviction for murder in the first degree. Like the district court, we decline the invitation. For the nonce, it suffices to say that after the brutally mistreated body of Belinda Miscioscia was discovered in an alley in Chelsea, Massachusetts, on June 27, 1993, the authorities charged Mims and a compatriot, Michael Cowels, with her slaying. A jury found each of them guilty of first-degree murder, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed their convictions. See Commonwealth v. Cowels, 680 N.E.2d 924 (Mass. 1997). The petitioner then filed an application for habeas relief in the federal district court, but to no avail. See Mims v. DiPaolo, No. 98-CV-11203-MEL (D. Mass. Apr. 1, 1999) (unpublished mem. op.). The district court did, however, grant a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); see also Grant-Chase v. Commissioner, N.H. Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 431, 435 (1st Cir. 1998). On appeal, the petitioner asseverates that (1) the evidence against him was inadequate to permit a jury to convict him, and (2) certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Mindful of the limits that attach to the federal courts' power to review state convictions in habeas proceedings, see, e.g., O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20-25 (1st Cir. 1998), the petitioner wraps both asseverations in the trappings of due process. The facts of the case have been canvassed methodically by the SJC, and we refer the reader who thirsts for greater detail to that court's lucid opinion. See Cowels, 680 N.E.2d at 926-28. Under current law (applicable to this case), our review of habeas petitions brought by state prisoners is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The AEDPA significantly alters the treatment of such petitions. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 20-25. Among other things, it brings the state court's decision to center stage and requires the performance of a bifurcated analysis. See id. at 20. First, the reviewing (federal) court must ask whether the United States Supreme Court has prescribed a rule that governs the petitioner's claim and, if so, whether the state court decision is contrary to that rule. If such a rule exists, and if the state court decision contravenes it, relief may be granted. If, however, the state court correctly apprehended the rule (or, alternatively, correctly apprehended the absence of a governing rule), the habeas court proceeds to the second step of the analysis and determines whether the state court's resolution resulted in an unreasonable application of existing Supreme Court case law. See id. at 24. Against this backdrop, we turn initially to the petitioner's insufficiency-of-evidence claim. The parties agree, as they must, that a landmark Supreme Court precedent directly governs this aspect of the case. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The core holding of Jackson is that the Due Process Clause precludes a valid criminal conviction unless the evidence admitted at trial, taken as a whole and interpreted in the light most favorable to the prosecution, suffices to permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 319. Because the SJC identified and articulated this tenet, see Cowels, 680 N.E.2d at 929 & n.6 (citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Mass. 1979), and noting that it incorporates the Jackson criterion), we move to the second tier of the AEDPA test. The petitioner argues vociferously that although the SJC paid lip service to the Jackson standard, it unreasonably (mis)applied that standard. Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, his argument boils down to the assertion that, even after taking the evidence in the aspect most congenial to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, no responsible jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Inasmuch as the district court already has addressed (and, in our view, successfully rebutted) this same assertion, we need not tarry. The short of it is that the SJC's careful analysis of the evidence belies the petitioner's argument. See id. at 928- 29. As that court noted, multiple witnesses placed Mims and Cowels in the decedent's company on the night of her murder; indeed, they were the last people seen with her. The evidence further established that Mims and Cowels each had a prior sexual relationship with the decedent; that she had voiced fears about being with them; that both Mims and Cowels attempted to dispose of clothing which they had been wearing on the night in question; and that each of them lied to the police when questioned about their activities. The jury also heard testimony that Mims and Cowels threatened others in what reasonably could be construed as a concerted effort to procure the silence of prospective witnesses. Last but far from least a percipient witness testified that, on the night of the slaying, Cowels, in the petitioner's presence and within his earshot, declared that "we killed her" and the petitioner offered no disclaimer. We think that this evidence more than suffices to allow a rational finder of fact to deem the petitioner's guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus to ground the petitioner's conviction under Jackson. That this case arises on habeas review cinches the matter. After all, under the AEDPA, the key question is not whether we, if sitting as a jury or as a court of first instance, would conclude that the Commonwealth had proved its case, but, rather, whether the state court decision is "so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes." O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 25; accord Vieux v. Pepe, 184 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 18, 1999) (No. 99-6629); Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 243 (1st Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 14, 1999) (No. 98-9840). Given this expansive framework, the state court decision easily passes muster. The petitioner's second asseveration likewise lacks force. He maintains that the prosecutor's summation was so improper and injurious that it violated his right to due process, and that the state court's refusal to recognize that verity constituted an unreasonable application of federal law. This is one of those context-contingent situations in which it cannot fairly be said that the case is controlled by a closely analogous Supreme Court precedent. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 24-25 (discussing, in general terms, what is needed to bring the first prong of the AEDPA analysis to bear). In the absence of explicit Supreme Court guidance, we proceed to the second tier of the AEDPA test and ask whether the SJC's rejection of the petitioner's "improper summation" plaint constituted an unreasonable application of general principles of federal constitutional law as articulated by the Supreme Court. The SJC noted in its opinion that the prosecutor had gone too far and had impermissibly appealed to emotion in his closing argument. See Cowels, 680 N.E.2d at 930. For example, the prosecutor described the decedent's screams (despite the utter absence of any evidence to that effect) and repeated numerous times, for no discernibly valid purpose, testimony that the petitioner had called the victim vile names. See id. On habeas review, however, it is not enough for the petitioner to show that an error occurred; he must show that the error was of constitutional magnitude. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1204 (1st Cir. 1987). He also must show that the state court's treatment of the error resulted in an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law as articulated by the Supreme Court. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 24. While it is theoretically possible for a prosecutor's closing argument to go so far afield as to threaten due process, see, e.g., Shurn v. Delo, 177 F.3d 662, 667 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 510 (1999); Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469, 473-74 (10th Cir. 1990), no such constitutional infirmity looms here, notwithstanding the excesses in which the prosecutor needlessly indulged. See James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869-70 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that state prosecutor's reference to petitioner as "slime" during closing argument did not sink to the level of a due process violation), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 15, 1999) (NO. 99-7516); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 794-95 (10th Cir.) (holding that state prosecutor's comments during final argument, though plainly improper, did not render petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 345 (1998); see also Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1406 (1st Cir. 1992). Consequently, we hold that the SJC's reasoned resolution of the "improper summation" charge not only gave the petitioner all the process that was due, but also accorded with the rigors of clearly established federal constitutional law. We need go no further. Simply put, the petitioner cannot come close to clearing the AEDPA hurdle. For aught that appears, Mims was fairly tried and justly convicted. Accordingly, the district court did not err in rejecting his application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.