Mills-Dewitt Co. v. Brazoria County

142 S.W.2d 916, 1940 Tex. App. LEXIS 643
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 25, 1940
DocketNo. 10977
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 142 S.W.2d 916 (Mills-Dewitt Co. v. Brazoria County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mills-Dewitt Co. v. Brazoria County, 142 S.W.2d 916, 1940 Tex. App. LEXIS 643 (Tex. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

GRAVES, Justice.

■ This appeal is from a judgment of the district court of Brazoria County sitting without a jury, sustaining a general demurrer (together with several special exceptions) to the appellant’s trial petition and dismissing its suit, wherein it sought to recover a 33⅛ per cent interest in delinquent tax collections of approximately $220,000, alleged to .have been realized by the appel-lee under the terms of a written contract ibetween the parties, dated June 17 of 1929; a substantial copy of such petition (along with the contract appellant declared upon and made a part of the pleading) is appended hereto as an exhibit.

Since the periods of time prescribed in the contract for the performance of the different classes of undertakings of the appel-Tant had, as per its affirmative declarations, all expired more than four years before this suit thereon was filed on the 22nd day of February of. 1939, hence that the action was barred by R.S. Article 5527, the correctness of the judgment so dismissing the cause depends upon whether or not the petition states a good cause of action, as upon either a waiver of the times of performance of appellant’s obligation so expressed, or a valid renewal by the parties of the contract embodying them, after the expirations of such original dates.

In other words, since it so expressly appears from the pleadings that none of ■appellant’s undertakings were completed -within the dates provided therefor in the -face of the contract, and that the parties, so recognizing, undertook by agreements in November of 1930, as well as in June and December, respectively, of 1931, to extend the times of such performance, so as to constitute -a continuing or renewed agreement that would be valid notwithstanding the provisions of Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. Article 7335a, which was passed in 1930, and Article 7264a, which was passed in 1931.

This court concludes that the learned trial court was correct:

[917]*917(1) In that it affirmatively appears from the face of the petition that the prerequisites to the formation or reinstatement of a valid contract, whether considered as in waiver or renewal of the provisions of the original one, were wanting; that is, it expressly appears upon the face thereof that this was, plainly, a contract “in connection with the collection of delinquent taxes”, within the terms of Articles 7335a and 7264a, supra, hence the efforts in November of 1930 and June and December of 1931 to resuscitate them- — after they had so become functus officio by their own terms • — were in direct contravention of the terms of those statutes, hence were abortive;

(2) In that, by its original terms, the appellant was to receive for its services 33⅛ per cent of all delinquent taxes collected for the period from 1885 to February 1 of 1929;

(3) In that, the time of performance was of the essence of the original contract, as per expressed specifications thereof in. its paragraph X- — that is, that appellant was strictly obligated not .only to complete its work on or before 18 .months after June 17 of 1929, but that likewise all suits had to be prosecuted to final -judgment within three years after the expiration of such 18 -months, and that in haec verba, "all interests of second party in any suits, or collections, not concluded within such period of three years from scud 18 months shall .be forfeited and this contract shall be absolutely terminated ,on and from said, .date";

(4) In that, the express terms of cited Article 7335a render such efforts to waive the time of performance or renew the obligation after its expiration, void, on two .counts: (a) The compensation was more than twice the 15% therein specified as a maximum charge, and (b) neither the Comptroller nor the Attorney General of the State had approved any of them;

(5) Neither did subsequent R.S. Article 7264a retrieve this black-out for appellant in any respect, because, by its express terms, it was “not intended to change any law now in effect regarding the collection of delinquent taxes”; these two statutes were reviewed by this court in Marquart v. Harris County, 117 S.W.2d 494, at page 502, column 1, paragraph (2), in an analogous' situation in this respect and given the effect here applied to them.

(5) There was no implied basis in the original contract for any subsequent waiver of the time for performance or renewal thereof after expiration of the specified time, because of the clear implication — as indicated supra — that the -parties had no such contingencies in mind, rather that they were contracting upon and fixing the time of duration, from their understanding, as being of its essence;

Furthermore, there seems no doubt that each of these so-called “waivers” of time, or renewals of the agreement, were attended by appellant’s' new agreement to do additional work by bringing the maps, plats, and abstracts and indexes down to the new dates indicated as considerations therefor; this could, in effect,. amount to nothing other than an attempt to renew such contracts after they had expired by a 'pre-existing law1 and after R.S. Articles 7335a and 7264a had expressly prohibited them. Wherefore, appellant’s finespun distinction that it “claims no renewal agreement, merely waiver of dates fixed for completion”, would seem to this court to be inept.

So that, it is thought, a close scrutiny of the petition will disclose, aside from mere conclusions of law, no averment of any waivers of or extensions of time, or of renewals of the obligations of the contract, except those that had their origin after the effective date of R.S. Article 7335a — that is, after February 17 of 1930. The additional work appellant was to do under the “waivers”, as it termed them, or the attempted renewals, as appellee termed them, of the original contract, are set out in paragraph IV' thereof, so that no 33½ per cent of compensation therefor could have been lawful.

As concerns the collection of the Hogg taxes in particular, while the conclusions ■already stated cover this feature along with the others, it may not be amiss to add that at the time of .their collection, by the unequivocal averments of the petition, the original contract had, under its own terms, long since expired, hence appellant was then operating under one of these new extensions or a new contract, which, like all the others, had to be in compliance with R.S. Article 7335a to become valid; especially was this true as to that claim, since by sub-paragraph (c) .of paragraph X of the original contract — as herein before quoted — it had been -specifically pro[918]*918vided that “all interest of the Second Party-in any suits, or collections, not concluded within such period of three years from said eighteen months, shall be forfeited, and this contract shall be absolutely terminated on and from said date.”

At that late date, according to the holding of the trial court, the interest of appellant in that collection for a 33⅛ per cent division thereof had ceased and could not be brought back to life without a compliance with the positive law then in effect.

Under the view that the original contract had expired, that the new efforts to waive the time of performance — or to renew the undertakings therein — all had their inception after the effective date of Article 7335a, and that this cause comes plainly within such cases as White v. McGill, 131 Tex. 231, 114 S.W.2d 860, and Marquart v.

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142 S.W.2d 916, 1940 Tex. App. LEXIS 643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mills-dewitt-co-v-brazoria-county-texapp-1940.