GRAVES,. Justice.
Appellants, as property taxpayers, brought this suit against Harris County, its Commissioners, and Tax Assessor-Collector, praying for an order restraining them, until trial on the merits, (1) from proceeding (in whole, or alternatively in part) with a property-valuation contfact between the County and two firms of individuals, as experts, of all the taxable property in Harris County, dated March 14 of 1938 and later supplemented — a substantial copy of the original being appended hereto as an exhibit —
and (2) from paying out thereon any of the county’s funds. It was alleged that J. W. Hall, Tax Assessor, and one of the Commissioners, R. H. Spencer,
Bad opposed the- contract, and they were made parties-defendant. The contractors undertaking' to do the valuation work, namely, the firms of Freese & Nichols and Pritchard & Abbott, were also made parties-defendant. Defendants Spencer and
Hall joined in as party-plaintiffs by separate pleadings, praying that the injunction be granted. The court heard testimony at length before entering the order appealed from, whereby the temporary writ so 'sought was refused. From that order, the Taxpayers and Spencer appeal, naming all the other parties as appellees.
The sued-upon contract, in its entirety, was hot only a part of the pleadings, but of the evidence as well; while it does not otherwise appear from the record here whether the Comptroller and Attorney General of the State
failed
or
refused
to approve it, it is affirmatively shown on the - face of the contract itself (hence as a part
of both pleadings and proof) that neither of these officers did in fact approve it. Only the parts of the long document deemed most material to this opinion will be specially adverted to.
In the preamble it is recited that it is desired to, as far as possible, eliminate unknown ownership, to have compiled, for the use of the Assessor, records showing the record-owners of all property, and
that the court desires to set up and place into effect a more efficient plan and system to aid in the assessment of property for taxation and to aid in the adjustment, collection, and equalization of taxes generally.
It contemplates a revaluation of all the property of Harris County, “of the types now being generally • assessed for taxation,” Paragraph II, expressive of that purpose as permeating the whole, being as follows :
“The intention of this contract is that all properties, subject to taxation of the types now generally taxed in Harris County shall be embraced in the terms of this contract, whether specially set forth herein or not, and on any of such taxes, the contractors shall appraise the same and file a report thereon in the manner and form prescribed generally for other properties so far as applicable.”
Other provisions, in whole or in part, are these:
From the preamble:
“Whereas, the Commissioners’ Court of Harris County desires to employ skilled experts in the matter of the discovery, appraisal, and valuation of property in Harris County, Texas, of the types now being assessed in said County for taxation, to the end that said Court may * * * place upon the rolls of Harris County properties of said types now escaping taxation, and desires to eliminate so far ..as possible unknown ownerships and to have compiled for its use and the use
of its assessor and collector of taxes * * *
■.
“Whereas, The court finds that much property in said County is entirely escaping taxation * * ⅜ and otherwise the full amount that could be realized as taxes is not being realized by said County; and
“Whereas, The Commissioners’ Court of said County desires to. set up and place into effect a. more efficient plan and system to aid in the assessment of property for taxation and to aid in the adjustment,
collection,
and equalization of taxes generally.” ■ ■
From Paragraph III:
“Personal Property:
The Contractors agree to diligently search for, survey, identify the owner of, and make an appraisal of, all personal property in said County of the type now generally assessed for taxation therein, showing the value of such property, as of January 1, 1938.”
From Paragraph I:
“Oil, Gas and Mineral Properties:
The Contractors agree to make in writing an .analytical appraisal of each and every place of real property in said County producing oil, and/or gas, whether held tinker fee title, mineral deed, lease, or royalty assignment, or otherwise, which shall show the value of each such interest as of January 1, 1938. The Contractors shall furnish a detailed inventory of all personal property on each piece of property in said County producing oil and/or gas, whether held under lease or operated by a fee owner.”
From Paragraph IV:
“Land Valuation:
The Contractors agree to furnish the services of experts in systematic methods of land and building valuation to complete a land and building valuation survey for the entire County, and file a complete report of said land and building values for the use of the Board of Equalization and the Assessor and Collector of Taxes.”
From Paragraph XIII:
“Expert Testimony in Law Suits:
The Contractors agree to furnish without cost to the County expert testimony in the matter of any and all suits that may be filed and reached for trial before May 1, 1939, which suits in any manner contest the correctness or validity of any assessment made pursuant to any information furnished by the Contractors. All such assistants so furnished shall have the necessary experience and background to qualify as highly specialized technical experts. After May 1, 1939, the Contractors shall be paid for expert testimony in case of suit on matters arising from the valuation fixed by the- Board of Equalization at its session in 1938, the sum to be agreed upon not to exceed $50 for each, day or part thereof of testimony actually required, plus necessary actual living and traveling expenses of the witness testifying.”
From Paragraph XIV:
“Orders:
The' County of Harris agrees to, at any time the same may become necessary, pass and enter of record in connection with this contract such orders as may be necessary.”
It is the opinion of this court that such contract was ultra vires the powers of the commissioners’ court, and therefore void in toto, which conclusion has been arrived at upon these, among other, considerations:
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GRAVES,. Justice.
Appellants, as property taxpayers, brought this suit against Harris County, its Commissioners, and Tax Assessor-Collector, praying for an order restraining them, until trial on the merits, (1) from proceeding (in whole, or alternatively in part) with a property-valuation contfact between the County and two firms of individuals, as experts, of all the taxable property in Harris County, dated March 14 of 1938 and later supplemented — a substantial copy of the original being appended hereto as an exhibit —
and (2) from paying out thereon any of the county’s funds. It was alleged that J. W. Hall, Tax Assessor, and one of the Commissioners, R. H. Spencer,
Bad opposed the- contract, and they were made parties-defendant. The contractors undertaking' to do the valuation work, namely, the firms of Freese & Nichols and Pritchard & Abbott, were also made parties-defendant. Defendants Spencer and
Hall joined in as party-plaintiffs by separate pleadings, praying that the injunction be granted. The court heard testimony at length before entering the order appealed from, whereby the temporary writ so 'sought was refused. From that order, the Taxpayers and Spencer appeal, naming all the other parties as appellees.
The sued-upon contract, in its entirety, was hot only a part of the pleadings, but of the evidence as well; while it does not otherwise appear from the record here whether the Comptroller and Attorney General of the State
failed
or
refused
to approve it, it is affirmatively shown on the - face of the contract itself (hence as a part
of both pleadings and proof) that neither of these officers did in fact approve it. Only the parts of the long document deemed most material to this opinion will be specially adverted to.
In the preamble it is recited that it is desired to, as far as possible, eliminate unknown ownership, to have compiled, for the use of the Assessor, records showing the record-owners of all property, and
that the court desires to set up and place into effect a more efficient plan and system to aid in the assessment of property for taxation and to aid in the adjustment, collection, and equalization of taxes generally.
It contemplates a revaluation of all the property of Harris County, “of the types now being generally • assessed for taxation,” Paragraph II, expressive of that purpose as permeating the whole, being as follows :
“The intention of this contract is that all properties, subject to taxation of the types now generally taxed in Harris County shall be embraced in the terms of this contract, whether specially set forth herein or not, and on any of such taxes, the contractors shall appraise the same and file a report thereon in the manner and form prescribed generally for other properties so far as applicable.”
Other provisions, in whole or in part, are these:
From the preamble:
“Whereas, the Commissioners’ Court of Harris County desires to employ skilled experts in the matter of the discovery, appraisal, and valuation of property in Harris County, Texas, of the types now being assessed in said County for taxation, to the end that said Court may * * * place upon the rolls of Harris County properties of said types now escaping taxation, and desires to eliminate so far ..as possible unknown ownerships and to have compiled for its use and the use
of its assessor and collector of taxes * * *
■.
“Whereas, The court finds that much property in said County is entirely escaping taxation * * ⅜ and otherwise the full amount that could be realized as taxes is not being realized by said County; and
“Whereas, The Commissioners’ Court of said County desires to. set up and place into effect a. more efficient plan and system to aid in the assessment of property for taxation and to aid in the adjustment,
collection,
and equalization of taxes generally.” ■ ■
From Paragraph III:
“Personal Property:
The Contractors agree to diligently search for, survey, identify the owner of, and make an appraisal of, all personal property in said County of the type now generally assessed for taxation therein, showing the value of such property, as of January 1, 1938.”
From Paragraph I:
“Oil, Gas and Mineral Properties:
The Contractors agree to make in writing an .analytical appraisal of each and every place of real property in said County producing oil, and/or gas, whether held tinker fee title, mineral deed, lease, or royalty assignment, or otherwise, which shall show the value of each such interest as of January 1, 1938. The Contractors shall furnish a detailed inventory of all personal property on each piece of property in said County producing oil and/or gas, whether held under lease or operated by a fee owner.”
From Paragraph IV:
“Land Valuation:
The Contractors agree to furnish the services of experts in systematic methods of land and building valuation to complete a land and building valuation survey for the entire County, and file a complete report of said land and building values for the use of the Board of Equalization and the Assessor and Collector of Taxes.”
From Paragraph XIII:
“Expert Testimony in Law Suits:
The Contractors agree to furnish without cost to the County expert testimony in the matter of any and all suits that may be filed and reached for trial before May 1, 1939, which suits in any manner contest the correctness or validity of any assessment made pursuant to any information furnished by the Contractors. All such assistants so furnished shall have the necessary experience and background to qualify as highly specialized technical experts. After May 1, 1939, the Contractors shall be paid for expert testimony in case of suit on matters arising from the valuation fixed by the- Board of Equalization at its session in 1938, the sum to be agreed upon not to exceed $50 for each, day or part thereof of testimony actually required, plus necessary actual living and traveling expenses of the witness testifying.”
From Paragraph XIV:
“Orders:
The' County of Harris agrees to, at any time the same may become necessary, pass and enter of record in connection with this contract such orders as may be necessary.”
It is the opinion of this court that such contract was ultra vires the powers of the commissioners’ court, and therefore void in toto, which conclusion has been arrived at upon these, among other, considerations:
(1) Considered from its four corners (and especially regarding the particular provisions noted and quoted supra), it was clearly one made by the commissioners’ court “in connection with the collection of delinquent taxes”, within the meaning of Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. arts. 7264a and 7335a, and not having been approved by either the Comptroller or the Attorney General of the State, nor by both of those officials acting together, was prohibited by the express terms of those two statutes.
(2) While it was not eo nomine a delinquent tax-collection agreement, it seems self-evident that .at least one of its major purposes was to discover and place on the rolls for taxation property which had theretofore escap.ed taxation, hence in part its substance, objective, and necessary effect was to bring it within the construction put upon that language of the latter of these statutes, “in connection with the collection of delinquent taxes”, by the Supreme Court in White v. McGill, Tex.Sup., 114 S.W.2d 860, at page 863, paragraph (5):
“When the purpose for which article 7335a was passed is considered, we do not think the Legislature used the words ‘delinquent taxes’ in a technical sense.”
Indeed, it would seem that no substantial difference in purport and effect exists between the contract at bar and the one stricken down by the Supreme. Court in that cause — its material provisions, as comparable with, the above-quoted ones .here,
clearly showing, as that court put it: “that the parties expected to locate personal property which had not been assessed for the year 1937, or years prior thereto, so that such property could be placed on the current roll for 1937. * * * Moreover, the contract contemplates the collection of such taxes by voluntary payment; or, if necessary, that they be collected by suit filed by the county attorney.” “ * * * such contract being called a ‘tax-ferret contract/ under the terms of which the tax-ferrets agreed to perform certain duties in the way of pointing out property for taxation.”
What boots it that there the contractors were bluntly called “tax-ferrets”, while here they were more euphoniously termed “skilled experts” — the respective services to be rendered, as affects the phase of them now under review, being non-distinguishable if not in fact identical?
Indeed, while neither was expressly a delinquent tax-collection engagement, the “tax-ferret” one there no more plainly contemplated the collection of such taxes than did the “skilled experts” one in this instance. If the mere reading of this contract does not disclose that these parties likewise expected to locate personal property, which had not theretofore been assessed, so that such property could be placed on the current roll for the ensuing year, it would be difficult to determine therefrom what their expectation was.
(3) If, however, there be any doubt as to the applicability of Art. 7335a, which was passed in 1930, the companion act, art. 7264a, passed in 1931, apparently clears it up, the two being construable together, along with other laws relating to the assessment and collection of taxes; while, as the Eastland court remarked in Sylvan Sanders Co. v. Scurry County, Tex.Civ. App., 77 S.W.2d 709, at page 711, the legislative intent as to this enactment in its entirety is not clear, and while, as the Supreme Court held in Easterwood v. Henderson County, 62 S.W.2d 65, at page 66, ,it neither dispenses with the approval of the Comptroller and the Attorney General, as required by art. 7335a nor was intended to change any pre-existing law regarding “the collection” of delinquent taxes, still its terms make plain that it did not deal alone with the mere
collection
of delinquent taxes, but that its purpose was to declare the public policy of the State to thereafter go further and “to
adjust
delinquent taxes, correct errors, to eliminate conflicts in surveys of land, and to collect the delinquent, occupation, franchise and Ad Valorem Taxes, in order to clear this State of'such taxes, errors and conflicts at the earliest date possible, and to provide a system for assessors, in order to eliminate the numerous errors that now appear on the tax rolls each recurring year.” Article 7264a, § 1.
By its section 3 it expressly requires contracts for the work so dealt with by the act to be made jointly by the State Comptroller and the Commissioners’ Court of the particular county involved.
(4) When the undertakings of this contract quoted supra, that is, obligating these contractors to:
(a)
Diligently
search for, survey, identify the owner of, and make an appraisal of
all personal property
in the County of the type now generally assessed for taxation, showing the value of such property,
as of January
1,
1938;
and,
(b) Complete a land and building-valuation survey for the entire county, and file a complete report of such land and buildings, and their values, for the use of the Board of Equalization and the Assessor and Collector of taxes, are applied to this statute, it becomes inescapable that the participation of the Comptroller - therein was an indispensable requirement for its validity.
(5) While the Commissioners’ Court may validly employ “skilled experts” to value for taxation purposes property in special instances, where technical equipment is required, since this contract — by its express terms — embraces a valuation of the entire taxable property of Harris County, as reflected by its tax records, it necessarily supersedes the powers, duties, and functions of the tax assessor and collector, and since those duties are devolved by law upon him, such an attempted employment by that body of other persons to, in the first instance, perform such duties instead, is an expenditure of public funds for an unauthorized purpose. Article 5, sec. 18, State Constitution; Sec. 18 and Sec. 14, as amended November 8, 1932, of Aid. 8, State Constitution; Sections 6 and 10 of Art. 16, State 'Constitution; Section 3 of Art. 1, State Constitution; Art. 3, Secs. 44, 53, and 55 of State Constitution; Articles 7148, 7161, 7162, 7183, 7184 to 7205, inclusive, all of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Shannon, 100 Tex. 379, 100 S.W.
138, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 681; Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 200 S.W. 375; Von Rosenberg v. Lovett, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W. 508; Roper v. Hall, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W. 289; Federal Royalty Co. v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 670; Id., 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021, 80 S.W.2d 741.
No extended discussion will be indulged in under this last-stated ground. Suffice it to say that such an apparent undertaking of a commissioners’ court to itself initially revalue the entire, taxable property of a county, under the guise of using the same for its own information and guidance when sitting as a Board of Equalization, does not seem to this court to square with the balanced system of relative powers and duties conferred upon that body by our laws, as comparable to the correlative ones conferred upon the county tax assessor-collector; it may be, as much testimony in the statement of facts indicates, that in this instance the commissioners’ court concluded that the tax assessor-collector’s office had broken down, and that its so occupying his place and performing his .functions instead, justified an original assumption of such power upon its part; but it is not this court’s understanding that our. statutes in such cases conferred upon it any such authority; on the contrary, it would seem to have been the tax assessor-collector’s legal right tb independently perform the duties actually conferred upon him by law. Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 31 S.W. 631, 634; 34 Tex.Jur. p. 444.
The authorities cited under ground (5) supra seem to make it quite clear that this contract did evidence an undertaking to in effect usurp the official privileges and obligations of the tax assessor-collector, as vouchsafed in the statutes there collated, 'while upon the other hand, the differing and correlative duties of the commissioners’ court—as a Board of Equalization—• are embraced within R.S. Articles 7206, 7211, and 7212. Under them it would seem never to have been contemplated that the Board of Equalization should act upon anything other than the assessments first rendered to them by the tax assessor-collector, and not initially upon their own motion. County of Galveston v. Galveston Gas Co., 72 Tex. 509, 10 S.W. 583. Further, under R.S. Article 7217—after the assessor-collector had discharged his duties under those preceding statutes and had furnished the lists therein called for to that Board— it is obligated to return the same to him for presentment to the Grand Jury ' of his county.
Further discussion is not deemed necessary, since this appeal is only from an interlocutory order, in advance of the trial of the cause below,on its merits; this opinion is not to be understood as holding that there are not a number of valid policies properly dealt with in the contract in suit, but simply that, since the provisions held void therein are inseparably connected with others which may be entirely valid, the entire contract must fall. Sylvan Sanders Co. v. Scurry County, Tex.Civ.App., 77 S.W.2d 709, at page 710, and authorities there cited.
If these conclusions be sound, it follows that the judgment should be reversed and the temporary-injunction should be granted substantially as prayed for by the appellants in the trial court; it will be so ordered.
Judgment reversed, temporary injunction granted.
PLEASANTS, C. J., absent.