Millon v. Clarion Hotel

719 So. 2d 568, 98 La.App. 4 Cir. 0002, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 2631, 1998 WL 658251
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 16, 1998
Docket98-CA-0002
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 719 So. 2d 568 (Millon v. Clarion Hotel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Millon v. Clarion Hotel, 719 So. 2d 568, 98 La.App. 4 Cir. 0002, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 2631, 1998 WL 658251 (La. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

719 So.2d 568 (1998)

Valerie M. MILLON
v.
CLARION HOTEL.

No. 98-CA-0002.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

September 16, 1998.
Rehearing Denied October 30, 1998.

*569 Michael D. Meyer, New Orleans, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jasper N. Pharr, William F. Evans, Sr., New Orleans, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Before KLEES, LOBRANO and MURRAY, JJ.

LOBRANO, Judge.

Defendant, PBHG-New Orleans, Inc., d/b/a Clarion Hotel, appeals a judgment from the Office of Workers' Compensation in favor of claimant, Valerie Millon. Claimant also appealed the judgment. In this judgment, the workers' compensation judge held that claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits from October 27, 1994 through October 5, 1995, plus medical expenses, travel expenses and penalties.

Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on April 1, 1991 and that she had a pre-existing condition when she was hired by the Clarion on May 2, 1994. In the instant case, claimant alleges that on August 18, 1994, she was bending over to make a room key at her job at the Clarion when she aggravated her preexisting back injury sustained in the 1991 automobile accident.

On appeal, defendant argues, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a job-related injury. Because we find that this argument has merit, we pretermit discussion of the other arguments.

The Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act provides that an employee is entitled to benefits if he or she receives a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of employment. La. R.S. 23:1031. La. R.S. 23:1021(1) defines "accident" as "an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration." In Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 610 So.2d 953 (La. App. 1 Cir.1992), the First Circuit interpreted this definition as requiring that an injured employee be able to identify the event marking the time when one can identify an injury, but not excluding from coverage employees *570 who are "worn down by their work rather than immediately crippled by it." Id. at 956. In Dyson, the claimant was able to identify an event, i.e. a pivoting or turning movement, which immediately preceded her pain.

The claimant in a worker's compensation case has the burden of proving a work-related accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Woods v. Ryan Chevrolet, Inc., 30,206 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/98), 709 So.2d 251, writ denied, 98-1169 (La.6/5/98), 720 So.2d 689, citing Bruno v. Harbert International, Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La.1992). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient when the evidence, taken as a whole, shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Id. at p. 4, 709 So.2d at 254.

In Bruno v. Harbert International Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La.1992), our Supreme Court elaborated on a worker's compensation claimant's burden of establishing a work-related accident as follows:

A worker's testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker's version of the incident; and (2) the worker's testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. Corroboration of the worker's testimony may be provided by the testimony of fellow workers, spouses or friends. Corroboration may also be provided by medical evidence. (citations omitted), Id. at 361.

A plaintiff's case must fail if the evidence shows only a possibility of a causative accident or leaves it to speculation or conjecture. Sisk v. Martin Specialty Coatings, 28,592 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So.2d 569, writ denied, 96-2328 (La.11/22/96), 683 So.2d 281, citing Prim v. City of Shreveport, 297 So.2d 421 (La.1974).

In worker's compensation cases, the standard for review is the manifest error/clearly wrong standard, which precludes the setting aside of a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Matthews v. Taylor Temporary, Inc., 97-1718 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/11/98), 707 So.2d 1021, citing Alexander v. Pellerin Marble & Granite, 93-1698 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 706.

The following testimony and documentary evidence were presented at the hearing:

VALERIE MILLON

The claimant, Valerie Millon, testified that she was involved in an automobile accident on April 1, 1991. In that rear-end collision, she sustained injuries to her head, back, neck, and left arm, leg and shoulder. Her medical records pertaining to her treatment for these injuries are included as exhibits in this case. When claimant applied for a job at the Clarion in April of 1994, she said she told Clarion employees conducting the application process about her back injuries suffered in the 1991 automobile accident.

Claimant started working at the Clarion on May 2, 1994. On that date, she was still experiencing pain from the injuries received in the 1991 accident. Claimant testified that she did not have any other accident or back injury between the 1991 accident and the beginning of her employment with the Clarion in 1994. She initially worked as front office supervisor during the evening shift. The main function of the evening shift is to register guests who are checking into the hotel. She detailed the steps involved in checking a guest into the hotel; the physical activities in this process include walking and standing as well as a lot of bending over to make room keys. Prior to August 18, 1994, supervisors could spend part of their shift sitting in the back office doing their paperwork. However, due to a policy change beginning August 15th, supervisors were required to stand at the front desk for their entire shift except for breaks. Therefore, as of that date, the majority of her eight to ten hour shift was spent either walking, standing or bending over to make room keys.

Claimant stated that on August 18, 1994, she was bending down to make a key when she suddenly felt a very sharp stinging pain in her back. She said that as she continued to work, the pain kept getting worse. Claimant testified that she reported her back pain to the managers on duty, who are the managers designated to handle all problems in the *571 hotel. She claims she told them her back was hurting so much that she might need to go to the hospital. Claimant continued to work because there were so many people waiting to check into the hotel and the front desk was understaffed at the time. However, her pain became so great that she was unable to finish her shift and left to go to Charity Hospital emergency room. Claimant testified that she was pregnant at the time.

At Charity, claimant was examined by Dr. Henry Eiserloh. She said she complained of back pain which was radiating down her left leg. Claimant went to work the next day, which was a Friday, with written instructions from Dr. Eiserloh that she could return to work with the restriction that she should work from a seated position and should avoid standing or walking as much as possible.

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Bluebook (online)
719 So. 2d 568, 98 La.App. 4 Cir. 0002, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 2631, 1998 WL 658251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/millon-v-clarion-hotel-lactapp-1998.