Miller v. State

2015 Ark. App. 117, 456 S.W.3d 761, 2015 Ark. App. LEXIS 148
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 25, 2015
DocketCR-14-591
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2015 Ark. App. 117 (Miller v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 117, 456 S.W.3d 761, 2015 Ark. App. LEXIS 148 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

I,On August 13, 2013, Deonta Miller was charged in Phillips County, Arkansas, with aggravated robbery and first-degree battery. Miller filed a motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of circuit court. After a juvenile-transfer hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. Miller presents three points on appeal: 1) the circuit court erred in denying the motion to transfer, 2) Arkansas Code Annotated sections 9-27-318 and 9-27-503 are unconstitutional, and 3) the State failed to comply with discovery. We affirm.

I. Motion to Transfer

A. The Factors Set Forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9 — 27—318(g)

A prosecuting attorney has the discretion to charge a juvenile sixteen years of age or older in the criminal division of circuit court if the juvenile has allegedly engaged in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony. Ark.Code Ann. § 9 — 27—318(c)(1) (Repl. 2009). On the motion of the court or any party, the court in which the criminal charges have |2been filed shall conduct a hearing to determine whether to transfer the case to another division of circuit court having jurisdiction. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e). The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving that his or her case should be transferred to the juvenile division of circuit court. See Magana-Galdamez v. State, 104 Ark. App. 280, 291 S.W.3d 203 (2009). The court shall order the case transferred to another division of circuit court only upon a finding by clear-and-convincing evidence that the case should be transferred. Ark.Code Ann. § 9 — 27—318(h)(2). Clear-and-convincing evidence is the degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Lewis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 691, 2011 WL 5562773. We will not reverse a circuit court’s determination of whether to transfer a case unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.

At a juvenile-transfer hearing the circuit court must consider and issue written findings on the following factors:

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court;
(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;
(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense;
(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other, previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence;
|a(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile’s home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult;
(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before the expiration of the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday;
(8) ■ Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense;
(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile’s mental, physical, educational, and social history; and
(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g); Neal v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 744, at 6-7, 379 S.W.3d 634, 638. The circuit court does not have to give- equal weight to each factor. Id. at 7. Our supreme court has held that although the trial court must consider all of the factors enumerated in Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318(g), it is not required to make written findings with regard to all of those factors. Beulah v. State, 344 Ark. 528, 42 S.W.3d 461 (2001). The extent of the written findings is not specified. Id. The statutory purpose is satisfied where the record shows that the trial court considered the factors in reaching the decision about whether to transfer a case or retain jurisdiction. Jongewaard v. State, 71 Ark. App. 269, 29 S.W.3d 758 (2000). The circuit court’s failure to specifically mention certain evidence in its order does not mean that the court ignored the evidence or failed to consider it. Beulah, supra.

At the transfer hearing, Suzanne McCommon, the CEO superintendant of the Helena-West Helena Public School District, testified about Miller’s poor grades from the beginning of his academic career. She testified that he had not engaged in mature thinking or behavior over the year that she had known him. She referred to Miller’s four pages of disciplinary pactions in his school records that listed infractions relating to truancy, disorderly conduct, dress-code defiance, and insubordination. Another, separate, five-page document concerning a group fight on a school bus related to gang activity that was admitted into evidence. A document relating to Miller’s expulsion for gang-related activity in the spring of 2013 was admitted into evidence. McCommon also testified about another previous expulsion in 2012, and the documentation was admitted into evidence as well. She testified about an incident involving threatening another person with bodily harm. McCommon also stated that she believed that Miller was capable of communicating, understanding communication, understanding why he was being punished, and knowing that teachers expected him to stop the behaviors he was exhibiting.

Bob Steel, a senior administrator with the Division of Youth Services (DYS), testified about services and treatment offered by the Juvenile Assessment Treatment Center that could address Miller’s educational, language, and comprehension deficiencies, and how the Center offers services to teach social skills, decision-making skills, and stress-management skills. Steel testified that DYS offers instruction on defining oneself, becoming a leader, and avoiding being negatively influenced by peers. He testified that DYS offered services to help individuals acquire job skills. Steel testified that DYS could help Miller develop empathy for others and deal with the trauma of his grandmother’s death. He admitted on cross-examination that his agency is not always successful and that there is no guarantee that services rendered will result in change.

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Bluebook (online)
2015 Ark. App. 117, 456 S.W.3d 761, 2015 Ark. App. LEXIS 148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-state-arkctapp-2015.