Miller v. Grandy

13 Mich. 540, 1865 Mich. LEXIS 52
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 11, 1865
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 13 Mich. 540 (Miller v. Grandy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540, 1865 Mich. LEXIS 52 (Mich. 1865).

Opinions

•Campbell J.:

Complainant, who describes himself as a resident taxpayer, owning real and personal property, subject to •taxation, in the Township of Napoleon, in Jackson County, files his bill in behalf of himself and all residents and taxpayers of that town, against the .members of the Town Board, to restrain them from allowing any .accounts of individuals for money pledged or advanced for bounty and enlistment purposes, and to restrain the -clerk from issuing orders on said accounts, if allowed, [546]*546and the supervisors from inserting any amount so allowed on the assessment roll. 'The case comes up on demurrer.

An act was passed by the Legislature of 1865, entitled “An act to legalize the action of the several townships, city ancl wards in the County of Jackson in paying bounties to volunteers, and to refund money to pay bounties. — I. 1865, p. 4'7'7. Under this act a vote of the Township of Napoleon was had, to refund bounties, as provided for by the act, at a meeting which the. complainant claims to have been irregularly called. He further states that a number of persons had conti’ibuted to procure enlistments of volunteers and substitutes, to avoid the necessity of a draft, 'to the amount of from seven thousand to eight thousand dollars, none of which was voted by the electors or Town Board, by way of tax, loan, or otherwise; that the Board have appointed a meeting, and intend to allow all of these claims as valid, and that the clerk intends to draw negotiable warrants, and the supervisor to insert the amount when certified upon the tax rolls. He claims this action will injure the taxpayers, by clouding their titles, or compelling them to pay such illegal assessments, and prays for an inj unction.

The notice of the meeting was more than six days; and as that is the time required by the statute for this particular purpose, the general statutes, fixing a different time, are pro tanto suspended. The want of a preliminary request is not stated in an issuable form, and need not, therefore, be regarded. Neither does the bill aver that no moneys had been advanced on township action, but only that some moneys, not so advanced, are. intended to be paid by the Board.

We' cannot suppose that the Legislature, by this statute, designed to provide for such advances as were made by individuals acting on their own behalf, and paying or pledging money for purposes determined upon by them[547]*547selves entirely. Such a purpose is somewhat foreign to. the title of the act, regarded as aimed at one specific purpose, and not two discordant purposes; and the dirties imposed upon the town clerks .of ascertaining-, before the meeting, the amount of money advanced, would be impracticable, if the advances were on private' account. The act was evidently aimed at enabling townships to adopt action, which was in some way taken on the faith of their future ratification, if it should be permitted, and not to open the door to the allowance of such claims as might arise ■ from the unchecked and irregular action of persons, in no way conforming to any rule or measure adopted or sanctioned by the general authority. We are not at liberty to give to a statute a meaning which would allow taxation for purely private purposes, when. a public purpose is apparent. Patriotism, and a desire to maintain the Government, by furnishing forces, speedily and efficiently, may very well be accepted as a duty by municipalities,- as well as by individuals; ■for every part of the commonwealth is interested in the public safety. But when individuals act on their own account, they must be considered as doing what they are willing to consider "their own part towards the public welfare, and they cannot shift their voluntary burden upon others. Whether they have been impelled by interest (or by devotion, 'their private contributions occupy the same position with their other personal expenditures. When we find a statute clearly requiring any municipality to pay the private disbursements of its citizens, we shall be prepared to decide upon its validity; but we will not do such discredit to the Legislature as to assume such an intention where it is not unavoidable.

The bill, then, assumes that the complainant is likely to be damnified, because a Town Board, authorized to act upon one class of claims, intends to act upon an[548]*548other class, which the law does hot permit to be Recognized.

It is a point which should not be entirely overlooked, that this statute provides for action only during the year 1865. Unless carried into effect, so as to have the claims allowed in time to be certified on or before the first Monday of October, there is no provision made to permit" such action at all thereafter.

. The case has been presented on two grounds: First, upon the special interest of complainant, in protecting his own taxable property; and, second, upon the interest which he sets up in common with all taxpayers.

If this case is properly framed as a suit merely on his private behalf, for special damage apprehended to himself, (and whether it can be so considered is more than questionable,) we are called upon to determine whether his ■ complaint is within the reach of equity. Before the extraordinary relief of an injunction against the action of municipal boards, in their public capacity, can be granted, where it will at all interfere with their strictly public functions, a Court of Equity must have full allegations of the precise rights which will be injured, and must see that without its aid an injury will result which cannot be adequately remedied otherwise. "When such a case arises, public considerations may interpose serious obstacles, which may even then prevent interference. We think that, in the present case, there are some fatal obstacles to relief, on the theory of the bill now under consideration.

Without undertaking to go into any elaborate discussion of all the questions which might arise, we feel confident that no case can be found which recognizes any propriety, in enjoining the preliminary proceedings, in advance of the actual levy of a tax, on either personalty or realty. Apart from the palpable difficulty of determining in advance whether the complainant will be [549]*549in a condition to be injured when the tax is assessed,, it is always to be remembered that, under our system, taxes must be provided for at regular times, and by annual and somewhat' rapid proceedings. They are assessed against entire districts at once; and the staying of proceedings, on behalf of one person, stops .the' rev-, enue system of the entire community. Before a suit in chancery could be regularly brought to a hearing- > on proofs in the Circuit Court, (to say nothing of the hearing on appeal,) the time for action by the local officers would have gone by. No Court could ever be justified in such an interference with the necessary course-of government. After a tax has been assessed and be-, comes collectable, each man’s share becomes severable from the rest; and delaying its payment will not necessarily operate upon his neighbors. When his land is in danger of 'being affected by a cloud upon its title, a sufficiently clear case ' will then enable him to be relieved. — Palmer v. Rich, 12 Mich. R., 414. But until that danger arises he cannot ask protection; and where, nothing but personalty is concerned, the circumstances must be very peculiar which will warrant equitable interference. These principles are familial-, and rest on good sense and sound policy.

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Bluebook (online)
13 Mich. 540, 1865 Mich. LEXIS 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-grandy-mich-1865.