Miller v. Georgia Real Estate Commission

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Miller v. Georgia Real Estate Commission

222 S.E.2d 183, 136 Ga. App. 718, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1470

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 24, 1975

Docket51179, 51180, 51181

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 222 S.E.2d 183 (Miller v. Georgia Real Estate Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Miller v. Georgia Real Estate Commission, 222 S.E.2d 183, 136 Ga. App. 718, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).

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Opinion

Quillian, Judge.

1. Code Ann. § 3A-120 (b) (Ga. L. 1964, pp. 338, 354) provides in part: "Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition within 30 days after the service of the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within 30 days after the decision thereon.” When an appeal of an adverse decision by an administrative agency is filed beyond the time allowed by law the superior court has no jurisdiction to take any action other than to dismiss the case. Pope v. Wolfe, 128 Ga. App. 226 (196 SE2d 412); Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494 (170 SE2d 29).

In the instant cases the appellants appealed to the superior court more than 30 days after the rendition of an adverse ruling on their motions for rehearing before the administrative board and indeed more than 30 days after they received notice of such rulings by the board. Under such circumstances therefore it was not error for the trial judge to dismiss each of the appeals.

2. It is urged that the appellants here made a showing of "excusable neglect” which would permit an extension of time for a late filing under CPA § 6 (b) (Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b); Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 617; 1967, pp. 226, 229, 230).

*719 Argued November 5, 1975 Decided November 24, 1975. J. O. Wyatt, Jr., for appellants. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, R. Douglas Lackey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

"CPA § 6 (b) (Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b)), providing for extensions of time under certain circumstances, by its own terms applies only to an act required or allowed to be done by the Civil Practice Act, a notice given thereunder, or order of the court, and does not apply to periods of time which are definitely fixed by other statutes such as the time for filing the notice of appeal as provided for by Code Ann. § 6-803.” (Emphasis supplied.) Wilson v. City of Waycross, 130 Ga. App. 253 (203 SE2d 301). The Supreme Court in Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 (203 SE2d 206), held that the judicial review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (Code Ann. § 3A-120), supra, is not governed by the provisions of the Civil Practice Act. Therefore, the appellants may not utilize CPA § 6 (b) to obtain, after the expiration of the specified time, an extension which would allow a late filing of their appeals.

Judgments affirmed.

Pannell, P. J., and Clark, J., concur.

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Quillian, Judge.

1. Code Ann. § 3A-120 (b) (Ga. L. 1964, pp. 338, 354) provides in part: "Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition within 30 days after the service of the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within 30 days after the decision thereon.” When an appeal of an adverse decision by an administrative agency is filed beyond the time allowed by law the superior court has no jurisdiction to take any action other than to dismiss the case. Pope v. Wolfe, 128 Ga. App. 226 (196 SE2d 412); Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494 (170 SE2d 29).

In the instant cases the appellants appealed to the superior court more than 30 days after the rendition of an adverse ruling on their motions for rehearing before the administrative board and indeed more than 30 days after they received notice of such rulings by the board. Under such circumstances therefore it was not error for the trial judge to dismiss each of the appeals.

2. It is urged that the appellants here made a showing of "excusable neglect” which would permit an extension of time for a late filing under CPA § 6 (b) (Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b); Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 617; 1967, pp. 226, 229, 230).

*719 Argued November 5, 1975 Decided November 24, 1975. J. O. Wyatt, Jr., for appellants. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, R. Douglas Lackey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

"CPA § 6 (b) (Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b)), providing for extensions of time under certain circumstances, by its own terms applies only to an act required or allowed to be done by the Civil Practice Act, a notice given thereunder, or order of the court, and does not apply to periods of time which are definitely fixed by other statutes such as the time for filing the notice of appeal as provided for by Code Ann. § 6-803.” (Emphasis supplied.) Wilson v. City of Waycross, 130 Ga. App. 253 (203 SE2d 301). The Supreme Court in Howell v. Harden, 231 Ga. 594 (203 SE2d 206), held that the judicial review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (Code Ann. § 3A-120), supra, is not governed by the provisions of the Civil Practice Act. Therefore, the appellants may not utilize CPA § 6 (b) to obtain, after the expiration of the specified time, an extension which would allow a late filing of their appeals.

Judgments affirmed.

Pannell, P. J., and Clark, J., concur.

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222 S.E.2d 183, 136 Ga. App. 718, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-georgia-real-estate-commission-gactapp-1975.

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