Holbrook, J.
Plaintiffs are parents of a mentally retarded child who was formally committed to the Lapeer State Home and Training School by the Wayne county probate court in January, 1957, and are within the classification of relatives liable for the care and maintenance of their child under the provision of PA 1965, No 335 (MCLA § 330.651 et seq., Stat Ann 1365 Cum Supp § 14.870[101] et seq.). Pertinent portions of this act are reprinted in the footnote.1
[151]*151Plaintiff brought this action against the Department of Revenue of the State of Michigan, in the circuit court for Wayne county, claiming that the [152]*152act was unconstitutional for several reasons and requesting relief from its threatened enforcement.
Both parties moved for a summary judgment stating that there was no issue of fact present in the case and that the matter could be disposed of by ruling on the law. After being furnished thorough briefs by all counsel and hearing arguments, the learned trial judge found the act unconstitutional for several reasons. The State of Michigan appeals.
[153]*153We need consider here only two reasons asserted concerning unconstitutionality of the act. Some of the other aspects of the case are. considered in our opinion in the case of In re Raseman Estate (1969), 18 Mich App 91, to which we make reference.
The plaintiffs, in the trial court and here, assert that the reimbursement statute violates the equal protection clauses of our State and Federal Constitutions. In the recent case of Fox v. Employment Security Commission (1967), 379 Mich 579, 588, 589, Mr. Justice T. M. Kavanagh states:
“This Court has held numerous times that the Michigan Const 1908, art 2, § 1, secures the same right of equal protection as does its counterpart in the Constitution of the United States. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Company (1960), 360 Mich 510, 514, and cases therein cited. The same provisions in Const 1963, art 1, §§ 1 and 2, must likewise be held to afford the same rights as the Federal equal protection clause.
“There is no doubt that State legislatures have a broad range of discretion in establishing classifications in the exercise of their powers of regulation. However, the constitutional guarantees of equal protection are interposed against discriminations that are entirely arbitrary. In determining what is within legislative discretion and what is arbitrary, regard must be had for the particular subject of the State legislation. There must be a relation between the classification and the purposes of the act in which it is found.” Smith v. Cahoon, Sheriff (1931), 283 US 553, 566 (51 S Ct 582, 587, 75 L Ed 1264, 1274); Morey v. Doud (1957), 354 US 457, 465 (77 S Ct 1344, 1350, 1 L Ed 2d 1485, 1491); Beauty Built Construction Corporation v. City of Warren (1965), 375 Mich 229; Palmer Park Theatre Company v. City of Highland Park (1961), 362 Mich 326.
In the case of People v. Chapman (1942), 301 Mich 584, a statute of this State was challenged as un'con[154]*154stitutionally denying the defendant therein equal protection of the laws. Justice Starr, writing for the Court, stated (pp 597, 598):
“It is well recognized that the legislature may make classifications of persons, provided such classifications are based on substantial distinctions and are in accord with the aims sought to be achieved. (Citing cases.) However, such classification must be neither arbitrary nor capricious, but must rest on reasonable and justifiable foundations. In Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (1918), 201 Mich 138, p 141, the rule is stated:
“ ‘ “Legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose for the common good, is limited by reasonable and justifiable differentiation to a distinct type or class of persons is not for that reason unconstitutional because class legislation, if germane to the object of the enactment and made uniform in its operation upon all persons of the class to which it naturally applies; but if it fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class, and extends immunities or privileges to one portion and denies them to others of like kind, by unreasonable or arbitrary subclassification, it comes within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.” ’
“See, also, Davidow v. Wadsworth Manfg. Co. (1920), 211 Mich 90, 97-102; Peninsular Stove Co. v. Burton (1922), 220 Mich 284, 286; Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge (1925), 231 Mich 409.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature, under the provisions of the act, endeavored to require those of the class liable to reimburse the State in accord with their financial ability to do so. By making the net taxable income as shown by their Federal income tax return the criteria for the amount of reimbursement in all cases (insofar as maximum payment is concerned) the legislature has actually permitted an opposite re-[155]*155suit. Our Federal income tax law has several legal economic incentive provisions exempting actual income of a taxpayer from being included in net taxable income inter-alia, all interest income from municipal bonds, 1/2 of income profit derived from long term capital gains, and partial depreciation credit and income depletion allowances for those in certain businesses. The inclusion of such actual income not reflected in net taxable income would require many of sufficient ability to reimburse the maximum amount set forth in the act even though their net taxable income may be less than $5,000. It is obvious that any reimbursement statute such as the one under consideration, to be uniform, should not exclude relatives who have actual ability to reimburse. A formula should not be tied to net taxable income shown by a Federal tax return that permits those of greater financial ability to reimburse the State less than others of lesser financial ability in the same class. It permits those more able to pay to reimburse the State less or possibly nothing at all.
We find that PA 1965, No 335 does not accomplish the purpose of the act, i.e., to fairly and uniformly charge those of sufficient ability to reimburse the State in a reasonable manner. Many illustrations of this truth can be made but we deem them unnecessary. Net taxable income under the Federal income tax law does not properly reveal the financial ability of the relative to be charged to reimburse the State for the costs of maintaining the patient.
We conclude that the act is arbitrary, unreasonable and in conflict with the equal protection clause of our constitution and therefore is invalid.
The plaintiffs also assert that the act is unconstitutional in that there is lack of due process in its operation.
[156]*156The legislature has provided for liability, total or partial, on a formula based on the net taxable income of a relative as shown by his or her Federal income tax return. The law determining net taxable income of any individual is controlled by the Congress of the United States.
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Holbrook, J.
Plaintiffs are parents of a mentally retarded child who was formally committed to the Lapeer State Home and Training School by the Wayne county probate court in January, 1957, and are within the classification of relatives liable for the care and maintenance of their child under the provision of PA 1965, No 335 (MCLA § 330.651 et seq., Stat Ann 1365 Cum Supp § 14.870[101] et seq.). Pertinent portions of this act are reprinted in the footnote.1
[151]*151Plaintiff brought this action against the Department of Revenue of the State of Michigan, in the circuit court for Wayne county, claiming that the [152]*152act was unconstitutional for several reasons and requesting relief from its threatened enforcement.
Both parties moved for a summary judgment stating that there was no issue of fact present in the case and that the matter could be disposed of by ruling on the law. After being furnished thorough briefs by all counsel and hearing arguments, the learned trial judge found the act unconstitutional for several reasons. The State of Michigan appeals.
[153]*153We need consider here only two reasons asserted concerning unconstitutionality of the act. Some of the other aspects of the case are. considered in our opinion in the case of In re Raseman Estate (1969), 18 Mich App 91, to which we make reference.
The plaintiffs, in the trial court and here, assert that the reimbursement statute violates the equal protection clauses of our State and Federal Constitutions. In the recent case of Fox v. Employment Security Commission (1967), 379 Mich 579, 588, 589, Mr. Justice T. M. Kavanagh states:
“This Court has held numerous times that the Michigan Const 1908, art 2, § 1, secures the same right of equal protection as does its counterpart in the Constitution of the United States. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Company (1960), 360 Mich 510, 514, and cases therein cited. The same provisions in Const 1963, art 1, §§ 1 and 2, must likewise be held to afford the same rights as the Federal equal protection clause.
“There is no doubt that State legislatures have a broad range of discretion in establishing classifications in the exercise of their powers of regulation. However, the constitutional guarantees of equal protection are interposed against discriminations that are entirely arbitrary. In determining what is within legislative discretion and what is arbitrary, regard must be had for the particular subject of the State legislation. There must be a relation between the classification and the purposes of the act in which it is found.” Smith v. Cahoon, Sheriff (1931), 283 US 553, 566 (51 S Ct 582, 587, 75 L Ed 1264, 1274); Morey v. Doud (1957), 354 US 457, 465 (77 S Ct 1344, 1350, 1 L Ed 2d 1485, 1491); Beauty Built Construction Corporation v. City of Warren (1965), 375 Mich 229; Palmer Park Theatre Company v. City of Highland Park (1961), 362 Mich 326.
In the case of People v. Chapman (1942), 301 Mich 584, a statute of this State was challenged as un'con[154]*154stitutionally denying the defendant therein equal protection of the laws. Justice Starr, writing for the Court, stated (pp 597, 598):
“It is well recognized that the legislature may make classifications of persons, provided such classifications are based on substantial distinctions and are in accord with the aims sought to be achieved. (Citing cases.) However, such classification must be neither arbitrary nor capricious, but must rest on reasonable and justifiable foundations. In Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (1918), 201 Mich 138, p 141, the rule is stated:
“ ‘ “Legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose for the common good, is limited by reasonable and justifiable differentiation to a distinct type or class of persons is not for that reason unconstitutional because class legislation, if germane to the object of the enactment and made uniform in its operation upon all persons of the class to which it naturally applies; but if it fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class, and extends immunities or privileges to one portion and denies them to others of like kind, by unreasonable or arbitrary subclassification, it comes within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.” ’
“See, also, Davidow v. Wadsworth Manfg. Co. (1920), 211 Mich 90, 97-102; Peninsular Stove Co. v. Burton (1922), 220 Mich 284, 286; Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge (1925), 231 Mich 409.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature, under the provisions of the act, endeavored to require those of the class liable to reimburse the State in accord with their financial ability to do so. By making the net taxable income as shown by their Federal income tax return the criteria for the amount of reimbursement in all cases (insofar as maximum payment is concerned) the legislature has actually permitted an opposite re-[155]*155suit. Our Federal income tax law has several legal economic incentive provisions exempting actual income of a taxpayer from being included in net taxable income inter-alia, all interest income from municipal bonds, 1/2 of income profit derived from long term capital gains, and partial depreciation credit and income depletion allowances for those in certain businesses. The inclusion of such actual income not reflected in net taxable income would require many of sufficient ability to reimburse the maximum amount set forth in the act even though their net taxable income may be less than $5,000. It is obvious that any reimbursement statute such as the one under consideration, to be uniform, should not exclude relatives who have actual ability to reimburse. A formula should not be tied to net taxable income shown by a Federal tax return that permits those of greater financial ability to reimburse the State less than others of lesser financial ability in the same class. It permits those more able to pay to reimburse the State less or possibly nothing at all.
We find that PA 1965, No 335 does not accomplish the purpose of the act, i.e., to fairly and uniformly charge those of sufficient ability to reimburse the State in a reasonable manner. Many illustrations of this truth can be made but we deem them unnecessary. Net taxable income under the Federal income tax law does not properly reveal the financial ability of the relative to be charged to reimburse the State for the costs of maintaining the patient.
We conclude that the act is arbitrary, unreasonable and in conflict with the equal protection clause of our constitution and therefore is invalid.
The plaintiffs also assert that the act is unconstitutional in that there is lack of due process in its operation.
[156]*156The legislature has provided for liability, total or partial, on a formula based on the net taxable income of a relative as shown by his or her Federal income tax return. The law determining net taxable income of any individual is controlled by the Congress of the United States. Thus the legislature has delegated to the Congress the ultimate determination of the amount to be reimbursed by each such relative.
In Auditor General v. Hall (1942), 300 Mich 215, 224, Mr. Justice Butzel stated:
“In far more traditional forms of action both criminal and civil, length of sentences and the amount of damages may vary materially before different judges and juries. As long as there is not an abuse of discretion and a judge remains within the limits of the law, we find there is due process. In re Brewster Street Housing Site (1939), 291 Mich 313, 340, we approved of the following citation from Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County (1852), 1 Ohio St 77, 88, 89:
“ ‘The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ ”
In the case of Dearborn Independent, Inc. v. City of Dearborn (1951), 331 Mich 447, it is stated on pp 454, 455, as follows:
“The requirement in said statute, above italicized, of admission by the post-office department as a second-class mail matter would make the validity of the publication of legal notices depend upon the future as well as present regulations of the United States post-office department. In that respect it offends against the Constitution of our State (1908), art 5, § 1, which, among other things, provides:
[157]*157“ ‘The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and house of representatives.’
“The act in question unlawfully attempts to delegate to the United States post-office department the determination of the qualifications of a newspaper to publish legal notices. See King v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. (1905), 140 Mich 258 (6 Ann Cas 87), (syllabus 5) as follows:
“ ‘The Michigan standard policy law of 1881 (Act No 149), providing for an insurance commission and authorizing it to prescribe a standard form for fire insurance policies, is unconstitutional because attempting to delegate legislative powers in violation of section 1 of article 4 of the Constitution.’
“At the time of the decision in the King Case the Constitution of 1850 was in effect, which, however, contained substantially the same delegation of the legislative power (Const 1850, art 4, § 1) as we have above quoted from the Constitution of 1908, which latter was in effect when the statute, above quoted (CL 1948, § 691.611), was enacted and also when the said statute was amended in 1933 in the form above quoted. See, also, In re Brewster Street Housing Site (1939), 291 Mich 313, in which, at page 340, the King Case, supra, is cited as establishing the law in this State upon the subject of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See, also, Colony Town Club v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (1942), 301 Mich 107, 113.
“ ‘The State legislatures cannot delegate their sovereign powers to the Federal government. While a statute is valid which adopts existing statutes, rules, or regulations of Congress by reference, an attempt to make future regulations of Congress part of the State law is generally held to be unconstitutional.’ 16 CJS, p 343.
“ ‘Since under the doctrine of the separation of the powers of government the lawmaking function is assigned exclusively to the legislature, it is a cardinal principle of representative government that except when authorized by the Constitution — as may [158]*158be the case in reference to municipal corporations— the legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other authority or body [citing decisions in 30 States]. Any attempt to abdicate legislative power in any particular field, although valid in form, is unconstitutional and void.’ 11 Am Jur 2d, pp 921, 922, § 214.”
Also, see, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 520, p 551.
Although we realize that the Congress may not know or consider its direct power or discretion to vary liability under the act, it still violates the fundamental requirement of constitutional due process and for this reason is invalid.
The trial court ruled the act unconstitutional for other reasons which we deem unnecessary to consider,2 except to note that the statute fails to provide for a notice of hearing and a hearing before the administrative agency to determine in the first instance the liability of the relatives.3
Limited to the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the trial court in its determination that PA 1965, No 335 is unconstitutional and invalid.
No costs, the construction of a statute being involved.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred.