Miller v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund
This text of 286 So. 2d 788 (Miller v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
James V. MILLER
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICE PENSION FUND OF the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
G. Patrick Hand, Jr., Dennis J. Waldron, Hand & Olsen, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Richard A. Dowling, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Before REDMANN, LEMMON and SCHOTT, JJ.
REDMANN, Judge.
A pension fund appeals from a district court judgment decreeing plaintiff, a former police officer, entitled to disability payments under R.S. 33:2292.[1]
Facts
Having earlier been (at least informally) denied disability retirement, plaintiff resigned from the police department July 20, 1970, citing a job offer "which has many benefits I cannot pass up". He had injured his back in January 1969 when his police car swerved to avoid collision and ran over a curb. His underlying condition was the congenital one of spondylolisthesis.
*789 The present symptoms were evaluated by two orthopedic surgeons as a 10% back dysfunction or disability. A third orthopedic surgeon described only "mild limitation of motion to forward bending of the back * * * questionable motor loss of the [right] extensor hallis [sic; hallucis?] longus muscle * * * [and] loss of sensation of the fifth lumbar dermatome" and, concluding plaintiff "has at this time evidence of nerve root irritation", stated his "impression * * * [plaintiff] should be looked upon favorably for being retired". (Emphasis added.)
A general surgeon recited that plaintiff had "reached a period where prolonged standing, walking, or sitting results in pain"; he gave as his "opinion" that plaintiff's request for "disability pension should be given every consideration."
Of the two orthopedic surgeons who described his problem as a 10% dysfunction or disability of his back, one opined only "I do not think he is capable of doing police work at this time, which would require * * * lifting or pushing, or prolonged standing". (Emphasis added.) The other felt plaintiff was "certainly able to perform the clerical tasks required of a detective in the Personnel Division [plaintiff's assignment] without undue suffering. Although there is a chance of re-injury of his back with recurrent symptoms with a new accident, this chance is not great and if a re-injury were to occur, conservative care could likely bring his symptoms under control again."
We conclude plaintiff has a partial disability, reasonably shown to be service-connected, amounting to a 10% back dysfunction, which disability did not make him unable to do the work of a police officer and in fact did not cause his retirement.
Law
The New Orleans police pension fund was enacted in its present form by Acts 1948, No. 96 (and among subsequent amendments that by Acts 1967, No. 69 is pertinent), to provide for the pensioning and retirement of police employees. It does not purport to be a second workmen's compensation law: R.S. 23:1034 (as amended by Acts 1950, No. 412) makes the general workmen's compensation law applicable to police officers.
That a police officer may be totally and permanently disabled within the workmen's compensation law's meaning is, however, not material to the question whether the officer is entitled to pension fund law disability benefits. The two laws and sources of funds are distinct. All police officers contribute a portion of their salaries to their pension fund.
R.S. 33:2298 demands that "No benefits, pensions, annuities, or refunds shall ever be made from the fund for any reason whatsoever, except in strict conformity with the provisions and requirements of this Sub-part. Any person who separates from the police department for any cause prior to retirement, shall have no claim to the benefits, pensions, or annuities provided herein, nor to refunds of any amounts paid into the fund. This provision shall be retroactive."[2]
We therefore reject any theory that pension fund disability should be coextensive with the obligatorily liberal interpretation of workmen's compensation disability. But by similar reasoning we also reject appellant's contention that plaintiff's having received total and permanent disability workmen's compensation benefits defeats (on exclusiveness of remedy *790 grounds, R.S. 23:1032) entitlement to pension benefits.
We conclude that the present New Orleans police pension found law's structure provides (1) for a disability "pension" for permanent disability which renders retirement necessary, whether the disability is service-connected, R.S. 33:2292, or not, R. S. 33:2294 subd. E; and (2) for disability "benefits" for temporary disability which renders removal from active service necessary, whether the disability is service-connected or not, except that if not the member must have ten years service, R.S. 33:2294 subd. F.
Prior to the 1967 amendment the pension fund's only provision for disability retirement was R.S. 33:2292. It provides that when an officer "while in the active discharge of duty, becomes permanently disabled so as to render his retirement from service necessary, he shall be retired by a two-thirds vote of the members of the board" and shall receive a pension. (Emphasis added.) We conclude that plaintiff has not shown that his disability (though permanent) "render[ed] his retirement from service necessary" and the board therefore was not obliged by § 2292 to retire him and grant him a pension.
The 1967 amendment did not purport to amend § 2292, but it did make further provisions for disability benefits in R.S. 33:2294 subds. E and F.[3]
Subd. E governs the case of an officer "permanently disabled and incapacitated to perform his duties" by a non-service-connected injury or illness. (Emphasis added.) It repeats the mechanics of the board (though by majority vote) retiring and pensioning the disabled officer. Evidently *791 the italicized words relate the permanent disability not to bodily function but to police officer function and, while the incapacity doubtless need not be 100%, some significant incapacity such as might disqualify a police officer from holding his job is required.
Subd. F's first sentence, relating exclusively to service-connected disability (as here present), does not repeat subd. E's dual qualification of "disabled", i. e., permanently disabled to perform his duties.[4] And nowhere in subd. F is there mention of retirement. But subd. F's second paragraph plainly indicates that the disability must have caused removal from active duty since, if disability is removed the member "shall be required to return to active duty and his disability payments shall cease."
We view subd. F as providing for the member whose disability (e. g., a broken leg) is only temporary but so substantial as to prevent his remaining on active duty (presumably, for a period longer than ordinary sick leave might cover). Subd. F provides not a "pension" on retirement (as do subd. E and § 2292), but a "disability benefit" without retirement to the member temporarily disabled from active duty.
We therefore conclude that, since plaintiff's disability was insufficient to require his removal from active duty, he was also not entitled to disability benefits under R. S. 33:2294 subd. F.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
286 So. 2d 788, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-board-of-trustees-of-police-pension-fund-lactapp-1974.