SMITH, Justice.
It is admitted that respondent on March 25, 1955, at the time of the happening of the event hereinafter described, was engaged in the duties of his employment; also, that some eight hours afterward he evidenced a personal injury which had resulted in violence to the physical structure of his body, in that he had suffered a hemorrhage of a branch of an artery supplying the right cortex of his brain, which produced complete and permanent paralysis of his left arm and left leg.
Respondent, as weed control supervisor of appellant Bingham County, with headquarters at Blackfoot, after attendance to duties pertaining to his employment at Boise, was returning to Blackfoot in a motor vehicle furnished him by his employer. When he had reached a point on the high[90]*90way near King Hill he was subjected to an event in respect to which the Industrial Accident Board found, in accordance with the evidence, as follows:
“Claimant * * * was suddenly and without warning involved in a near collision with another vehicle traveling in the same direction; said other vehicle swerved into the path of claimant’s vehicle while said claimant was lawfully attempting to overtake and pass said other vehicle; by sudden and full application of brakes and swerving his vehicle; claimant avoided and narrowly missed striking said other vehicle by a margin of approximately four feet and while both automobiles were traveling at a rate of speed estimated to be fifty miles per hour; said other vehicle, containing several small children, never stopped.”
Appellants by their assignments of error contend that the Board erroneously found that respondent received a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
I.C. sec. 72-201 provides in part:
“ ‘Accident/ as used in this law, means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury, as defined in this law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“The terms ‘injury’ and ‘personal injury,’ as the same are used in this law, shall be construed to include only an injury caused by an accident, as above defined, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body. * *
The described event fulfills certain of the requirements of the statutory definition of an accident, since it was unexpected, undesigned, unlooked for and unforeseen; it happened suddenly, and was connected with the industry, and was definitely located as to time and place where it occurred. However, a further statutory requirement must be met, i. e., such event, to constitute an accident within the purview of the workmen’s compensation law, must have caused the personal injury.
The question then, which must be answered is, — did the described event cause respondent’s personal injury? I.C. sec. 72-201. The question requires a review of the evidence since it presents the matter of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of the Industrial Accident Board. The Board found:
“Claimant, as a direct and proximate result of said sudden, unexpected and unforseen incident and episode, was immediately and seriously frightened and shocked thereby; which said fright and shock was immediately manifested in [91]*91claimant by a feeling of weakness, involuntary shaking, chilliness, nausea, the inability except with difficulty to gather his thoughts, and an immediate numbness in his head. These manifestations continued thereafter with somewhat lessening degree until retirement the same evening, but never entirely left him. Several hours after the incident and episode above described and before his retirement, claimant manifested paleness and an extremely tired appearance; he suffered a loss of appetite and experienced a definite difficulty of articulation or a slurring of his speech.
“Upon the happening of said accident, or some time during the period thereafter to about 6:00 A.M., on March 26, 1955, claimant suffered a cerebral vascular accident diagnosed as and found to be a hemorrhage of a branch of the arteries of the brain in the right cerebral cortex, which produced in claimant a complete and permanent paralysis of the left arm and left leg.
“The immediate, direct and precipitating cause of said cerebral vascular accident was the sudden, frightening,unexpected, undesigned and unlooked for accident of the afternoon of March 25, 1955, and the emotional strain, anxiety and nervous tension produced in claimant by the happening thereof; the shock to claimant’s nervous system, which in turn caused the cerebral vascular accident, was sufficiently violent to and did produce the injury to the physical structure of claimant’s body as hereinbefore found.”
Respondent was diagnosed as having suffered a cerebral vascular accident with paralysis on the left side of his body which included his left arm and left leg. The event of the untoward frightening experience to which respondent was subjected in the near automobile collision was related hypothetically to Dr. Hoge, one of respondent’s attending physicians; his testimony on direct examination appears:
“Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not that sudden incident which has been related to you caused or probably caused this cerebral vascular accident? A. Well, it certainly could have, and in my opinion, did. * * *
* * * * * *
"A. I will say that many strokes follow emotional upsets and sometimes not immediately but hours after and days after.”
On cross examination Dr. Hoge testified:
“A. * * * The most likely diagnosis, that is, type of cerebral vascular accident, would be cerebral hemorrhage, or what they commonly call stroke or apoplexy.
* * * * * *
[92]*92“A. In my experience most of them come after extreme exertion, physical exertion, or excitement, or anxiety.
* * * * * *
“Q. Doctor, is the condition the same in a strain from physical exertion as it is from a sudden fright?
* * * * * *
“A. Well, the heart puts more pressure on the blood vessels in either instance.
“Q. So that they would be comparable, would they not? A. Comparable.
******
“A. * * * in just a few minutes of increased pressure you can get an artery to blow out and leak for hours and hours and hours afterwards, just a little one, maybe.
******
“A. * * * There may have been preexisting weakness in the vessel. However, an emotional upset would cause an increase of pressure within the vessel and also cause spasm and. dilation of the vessel and would predispose to either a stroke or thrombosis. * * *."
Dr. Anderson, appellant’s remaining attending physician, testified on direct examination on the basis of the evidence hypothetically stated, including the history of the case which the doctor obtained. His testimony appears in part:
“Q. * * * Do you have an opinion as to what was the probable cause of this stroke? A. * * * It is my opinion that a good probability exists that the progression of the symptoms which finally became recognized as a stroke began shortly after the near accident on the road. * * *
* * * * * *
“A. * * * there have been many observations in medical, experience where an individual who is predisposed to a cerebral vascular accident seems to have the accident occur during periods of severe physical fatigue or severe emotional fatigue or a severe emotional upset or even less defined words or events. Those things have occurred with sufficient regularity for many neurologists and practitioners to be of the opinion that in predisposed individuals physical and emotional fatigue and physical and emotional strain can be precipitating events, and in my own experience, I have seen a number of cases in which such factors were present at the time of the incident.
“Q. And those factors, are they a probability in this case? A. They are a probability.”
The doctor then further stated that in his opinion the hemorrhage probably had occurred before respondent went to sleep the evening of March 25, 1955, after having experienced the untoward frightening experi[93]*93ence during the afternoon of that day. Nothing was elicited from the doctor on cross examination which conflicted with his theories expressed on direct examination.
Dr. Howard, called by appellants, on direct examination stated that he could not make a positive statement as to whether there was a causal connection between respondent’s stroke and the emotional strain. However, he recognized the medical theories of such causal connection. On cross examination the doctor testified more positively:
“Q. Then * * * you recognize that there can be a relationship between emotional strain, anxiety, tension, and the happening of a stroke? A. Well, there certainly can be, yes. * * *
***** *
“Q. * * * emotional strain and anxiety can be a precipitating cause? A. I certainly think so, yes. I certainly agree with that.”
Dr. Blackburn called by appellants testified hypothetically on direct examination, that in his opinion there was no reasonable factual connection between rspondent’s experience on the highway and the subsequent stroke. On cross examination, however, Dr. Blackburn recognized the medical theory as did the other physicians, as follows:
“Q. It is a well-recognized fact * * * that such things as excitement, confusion, restlessness, anxiety and emotional strain can produce a cerebral vascular accident such as has been described here?
******
“A. It is a recognized theory.”
The doctor’s testimony then assumed a negative character. He stated that in practice he had never seen such cases. Again reverting to the medical theories the doctor recognized that emotional anxiety, tension and fright, by elevating the blood pressure, can be precipitating factors of a stroke.
Dr. Kiefer, called by appellants, stated that in his opinion there was not a causal connection between the experience which respondent had on the highway and his cerebral vascular accident. He then recognized medical theories, as did the other physicians, as applicable to the case by the following testimony on cross examination:
“Q. * * * Now, does emotion, in which term I include fright and the physiological reactions that the human body has to fright, have any effect upon the arteries of the body? A. The [that] causes an increased strain on the vessel wall because of the increased blood pressure.
“Q. Then * * * emotion can be a precipitating factor in a cerebral hemorrhage? A. Yes.”
The doctor then stated that with a slow leak an appreciable time could pass before paralysis sets in, such as “a matter of minutes or a very few hours.”
[94]*94The doctors - generally recognized that arteriosclerosis, since it causes weakening of blood vessels, is a condition associated with cerebral hemorrhage. Dr. Howard, called by appellants, expressed the opinion that since in respondent’s case the presence of some arteriosclerosis was detected, the emotional stress and strain, produced by the untoward frightening event, was a precipitating cause of the cerebral hemorrhage.
The fact that there was no physical contact between respondent and the accident is immaterial; such rule is announced by this Court in Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 385, 232 P.2d 975, 978, as follows:
“The authorities considering this precise point are uniform in holding there need not be physical contact between the accident and the person to constitute an accidental injury.”
In Roberts v. Dredge Fund, supra, Roberts, a dredge employee, was standing outside a metal fence surrounding a power substation, situated about 1000 feet from the dredge, when a power company employee started to replace a burned out fuse, whereupon a short circuit resulted attended by a roar and a fall of fire. The death of the dredge employee occurred from resulting emotional shock, summarized by an attending physician:
“A. * * * I mean a shock to his system by a sudden flash, you might say by a blow to his mind to see this sudden ball of fire. I felt, and I feel now that the cause of his death was hastened by the fact that this shock from the ball of fire which has caused his heart to stop beating from * * * occlusion of a coronary artery * *
This Court adopted the following reasoning of the dissenting opinion in the case of Bekeleski v. O. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741, 744, as more worthy of acceptance:
“I am inclined to think that the lawmakers, by the use of the term ‘violence to the physical structure of the body,’ meant an animate body with a directing brain containing blood, sensitive nerves, fibers and convolutions. The brain is part of the physical structure of the body. Without it there could be no performance of an employee’s duties. Accidental violence to the brain and resulting disability may be difficult to prove, but plaintiff was rational before the accident and irrational afterward. Her blood pressure was higher and her pulse more rapid. The pupils of her eyes were dilated and her posture abnormal. She had tremors and was unable to walk in her usual manner, all as properly indicated by the majority opinion, but it seems to me these results of the accident evidence ‘violence to the physical structure of the body,’ within the meaning of the compensation law.”
Also, this Court in Roberts v. Dredge Fund, supra, quoted with approval from the case [95]*95of J. Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165, 190 A. 836, 109 A.L.R. 887, as follows:
“It is not perceived that there is any fundamental difference in law or in principle between an injury causatively resulting from a blood vessel being cut or crushed and one broken by an artificial distension of that blood vessel from fright, apprehension, or exertion directly and proximately a consequence of an accidental event.”
See also the following cases, comparable to the one under consideration here, in each of which an award of compensation was upheld on account of personal injury although there was no personal contact between the accident and the injured employee: Yates v. South Kirby, etc., Collieries, 2 K.B. 538, 3 B.W.C.C. 418; Montgomery v. State Compensation Com’r, 116 W.Va. 44, 178 S.E. 425; Monk v. Charcoal Iron Co., 246 Mich. 193, 224 N.W. 354; Reynolds v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 21 N.J. Super. 528, 91 A.2d 435; Geipe v. Collett, supra; Church v. Westchester County, 253 App.Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581; Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894, 139 A.L.R. 1465; Charon’s Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511; Burlington Mills Corporation v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291; Van Ness v. Borough of Haledon, 45 A.2d 673, 24 N.J. Misc. 29, see also Annotation, 109 A.L.R. 892.
The fact that respondent may have been afflicted with arteriosclerosis which tended to weaken his blood vessels, and that arteriosclerosis is a condition regarded as affiliated with cerebral occlusion also is immaterial.
Nothing is contained in the workmen’s compensation law that limits its provisions to workmen who, previous to injury, were in sound condition and perfect health; for as stated in McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 793, 203 P. 1068, 1075:
“ * * * our Compensation Law makes no distinction between * * * healthy and unhealthy employés.”
In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087, 1089, appears the following:
“Our statute prescribes no standard of fitness, makes no distinction between the sound and the unsound, which, being true, compensation under the act is not based on an implied warranty of perfect health or immunity from latent or unknown tendencies to disease.”
In Taylor v. Federal M. & S. Co., 59 Idaho 183, 81 P.2d 728, 730, is found the following statement:
“A weakened condition or susceptibility to injury does not preclude recovery.”
See also Hanson v. Independent School Dist. 11-J, 50 Idaho 81, 294 P. 513; Scar[96]*96borough v. Beardmore, 52 Idaho 180, 12 P.2d 771; Young v. Herrington, 61 Idaho 183, 99 P.2d 441; Hamlin v. University of Idaho, 61 Idaho 570, 104 P.2d 625; Woodbury v. Frank B. Arata Fruit Co., 64 Idaho 227, 130 P.2d 870. See also I.C. secs. 72-323 and 72-311 which forbid separation of preexisting disability or infirmity where the disability caused by the injury is total and permanent.
Again returning to the definition of an accidental personal injury set out in I.C. sec. 72-201, an emotional shock, though it be a sudden, untoward and unforeseen event, cannot constitute an accident unless such event causes or is causative of a resulting personal injury. This principle is stated in Geipe v. Collett [172 Md. 165, 190 A. 840], supra, in language as follows:
" * * * an accidental personal injury takes place if the injury be a nervous shock that produces not a mere emotional impulse but a physiological injury as the proximate effect of an unforeseen or unexpected event, which occurs without design in the reasonable performance of the employee’s duties, [citations.] ”
The evidence, in the case under consideration here, is conflicting in the respect as to whether the sudden, untoward frightening event, to which respondent was subjected, caused or was the causative factor of his personal injury. However, the evidence is not conflicting in the respect that medical theories recognize that frightening episodes and events can and do bring about conditions of physical tension, stress and strain sufficient to cause or constitute the causative factors of cerebral or other vascular accidents in the case of some individuals whose blood vessels may have become somewhat weakened.
The evidence, though conflicting, as aforesaid, is substantial and competent, and sustains the finding of the Industrial Accident Board that the sudden frightening event, to which respondent was subjected, caused or was the causative factor in precipitating the personal injury, i. e., the cerebral hemorrhage by which respondent became afflicted within a comparatively short time after the happening of said event; and having caused, or been the causative factor of the injury, such event constituted an accident within the purview of I.C. sec. 72-201 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The evidence, therefore, is sufficient to sustain the Board’s finding that respondent received a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
Idaho Constitution, Art. V, sec. 9, and I.C. sec. 72-609 limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on appeals from the Industrial Accident Board to a review of questions of law only. Wells v. Potlatch Forests, 67 Idaho 420, 183 P.2d 202; Yanzick v. Sunset Minerals, 75 Idaho 384, 272 P.2d 696; Application of Idaho Hospital Association, 76 Idaho 34, 277 P.2d 287.
[97]*97 It is only in cases where the evidence is not conflicting and not in dispute, that the application of the law to the undisputed facts raises a question of law. Johnston v. A. C. White Lbr. Co., 37 Idaho 617, 217 P. 979; Burchett v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 48 Idaho 524, 283 P. 515; Horst v. Southern Idaho Oil Co., 49 Idaho 58, 286 P. 369; Rabideau v. Cramer, 59 Idaho 154, 81 P.2d 403; Howard v. Texas Owyhee Min. & Dev. Co., 62 Idaho 707, 115 P.2d 749. Also, where the findings are absolutely unsupported, they may be reviewed as a matter of law. Bybee v. Idaho Equity Exchange, 57 Idaho 396, 65 P.2d 730; In re Black, 58 Idaho 803, 80 P.2d 24; Paull v. Preston Theatres Corp., 63 Idaho 594, 124 P.2d 562; Benson v. Jarvis, 64 Idaho 107, 127 P.2d 784.
The findings of the Industrial Accident Board, when supported by competent, substantial though conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Golay v. Stoddard, 60 Idaho 168, 89 P.2d 1002; Knight v. Younkin, 61 Idaho 612, 105 P.2d 456; Cole v. Fruitland Canning Ass’n, 64 Idaho 505, 134 P.2d 603; Zipse v. Schmidt Bros., 66 Idaho 30, 154 P.2d 171; Herman v. Coeur d’Alene Hardware & Foundry Co., 69 Idaho 423, 208 P.2d 167; McGee v. Koontz, 70 Idaho 507, 223 P.2d 686; Limprecht v. Bybee, 76 Idaho 293, 281 P.2d 1047.
The award of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
PORTER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.