Miller v. Arab Bank

372 F. Supp. 3d 33
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMarch 10, 2019
Docket18-cv-2192 (BMC); 18-cv-4670 (BMC)
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 372 F. Supp. 3d 33 (Miller v. Arab Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Arab Bank, 372 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

Brian M. Cogan, U.S.D.J.

These cases involve claims brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (the "ATA") against Arab Bank, PLC ("Arab Bank"), which has moved to dismiss the complaints in both actions. For the reasons stated below, the [30] motion to dismiss in the action docketed under docket number 18-cv-2192 is granted in part and denied in part, and the [12] motion to dismiss in the action docketed under docket number 18-cv-4670 is denied.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINTS

According to the complaints in the above-captioned proceedings, which are assumed to be true for purposes of defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Arab Bank - a Jordanian bank with a branch in the State of New York that was converted into a federal agency in 2005 - provided financial support for 14 terrorist attacks in Israel and surrounding areas. Plaintiffs - all but six of whom are American citizens - were either injured in these attacks or are relatives of American citizens injured in these attacks. Designated foreign terrorist organizations *39("FTOs"), including Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya ("Hamas"),1 and their agents committed 12 of these attacks.

These terrorist attacks were part of the Second Intifada, a terrorist campaign against the State of Israel from approximately 2000-2004. At a meeting at the beginning of the Second Intifada, terrorists discussed the need for a mechanism to distribute donations to the Second Intifada. The Chairman of Arab Bank noted that - although Arab Bank employees donated 5% of their salaries for the Second Intifada in October 2000 - the donations were not transferred to support the Second Intifada. Arab business and political leaders then formed a fund to further bankroll the Palestinian Authority and the Second Intifada. Arab Bank pledged $ 2,000,000 to support this fund, and the Chairman of Arab Bank personally pledged $ 500,000.

In addition to these monetary contributions, Arab Bank provided various financial services in connection with the Second Intifada. Arab Bank processed over $ 30,000,000 for Hamas entities from various sources, as well as processing millions of dollars though New York for Hamas leaders. Arab Bank also maintained a large number of accounts for entities and individuals affiliated with Hamas and other American-, European-, and Israeli-designated terrorist organizations.

One of the Hamas-related entities that maintained an account at Arab Bank was a fundraising network - the "Union of Good" - whose members included the Saudi Committee in Support of the Intifada Al Quds (the "Saudi Committee"). The Saudi Committee was established to support the families of "martyrs," i.e. terrorists who died during terrorist attacks, Palestinians who were wounded when confronting Israeli security forces, and Palestinians held in Israeli custody. The Saudi Committee provided Hamas-controlled front organizations with over $ 15,000,000, including payments routed through Arab Bank.

Further, Arab Bank administered a terrorist insurance scheme (the "Insurance Scheme") in which the Saudi Committee provided over $ 35 million to martyrs and their families, including individuals responsible for attacks that have injured plaintiffs in the instant cases. To fund the Insurance Scheme, the Saudi Committee raised money from private donors in Saudi currency, converted the funds to U.S. dollars through Arab Bank's then-operating New York branch, and routed the funds to local branches of the Arab Bank in the West Bank.

To distribute these funds, the Saudi Committee and Hamas-affiliated organizations provided Arab Bank with detailed lists containing the names of the martyrs, their personal information, and the date and manner of their death, which often included bullets, bombs, and assassinations. The causes of death identified in lists provided to Arab Bank even included "Martyr Operation," and - in the case of an individual who died carrying out a terrorist attack in the French Hill section of Jerusalem - "French Hill Operation." The lists contained instructions to substitute transfers for these individuals with transfers *40for an attached list of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were encouraged to collect their benefits through Arab Bank, as illustrated through the following examples:

• In early 2001, an Arab Bank employee called a terrorist to inform him that, because the terrorist was injured and hospitalized, he was eligible for $ 1,330. The terrorist met with an Arab Bank employee who gave him a check for that amount;
• On July 1, 2001, a Palestinian newspaper published an announcement calling on residents of the West Bank and the northern Gaza Strip to collect their funds from the Insurance Scheme at Arab Bank;
• November 23, 2001, the Saudi Committee placed an announcement in a Palestinian newspaper listing the names of over 1,000 individuals killed or captured during the Second Intifada and invited their families "to go to the branches of the Arab Bank in their places of residence to receive their allocations donated by the Committee ...";
• On February 18, 2002, a Hamas front organization placed an advertisement in a Palestinian newspaper announcing that "the relatives of the martyrs, whose names hereby follow, are requested to head for the Arab Bank branches in their place of residence in order to receive the tenth payment from the Honorable Saudi Committee - a sum of 5,316.06 USD ...." One of the individuals on this list carried out a terrorist attack that injured multiple plaintiffs in the instant proceedings.

The Insurance Scheme incentivized terrorists to commit acts of violence to receive the benefits. The Insurance Scheme also helped Hamas gather support among the Palestinian people, but it was open to terrorists belonging to any terrorist organization or none at all - not just Hamas-affiliated terrorists - which further incentivized terrorist attacks in Israel. By administering the Insurance Scheme, Arab Bank allowed donors to bypass corrupt Palestinian Authority officials, avoided the uncertainty associated with cash payments delivered by courier, and provided a professional accounting system that minimized the risk of duplicate payments and unreliable record-keeping.

Arab Bank's conduct prompted multiple lawsuits, including the instant proceedings, in which victims of terrorism alleged that Arab Bank violated the ATA. Litigation against the Arab Bank also prompted the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") to investigate Arab Bank.

FinCEN found that, from 2000 to 2004, regulatory authorities in the Palestinian Territories provided Arab Bank with information regarding the fund transfers to beneficiaries with accounts at the Arab Bank and also ordered financial institutions to either freeze accounts of suspected criminals or place the accounts on a watch list. FinCEN also found that, despite a heightened risk of illicit activity, Arab Bank failed to implement proper compliance procedures. FinCEN also found that Arab Bank failed to conduct the proper investigations after Arab Bank learned that it cleared fund transfers for entities that the United States government later designated as terrorist organizations.

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Bluebook (online)
372 F. Supp. 3d 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-arab-bank-nyed-2019.