Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 7, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-03320
StatusUnknown

This text of Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC (Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DIANA BONACASA, VINCENT BONACASA, RAQUEL BONACASA, BARBARA ROSENDAHL, JEFFREY MUNCY, GILBERT RUSSELL, ABIGAIL RUSSELL, SARAH RUSSELL, NOEMI RUSSELL, BENJAMIN RUSSELL, NATHANAEL RUSSEL, DEBBIE WILLIAMS, and CHELSEA MANGANO, OPINION & ORDER Plaintiffs, 22 Civ. 3320 – against – STANDARD CHARTERED PLC and STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, Defendants. RAMOS, D.J.:

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), alleging that Standard Chartered PLC (“SC PLC”)—through its subsidiary, Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”) (together with SC PLC, “Standard Chartered”)—aided and abetted al-Qaeda by providing banking services to the Fatima Group (“Fatima”), a Pakistani fertilizer company that purportedly supplied al-Qaeda with materials used to make improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”). Doc. 1. Diana Bonacasa, Vincent Bonacasa, Raquel Bonacasa, Barbara Rosendal, Jeffrey Muncy, Gilbert Russel, Abigail Russel, Sarah Russel, Noemi Russel, Benjamin Russel, Nathaniel Russel, Debbie Williams, and Chelsea Mangano are family members of service members killed by such explosive devices in Afghanistan between 2013 and 2015. Pending before the court is Standard Chartered’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Doc. 20. For the reasons set forth below, Standard Chartered’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND1 In the early 2000s, during the American war in Afghanistan, members of al-Qaeda attacked U.S. service members to drive them out of Afghanistan.2 ¶¶ 45, 52. To that end, al- Qaeda established bomb-making factories in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where the Pakistani Taliban would manufacture explosives for al-Qaeda and the al- Qaeda Terror Syndicate.3 ¶¶ 55, 109. The IED was one type of bomb these factories produced. ¶ 55. The main explosive ingredient in the vast majority of IEDs at that time was calcium ammonium nitrate (“CAN”), which is used in agricultural fertilizers.4 ¶¶ 96, 101. These CAN- based IEDs were responsible for about ninety percent of American IED casualties in Afghanistan. ¶ 125. In 2010, Afghanistan banned the importation, production, transportation, use, sale, and storage of CAN. ¶ 103. In 2011, Pakistan also adopted a policy to prevent the smuggling of CAN into Afghanistan, which included a counter-IED public awareness campaign, training, and

1 The following facts are based on the allegations in the complaint, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the instant motion. See, e.g., Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F. 3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012). Unless otherwise noted, citations to “¶ __” refer to the complaint, Doc. 1. 2 Al-Qaeda is a Sunni Islamic terrorist organization originally founded during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1980s. ¶ 52. It was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) in 1999 and continues to be designated as an FTO today. ¶ 53. The al-Qaeda Terror Syndicate (the “Syndicate”) was a “closely affiliated” group of organizations—led by al-Qaeda—that came together in the early 2000s to eliminate the U.S. presence in Afghanistan through violence. ¶¶ 45–46, 49–50. Al-Qaeda often planned, reviewed, approved, authorized, and participated in attacks carried out by members of the al-Qaeda Terror Syndicate; al-Qaeda and its sister organizations were so closely aligned that individual terrorists moved back and forth from organization to organization within the Syndicate with such fluidity that, during the relevant period, the terrorist organizations were no longer truly distinct. ¶¶ 49–50. 3 The Pakistani Taliban is a designated FTO that is part of the Syndicate. ¶¶ 75, 79. The U.S. State Department considered the Pakistani Taliban to have a symbiotic relationship with al-Qaeda during the early 2010s; for example, the Pakistani Taliban provided al-Qaeda with a safe haven in areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. ¶¶ 77, 80. 4 This ingredient, however, was not widely used to support agriculture at the time, as “more suitable” and “less expensive” alternatives existed. ¶ 96. Indeed, CAN fertilizer then accounted for as little as five percent of all fertilizer used in the Afghani region. ¶ 98. And when Afghanistan banned the use of CAN fertilizer, other effective, nonexplosive fertilizers were available for agricultural purposes. ¶ 103. strengthened legislation. ¶¶ 106–07. But the flow of CAN into Afghanistan did not stop.5 ¶¶ 109–111. Around this time, news organizations began to take notice of this problem. On September 1, 2011, for example, the Associated Press published an article, noting that the “main in gradient in most of the homemade bombs [used by the Syndicate] . . . is fertilizer produced by a single company in Pakistan,” with one plant alone producing enough CAN “fertilizer for at least 140,000 bombs” in a single year. ¶ 141. In August 2011, the U.S. government began working to limit the access of al-Qaeda and its allies to CAN. ¶ 126. Fatima, a Pakistani fertilizer company, supplied al-Qaeda with almost all of its CAN. ¶ 127. That month, United States Army Lieutenant General Michael Barbero discussed al-Qaeda’s use of CAN with Fawad Mukhtar, Fatima’s Chairman, on the phone. ¶ 127. The two met in Virginia later in 2011, where General Barbero told Chairman Mukhtar that the CAN fertilizer from Fatima’s plants was responsible for most U.S. service member deaths from IEDs in Afghanistan. ¶ 129. Fatima agreed to add dye to its fertilizer—so that U.S. officials could more easily detect and seize CAN being smuggled across the Afghan border—and to stop selling CAN to dealers near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. ¶ 130. But Fatima never added dyes to its fertilizer. ¶¶ 130–31. After giving a tour of one of its factories to U.S. officials, Fatima cut off contact with the U.S. government, directing it to communicate with Fatima through the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. ¶ 131. In 2012, U.S. officials again attempted to convince Fatima to implement CAN- preventative measures, such as using dye, but Fatima refused to do so. ¶ 132; see also ¶ 143 (describing a May 5, 2012 article published by the Khaama Press Agency—at that time, Afghanistan’s largest online news service—which reported that “Fatima Group . . . ha[d] not been cooperative” with U.S. officials) ¶¶ 144–45 (quoting an August 19, 2012 article published by the Washington Post article, reporting that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency had

5 Reported IED explosions increased from 9,300 in 2011 to 14,500 in 2012. ¶ 119. And in 2012, the United States seized 440 tons of CAN in Afghanistan—up from 30 tons in 2009. ¶ 110. “put the clamps on” U.S. efforts with Fatima).6 On December 13, 2012, General Barbero testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, explaining that “no progress or minimal progress” had been made with Fatima, despite continued efforts on part of U.S. officials. ¶ 143; Doc. 22-2 at 15.7 American requests continued into May 2013, when Fatima told U.S. officials that it was working on a new fertilizer formula that would make it harder for insurgents to turn its CAN fertilizer into explosives. ¶¶ 135–36. But Fatima’s production of CAN fertilizer continued. SC PLC is an international bank based in London with more than 1,700 branches across 60 countries. ¶ 28. SCB is a wholly owned subsidiary of SC PLC, with a principal place of business is in London, England. ¶ 29. SCB was Fatima’s “major banker” during this time. ¶¶ 139–140. SCB provided Fatima with various day-to-day banking services, such as dollar clearing, export financing, and foreign exchange services through SCB’s New York branch; approximately $195 billion are processed daily through the New York branch, which is the overwhelming majority of SCB’s transactions. ¶¶ 31, 153.

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Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bonacasa-v-standard-chartered-plc-nysd-2023.