F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
LAWANA R. MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 98-7038 v. (D.C. No. 96-CV-573-B) (E.D. Okla.) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , BRISCOE , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
This case is before us on review of the district court’s affirmance of the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits. 1 We first review the many steps the case has
taken en route here.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on December 5, 1990, alleging
disability because of mental problems and back pain. Her application was denied
initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and he, too, denied benefits. The Appeals
Council denied review, and plaintiff appealed to the United States District Court.
The district court reversed the Commissioner’s final decision and remanded to
the Commissioner for further proceedings. The ALJ held two more supplemental
hearings and again denied benefits at step five of the sequential analysis, see
Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), finding that plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light and
sedentary jobs. The Appeals Council issued a letter of conclusion on
September 4, 1996, stating that the regulations provided no basis for it to assume
jurisdiction. Thus, the ALJ’s August 15, 1995 denial of benefits became the final
decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff again appealed to the district court.
A magistrate judge recommended that the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits be affirmed. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings
and recommendations, thereby affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff
appeals.
Plaintiff presents three arguments: (1) the ALJ either ignored or failed
to demonstrate that he properly considered much of the record evidence, and the
-2- record does not contain substantial evidence supporting his finding that plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform the exertional demands of light work; (2) the
record does not contain substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings
concerning the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairment for the period of time
between 1990 and 1994; and (3) the vocational testimony does not support the
ALJ’s finding at step five. Like the district court, we review the record to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings
and decision that plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits. See James v.
Chater, 96 F.3d 1341, 1342 (10th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). We also review the record to assure that the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards. See James, 96 F.3d at 1342. Guided by these standards, we affirm.
On August 15, 1995, 2 the ALJ found that the medical evidence established
plaintiff’s scoliosis. The condition was characterized as moderate in severity with
intermittent signs of neuroclaudication. Lifting was limited to no more than 25
pounds with the right arm, and sweeping movement and overhead activity on the
right side was proscribed. The medical opinions established that plaintiff’s stable
2 The ALJ incorporated by reference all the testimony and documented evidence presented at the first administrative hearing into his decision following the second hearing. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 210.
-3- scoliosis was not a source of plaintiff’s alleged pain, concluding instead the pain
was most probably secondary to muscle tenderness. In his evaluation pursuant
to Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987), the ALJ found plaintiff’s
allegations of pain not credible. He cited the lack of objective medical evidence
to support the complaints, irregular medical treatment, lack of significant medical
restrictions on activities, and response to medications. Considering this evidence,
the ALJ found that plaintiff’s subjective complaints about this nonexertional
limitation had no significant impact on plaintiff’s ability to perform a wide range
of light and sedentary jobs. We find substantial evidence in the record supporting
these findings.
The ALJ found that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment that
continued after December 12, 1994. The consultative mental exam showed
plaintiff should be able to sustain productivity in work. Plaintiff was off
prescription medication, she was attending college and receiving good grades,
she reported feeling well, and she had completed her out-patient mental health
treatment with a good prognosis. The record contains substantial evidence to
support these findings. The record contains substantial evidence, as well, that
supports the findings that plaintiff had no nonexertional impairment after
December 12, 1994; the ALJ correctly applied the Medical Vocational Guidelines
(grids) to determine that plaintiff was not disabled.
-4- Regarding the period between 1990 and 1994, when plaintiff did have
a severe mental impairment, the ALJ found that mental condition limited
her residual functional capacity during that time because it required that she avoid
extremely stressful situations. The hypothetical posed to the vocational expert at
the second hearing properly reflected the following limitations supported by the
medical and other documented evidence: “limited to light or sedentary work.
Requires a sit/stand option at 15 to 20 minute intervals. Must avoid extremely
stressful situations. . . . [N]o working overhead. No sweeping. No exposure to
the general public. . . . [N]o repetitive bending, twisting or stooping. . . .
[C]apable of understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions.”
Appellant’s App. at 271-72. The record contains substantial evidence that
supports the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert.
We also find substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination that
plaintiff could perform a wide range of light and sedentary work available in
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
LAWANA R. MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 98-7038 v. (D.C. No. 96-CV-573-B) (E.D. Okla.) KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , BRISCOE , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
This case is before us on review of the district court’s affirmance of the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits. 1 We first review the many steps the case has
taken en route here.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on December 5, 1990, alleging
disability because of mental problems and back pain. Her application was denied
initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), and he, too, denied benefits. The Appeals
Council denied review, and plaintiff appealed to the United States District Court.
The district court reversed the Commissioner’s final decision and remanded to
the Commissioner for further proceedings. The ALJ held two more supplemental
hearings and again denied benefits at step five of the sequential analysis, see
Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), finding that plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light and
sedentary jobs. The Appeals Council issued a letter of conclusion on
September 4, 1996, stating that the regulations provided no basis for it to assume
jurisdiction. Thus, the ALJ’s August 15, 1995 denial of benefits became the final
decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff again appealed to the district court.
A magistrate judge recommended that the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits be affirmed. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings
and recommendations, thereby affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff
appeals.
Plaintiff presents three arguments: (1) the ALJ either ignored or failed
to demonstrate that he properly considered much of the record evidence, and the
-2- record does not contain substantial evidence supporting his finding that plaintiff
retained the capacity to perform the exertional demands of light work; (2) the
record does not contain substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings
concerning the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairment for the period of time
between 1990 and 1994; and (3) the vocational testimony does not support the
ALJ’s finding at step five. Like the district court, we review the record to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings
and decision that plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits. See James v.
Chater, 96 F.3d 1341, 1342 (10th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). We also review the record to assure that the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards. See James, 96 F.3d at 1342. Guided by these standards, we affirm.
On August 15, 1995, 2 the ALJ found that the medical evidence established
plaintiff’s scoliosis. The condition was characterized as moderate in severity with
intermittent signs of neuroclaudication. Lifting was limited to no more than 25
pounds with the right arm, and sweeping movement and overhead activity on the
right side was proscribed. The medical opinions established that plaintiff’s stable
2 The ALJ incorporated by reference all the testimony and documented evidence presented at the first administrative hearing into his decision following the second hearing. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 210.
-3- scoliosis was not a source of plaintiff’s alleged pain, concluding instead the pain
was most probably secondary to muscle tenderness. In his evaluation pursuant
to Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987), the ALJ found plaintiff’s
allegations of pain not credible. He cited the lack of objective medical evidence
to support the complaints, irregular medical treatment, lack of significant medical
restrictions on activities, and response to medications. Considering this evidence,
the ALJ found that plaintiff’s subjective complaints about this nonexertional
limitation had no significant impact on plaintiff’s ability to perform a wide range
of light and sedentary jobs. We find substantial evidence in the record supporting
these findings.
The ALJ found that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment that
continued after December 12, 1994. The consultative mental exam showed
plaintiff should be able to sustain productivity in work. Plaintiff was off
prescription medication, she was attending college and receiving good grades,
she reported feeling well, and she had completed her out-patient mental health
treatment with a good prognosis. The record contains substantial evidence to
support these findings. The record contains substantial evidence, as well, that
supports the findings that plaintiff had no nonexertional impairment after
December 12, 1994; the ALJ correctly applied the Medical Vocational Guidelines
(grids) to determine that plaintiff was not disabled.
-4- Regarding the period between 1990 and 1994, when plaintiff did have
a severe mental impairment, the ALJ found that mental condition limited
her residual functional capacity during that time because it required that she avoid
extremely stressful situations. The hypothetical posed to the vocational expert at
the second hearing properly reflected the following limitations supported by the
medical and other documented evidence: “limited to light or sedentary work.
Requires a sit/stand option at 15 to 20 minute intervals. Must avoid extremely
stressful situations. . . . [N]o working overhead. No sweeping. No exposure to
the general public. . . . [N]o repetitive bending, twisting or stooping. . . .
[C]apable of understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions.”
Appellant’s App. at 271-72. The record contains substantial evidence that
supports the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert.
We also find substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination that
plaintiff could perform a wide range of light and sedentary work available in
significant numbers in the national economy considering her exertional and
nonexertional impairments. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 392 (10th Cir.
1995) (ALJ’s questions to vocational expert proper where questions addressed
only impairments ALJ found to be supported by substantial evidence). The fact
that the vocational expert testimony was obtained before Dr. McGovern’s
consultative physical exam does not render the expert’s testimony improper.
-5- Plaintiff does not suggest that Dr. McGovern’s consultative opinion conflicted
with the medical evidence already in the record, and, as noted, the record contains
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s questioning of the expert.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ complied with the requirements
of assessing plaintiff’s residual functional capacity in light of her severe mental
impairment. See Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1994).
Finally, we are satisfied that the ALJ properly considered all the record evidence
in reaching his decision; he discussed the evidence upon which he relied; he is not
required to discuss every piece of evidence. See Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007,
1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge
-6-