Miller et al. v. Roberge CV-08-293-JL 9/12/08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Marie Miller, et. a l .
v. Civil No. 08-CV-00293-JL Opinion No. 2 008 DNH 17 0
Scott Roberge
O R D E R
Plaintiffs Marie Miller, Dorothy Lafortune, Barbara Batson,
and Carl Weston brought this action, pleading as a "Federal Civil
Rights Complaint Freedom of Speech" and "Conspiracy/Obstruction
of Justice" against Scott Roberge, the Police Chief of
Farmington, New Hampshire. The plaintiffs brought the complaint
as the "Next Friend" of plaintiff Miller's sons, John Miller and
William Miller, who are currently detained awaiting trial on
state criminal charges in New Hampshire.1 The complaint asserts
1 Although John Miller and William Miller are listed on the face of the complaint, they did not sign the complaint, and thus are not treated as parties by this court. See Brown v. United States, 2 008 DNH 02 9, 2; c f . Seaver v. Manduco, 17 8 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 35 (D. Mass. 2002) . Further, "[t]he federal courts have consistently rejected attempts at third-party lay representation, Herrera-Veneqas v. Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1982) and as such, the plaintiffs cannot appear as "Next Friend" on behalf of John and William Miller. See L.R. 83.6(b) (2008)(relative or any other party cannot appear on behalf of a pro se litigant); Wilson v. Brock, 2002 D.N.H. 137, 1. three counts: (1) various civil rights violations arising from
the detention of William Miller (Count 1), (2) freedom of speech
violations arising from the detention of John Miller (Count II),
and (3) various acts of malfeasance arising from the death of
Philip Castora in 2006 (Count III). Roberge filed a motion to
dismiss all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as
well as failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 (b)(1), 1 2 (b)(3), 1 2 (b)(6) (2008). Roberge
also requests that this court impose sanctions on the plaintiffs
in the form of attorneys' fees and a prohibition on further
filings against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (2008). The
plaintiffs have filed no response to Roberge's motion.
For the reasons set forth below, this court grants the
motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs lack standing. The
court denies Roberge's request for sanctions on procedural
grounds.
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Roberge's motion to dismiss asserts that the complaint fails
for both jurisdictional reasons and for failure to state a claim.
In such cases, "a district court, absent good reason to do
otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) [jurisdictional]
motion first." Northeast Erectors Ass'n of BTEA v. Sec'v of
2 Labor, 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1995). A court faced with a
challenge to standing at the pleading stage must "accept as true
all material allegations of the complaint, and . . . construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). While forgiving, this standard does
not require the court to credit "empirically unverifiable
conclusions, not logically compelled, or at least supported, by
the stated facts" in the complaint. Sea Shore Corp. v. Sullivan,
158 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal bracketing and
quotation marks omitted).
II. BACKGROUND
The disputes that give rise to the complaint begin with
Castora's death in 2006, apparently from lung cancer. The
plaintiffs, however, are convinced that Castora's death was a
homicide perpetrated by relatives who were caring for him in the
last months of his life.
After Castora died, Lafortune urged Roberge, in his capacity
as chief of the Farmington Police Department, to investigate the
death. Dissatisfied with the investigation, Lafortune now
believes that Roberge was "covering up a murder."
3 In March 2007, Lafortune became aware that Marie Miller also
was dissatisfied with the Farmington Police Department.2
Lafortune and William Miller met in the summer of 2007 "to
compare notes of the malfeasance of office and obstruction of
justice by the Farmington Police Department and Police Chief,
Scott Roberge." Thus, by the fall of 2007, plaintiffs Miller,
Lafortune, and Batson, along with Miller's sons William and John
became convinced that the Farmington Police Department was
covering up the murder of Castora.3
In October 2007, the Farmington Police were called to the
Miller family home to investigate a disturbance and ended up
arresting William Miller. The plaintiffs' allege that William
Miller was upset, and while in the family's yard, he began
yelling about police corruption and hitting trash bags with a
shovel. William Miller was charged with multiple misdemeanors
and one felony count of criminal threatening. Although two of
the charges were dismissed by the trial court on motion of his
attorney, William Miller remains in jail pending resolution of
2 The specific nature of the Miller family's unhappiness with the Farmington Police Department as of March, 2007, is unclear from the complaint, but appears to arise out of the department's alleged failure to respond to the Miller's complaints of harassment by their neighbors and others.
3 It remains unclear what interest plaintiff Carl Weston has in this case.
4 two counts of criminal threatening instituted by a superseding
indictment. Then, during the early summer of 2008, John Miller
was indicted on one felony count and three misdemeanors arising
from allegations of criminal threatening of a potential witness
in the criminal case against his brother.
The plaintiffs--who include neither William nor John Miller
--subsequently filed their instant complaint. Count I alleges
William Miller, in violation of his right to free speech, was
falsely arrested in retaliation for "sharing with the public
about issues of Defendant's cover-up of the death (murder?) of
Phil Castora." Count II alleges that John Miller was also
falsely arrested "to [quiet] his freedom of speech." Count III
simply alleges that Roberge "knowingly has covered up an
investigation of the Death of Phil Castora."
III. ANALYSIS
a. Standing
This court grants Roberge's motion to dismiss on the basis
of a lack of jurisdiction, namely, that the parties lack
standing. See generally. In re Tyco Int', Ltd., 340 F. Supp. 2d
94, 97 (D.N.H. 2004). Grounded in Article III of the
Constitution, the doctrine "limit[s] access to the federal court
to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."
5 Conservation Law Found, of N.E., Inc. v. Reilly, 950 F.2d 38, 40
(1st Cir. 1991); see United States v.
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Miller et al. v. Roberge CV-08-293-JL 9/12/08 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Marie Miller, et. a l .
v. Civil No. 08-CV-00293-JL Opinion No. 2 008 DNH 17 0
Scott Roberge
O R D E R
Plaintiffs Marie Miller, Dorothy Lafortune, Barbara Batson,
and Carl Weston brought this action, pleading as a "Federal Civil
Rights Complaint Freedom of Speech" and "Conspiracy/Obstruction
of Justice" against Scott Roberge, the Police Chief of
Farmington, New Hampshire. The plaintiffs brought the complaint
as the "Next Friend" of plaintiff Miller's sons, John Miller and
William Miller, who are currently detained awaiting trial on
state criminal charges in New Hampshire.1 The complaint asserts
1 Although John Miller and William Miller are listed on the face of the complaint, they did not sign the complaint, and thus are not treated as parties by this court. See Brown v. United States, 2 008 DNH 02 9, 2; c f . Seaver v. Manduco, 17 8 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 35 (D. Mass. 2002) . Further, "[t]he federal courts have consistently rejected attempts at third-party lay representation, Herrera-Veneqas v. Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1982) and as such, the plaintiffs cannot appear as "Next Friend" on behalf of John and William Miller. See L.R. 83.6(b) (2008)(relative or any other party cannot appear on behalf of a pro se litigant); Wilson v. Brock, 2002 D.N.H. 137, 1. three counts: (1) various civil rights violations arising from
the detention of William Miller (Count 1), (2) freedom of speech
violations arising from the detention of John Miller (Count II),
and (3) various acts of malfeasance arising from the death of
Philip Castora in 2006 (Count III). Roberge filed a motion to
dismiss all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as
well as failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 (b)(1), 1 2 (b)(3), 1 2 (b)(6) (2008). Roberge
also requests that this court impose sanctions on the plaintiffs
in the form of attorneys' fees and a prohibition on further
filings against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (2008). The
plaintiffs have filed no response to Roberge's motion.
For the reasons set forth below, this court grants the
motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs lack standing. The
court denies Roberge's request for sanctions on procedural
grounds.
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Roberge's motion to dismiss asserts that the complaint fails
for both jurisdictional reasons and for failure to state a claim.
In such cases, "a district court, absent good reason to do
otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) [jurisdictional]
motion first." Northeast Erectors Ass'n of BTEA v. Sec'v of
2 Labor, 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1995). A court faced with a
challenge to standing at the pleading stage must "accept as true
all material allegations of the complaint, and . . . construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). While forgiving, this standard does
not require the court to credit "empirically unverifiable
conclusions, not logically compelled, or at least supported, by
the stated facts" in the complaint. Sea Shore Corp. v. Sullivan,
158 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal bracketing and
quotation marks omitted).
II. BACKGROUND
The disputes that give rise to the complaint begin with
Castora's death in 2006, apparently from lung cancer. The
plaintiffs, however, are convinced that Castora's death was a
homicide perpetrated by relatives who were caring for him in the
last months of his life.
After Castora died, Lafortune urged Roberge, in his capacity
as chief of the Farmington Police Department, to investigate the
death. Dissatisfied with the investigation, Lafortune now
believes that Roberge was "covering up a murder."
3 In March 2007, Lafortune became aware that Marie Miller also
was dissatisfied with the Farmington Police Department.2
Lafortune and William Miller met in the summer of 2007 "to
compare notes of the malfeasance of office and obstruction of
justice by the Farmington Police Department and Police Chief,
Scott Roberge." Thus, by the fall of 2007, plaintiffs Miller,
Lafortune, and Batson, along with Miller's sons William and John
became convinced that the Farmington Police Department was
covering up the murder of Castora.3
In October 2007, the Farmington Police were called to the
Miller family home to investigate a disturbance and ended up
arresting William Miller. The plaintiffs' allege that William
Miller was upset, and while in the family's yard, he began
yelling about police corruption and hitting trash bags with a
shovel. William Miller was charged with multiple misdemeanors
and one felony count of criminal threatening. Although two of
the charges were dismissed by the trial court on motion of his
attorney, William Miller remains in jail pending resolution of
2 The specific nature of the Miller family's unhappiness with the Farmington Police Department as of March, 2007, is unclear from the complaint, but appears to arise out of the department's alleged failure to respond to the Miller's complaints of harassment by their neighbors and others.
3 It remains unclear what interest plaintiff Carl Weston has in this case.
4 two counts of criminal threatening instituted by a superseding
indictment. Then, during the early summer of 2008, John Miller
was indicted on one felony count and three misdemeanors arising
from allegations of criminal threatening of a potential witness
in the criminal case against his brother.
The plaintiffs--who include neither William nor John Miller
--subsequently filed their instant complaint. Count I alleges
William Miller, in violation of his right to free speech, was
falsely arrested in retaliation for "sharing with the public
about issues of Defendant's cover-up of the death (murder?) of
Phil Castora." Count II alleges that John Miller was also
falsely arrested "to [quiet] his freedom of speech." Count III
simply alleges that Roberge "knowingly has covered up an
investigation of the Death of Phil Castora."
III. ANALYSIS
a. Standing
This court grants Roberge's motion to dismiss on the basis
of a lack of jurisdiction, namely, that the parties lack
standing. See generally. In re Tyco Int', Ltd., 340 F. Supp. 2d
94, 97 (D.N.H. 2004). Grounded in Article III of the
Constitution, the doctrine "limit[s] access to the federal court
to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."
5 Conservation Law Found, of N.E., Inc. v. Reilly, 950 F.2d 38, 40
(1st Cir. 1991); see United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108,
113 (1st. Cir. 1992)(if a party lacks standing, the court lacks
jurisdiction). The standing doctrine, grounded in Article III of
the Constitution, "limit[s] access to the federal court to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."
Conservation Law Found, of N.E., Inc. at 41 (quotations omitted).
"Because standing is the sine qua non to the prosecution of a
suit in a federal court, the absence of standing sounds the death
knell for a case." Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia
Online, A B , 266 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2000).
One of the core concepts of the standing doctrine is that a
litigant is prohibited from asserting a claim based on another
person's rights. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
Rather, the litigant must "allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Id.
(emphasis added); c f . AVX Co r p ., 962 F.2d at 114 ("mere interest
in an event - no matter how passionate or sincere" is not
sufficient to show actual personal injury that forms the basis
for a standing claim).
In Counts I and II of this case, the plaintiffs assert
claims based on a violation of the civil rights of others, namely
William Miller and John Miller. Count III alleges injury on
6 behalf of decedent Philip Castora.4 None of the plaintiffs is in
a position to assert that they have suffered the personal injury
necessary to have standing before this court. Accordingly,
because the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this action, this
court is without jurisdiction, see generally, Tyco Int'l, Ltd.,
340 F. Supp. 2d at 97 (standing is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction). The complaint is dismissed.5
b. Rule 11 Sanctions
Finally, Roberge requests that this court impose sanctions
on the plaintiffs because their pleadings are slanderous, allege
specious claims for relief, and contain numerous factual
assertions unsupported by the record. The court denies this
motion because, reasons for Rule 11 sanctions may be entertained
by this court only if made by a separate motion that is first
served on the opposing party 21 days before it is filed with this
court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (2) . Roberge did not properly
4 Presumably, that claim would be brought by a representative of Castora's estate, and none of the plaintiffs have shown that they presently possess such authority.
5 The plaintiffs invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, which provides for certain parties to sue under their own name on behalf of another. None of the plaintiffs fall within the category of litigants allowed to file suit under that provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) (2008).
7 prepare and serve his Rule 11 request, and therefore, his request
is denied.'0
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Roberge's motion to dismiss (doc.
no. 11) is GRANTED. His motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED.
All other pending motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Clerk is
directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 12, 2008
cc: Marie Miller Dorothy Lafortune Barbara Batson Carl Weston John A. Curren
The court would have been inclined to seriously entertain such a motion, however, had Roberge complied with Rule 11(c) (2) .