Mildred Hine Trust v. Buster, 07ap-277 (12-27-2007)

2007 Ohio 6999
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 27, 2007
DocketNo. 07AP-277.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2007 Ohio 6999 (Mildred Hine Trust v. Buster, 07ap-277 (12-27-2007)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mildred Hine Trust v. Buster, 07ap-277 (12-27-2007), 2007 Ohio 6999 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendants-appellants, Ward P. Buster and Teresa Buster, appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee, The Mildred Hine Trust. Because defendants submitted no evidence creating a genuine issue of fact regarding the fair market value of the property subject of the real estate contract between plaintiff and defendants, we affirm.

{¶ 2} According to the evidence submitted in connection with plaintiff's summary judgment motion, plaintiff sought to sell a residence ("the property") located at 2730 *Page 2 Crafton Park, in Upper Arlington, Ohio. To market the property, plaintiff placed a sign in the front yard and purchased print advertisement in one newspaper, The Columbus Dispatch. In addition to describing the house and detailing the bidding process, the advertisement also informed prospective buyers that plaintiff expected to accept an offer by March 31, 2005. As additional marketing, plaintiff held two open houses at which prospective buyers could view the property. At no time did plaintiff employ a real estate agent to market the property or seek out prospective purchasers.

{¶ 3} Defendant Teresa Buster, who was nine months pregnant, happened to be driving in the cul-de-sac on which the property is located. The house piqued her interest, and she and her husband, defendant Ward P. Buster, placed a bid of $516,000 for the property on March 28, 2005; the cover letter to defendants' offer included information similar to the text of the newspaper advertisement for the house. Defendants reiterated their interest in the house via fax on March 31, 2005, noting their plans to move in "[i]f we are fortunate enough to have our bid accepted." Plaintiff received other bids on the property, ranging from $425,000 to $452,000. Because defendants' bid was by far the highest, plaintiff accepted it.

{¶ 4} Defendants' interest in the house shifted after Teresa Buster gave birth on March 28, 2005. Defendants experienced complications with the birth, and the baby's health deteriorated after the baby was released from the hospital. On Sunday, April 3, 2005, defendants left a telephone message for plaintiff's representative to notify her they wished to rescind the contract; the same information was repeated via a fax sent on April 4, 2005. *Page 3

{¶ 5} After receiving defendants' notice of rescission, plaintiff offered the house for sale a second time. As before, a real estate agent was not employed. Apart from an advertisement in two newspapers, not just one, plaintiff relied on the same marketing efforts that produced the first bid: soliciting bids and holding two open houses.

{¶ 6} In terms of attracting bids, the second sale was more successful. The first attempt at selling the house drew only three bids, one of which was withdrawn several hours after it was made and before the March 31 deadline. In contrast, six bids were proffered in response to the second set of advertisements, ranging from $421,500, below the requested minimum of $430,000, to $472,000. Plaintiff accepted the highest bid and filed a complaint against defendants on December 6, 2005 to recover the difference between their bid and the resale price.

{¶ 7} On November 14, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment (1) requesting that the court find defendants breached their contract with plaintiff when they rescinded their bid, and (2) seeking recovery of the difference between the contract and resale price, plus consequential damages sustained as a result of the breach. Defendants filed a response to plaintiff's motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 8} In resolving the cross-motions, the trial court determined the parties entered into an enforceable contract that defendants breached. The trial court further concluded the resale price was an adequate measure of the fair market value of the property, as the resale took place within one month of defendants' breach and was conducted in the same manner as the previous sale. Finally, the trial court determined plaintiff fulfilled its duty to *Page 4 mitigate damages in using the same marketing procedures for both sales. Subsequent to the trial court's decision, plaintiff abandoned its request for consequential damages. Accordingly, the trial court entered final judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $44,000, reflecting the difference between the contract price and the actual resale price.

{¶ 9} Defendants appeal, assigning two errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS THE BEST AND ONLY NECESSARY MEANS BY WHICH THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY COULD BE OBTAINED.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLEE SUFFICIENTLY MITIGATED HER DAMAGES.

{¶ 10} An appellate court's review of summary judgment is de novo.Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704,711. We apply the same standard as the trial court and conduct an independent review without deference to the trial court's determination.Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107;Brown, at 711. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds the movant raised before the trial court support the judgment.Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42.

{¶ 11} Summary judgment is appropriate only when (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64,66. A *Page 5 party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280,292.

I. First Assignment of Error

{¶ 12} In their first assignment of error, defendants contend the trial court erred in holding that the resale price equaled the fair market value of the property. Relying on Loft v. Sibcy-ClineRealtors (Dec. 13, 1989), Hamilton App. No. C-880446, defendants argue that the trial court should have taken into account other relevant factors besides the resale price, and in particular, plaintiff's limited marketing efforts.

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Bluebook (online)
2007 Ohio 6999, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mildred-hine-trust-v-buster-07ap-277-12-27-2007-ohioctapp-2007.