Milan v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County
This text of 2025 IL App (1st) 241058 (Milan v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
2025 IL App (1st) 241058
SECOND DIVISION November 12, 2025
No. 1-24-1058
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NICOLE MILAN, ) Appeal from ) the Circuit Court Plaintiff-Appellant, ) of Cook County ) v. ) 22CH11940 ) THE FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, ) Honorable ) Sophia H. Hall, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Nicole Milan sued the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (Forest Preserve or forest
preserve system), contending its captive animal program at the River Trail Nature Center (River
Trail) in Northlake was violating the Humane Care for Animals Act (Act) (510 ILCS 70/3(a) (West
2022)), which created a public nuisance (count I), and that the program was a misuse of county
tax funds (count II). She requested the Forest Preserve to relinquish its coyote and several large
birds of prey to wildlife sanctuaries and for the court to enjoin it from acquiring more animals. The
circuit court, however, granted the Forest Preserve’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022). In this appeal, Milan seeks reinstatement of her
complaint or an opportunity to amend it.
¶2 The following is taken from the face of Milan’s pleading and its various attachments. Milan 1-24-1058 attached a study that Forest Preserve staff completed after she began advocating for the coyote’s
well-being, internal e-mail messages, correspondence with a wildlife sanctuary, and local news
reports. See Wells v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2020 IL App (1st) 190631, ¶ 29 (in a section
2-615 proceeding, court may consider exhibits attached to complaint, judicial admissions in record,
and matters subject to judicial notice); McCormick v. McCormick, 118 Ill. App. 3d 455, 460-61
(1983) (written instrument being sued over and attached to complaint is dispositive of pleading’s
factual sufficiency, but an evidentiary attachment is not).
¶3 Milan has a lifelong affinity for animals, volunteers with pet rescue agencies, and has three
rescue pets of her own. Her home in Northbrook is in Cook County, and she is a taxpayer. The
Forest Preserve is a governmental entity that conserves nearly 70,000 acres of county land, much
of which is set aside in its natural state. It maintains six nature centers, including the River Trail
center that is situated within the Allison Woods. At five of the centers, “Ambassador Animals” are
exhibited to educate the public about native animals and their importance to the local ecosystems.
River Trail’s animal program costs about $63,000 per year and relies on the support of paid and
volunteer staff and a local veterinarian practice.
¶4 The animals include a male coyote named “Rocky,” who was part of a litter born in the
wild in Tennessee in 2018. While very young, the pups were mistaken for domestic dog puppies,
taken to an animal shelter, and socialized for weeks before it became apparent that they were
coyotes. Rocky was transferred to Walden’s Puddle Wildlife Center in Tennessee, where an animal
rehabilitator worked with him for several weeks to determine if he could be released. However,
the rehabilitator and a veterinarian determined that Rocky had imprinted on humans, meaning that
he could never live in the wild. The wildlife center searched for a suitable adopter, which led to
-2- 1-24-1058 the Forest Preserve acquiring Rocky when he was about four months old. Milan first observed him
at River Trail in October 2021 when he was several years old, and she has since visited him
“dozens of times.”
¶5 River Trail’s other ambassador animals include a red-tailed hawk, a Swainson’s hawk, a
barred owl, a great horned owl, and a bald eagle.
¶6 Milan further alleged that Rocky cannot “lead[ ] a healthy and happy life” while confined
as if in a “roadside zoo.” He is always on display, next to a public trail and parking lot, in a cage
that is 266 square feet. Instead of a burrow den and structures that would enable Rocky to avoid
the commotion, he has a plastic dog cage and a hollowed log. She has seen him pace back and
forth or circle around his “tiny” space and attributes this to “excessive stress and boredom” and
“zoochosis,” which she describes as a mental illness brought on by the stress and abnormality of
his confinement. As the lone coyote, he has no opportunity to socialize. His habitat also offers
“little respite from the often severe conditions of Cook County winters,” and his water bowl has
frozen over. Furthermore, he is treated like a domesticated dog that must “perform tricks for the
public in order to get his food.” The River Trail staff “have virtually no formal education or training
qualifying them to make decisions” about his care and have, for example, chosen to feed him dry
food formulated for domesticated dogs, without questioning whether it is healthy food for a coyote.
His veterinarian, Dr. Jamie A. Abete, is similarly underqualified because she is “not a wild canid
specialist.” She has “repeatedly failed to competently address [his] veterinary needs,” “condones”
his “woefully inadequate” enclosure, and has him medicated and brought to her clinic for exams
rather than conducting his care on site.
¶7 River Trail’s birds are similarly isolated in individual, undersized cages next to the parking
-3- 1-24-1058 lot and do not have drinkable water, adequate shelter or heated perches during the winter.
¶8 The displays are intended to be educational, but the public is not observing natural, wild
animal behavior. Furthermore, the staff misinform visitors that the animals’ strange behavior is
“healthy and happy.”
¶9 The “unsafe housing, inadequate water, and lack of protection from the elements” have
upset and offended Milan in particular because she “suffers psychologically distress when she
witnesses animals in conditions that [are] physically or psychologically harm[ful] *** or are
otherwise inhumane.” She has “experienced injury above and beyond [that of] the average visitor
to [the] property due to her particular emotional attachment to the confined animals and
[subsequent] efforts to help improve the animals’ lives.”
¶ 10 After Milan first encountered Rocky in October 2021, in December 2021, she contacted
River Trail’s staff, public officials, veterinary experts, animal sanctuaries, and lawyers. Towards
the end of December, her attorneys asked that Rocky be surrendered to The Wild Animal Sanctuary
in Keenesburg, Colorado, within five days due to northern Illinois’s winter weather.
¶ 11 In January 2022, two investigators for the Cook County sheriff responded to an e-mail
complaining of neglect. They met with the assistant director of the nature center and were told that
the Forest Preserve had an exhibitor license from the United States Department of Agriculture,
which is a federal agency that conducts regular inspections, and that the size of Rocky’s enclosure
exceeded the agency’s requirements. The sheriff’s investigators did not observe any violations of
the Act and noted that Rocky “appeared to be in excellent condition.” That same month, two news
outlets reported about Rocky’s circumstances.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2025 IL App (1st) 241058
SECOND DIVISION November 12, 2025
No. 1-24-1058
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NICOLE MILAN, ) Appeal from ) the Circuit Court Plaintiff-Appellant, ) of Cook County ) v. ) 22CH11940 ) THE FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, ) Honorable ) Sophia H. Hall, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Nicole Milan sued the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (Forest Preserve or forest
preserve system), contending its captive animal program at the River Trail Nature Center (River
Trail) in Northlake was violating the Humane Care for Animals Act (Act) (510 ILCS 70/3(a) (West
2022)), which created a public nuisance (count I), and that the program was a misuse of county
tax funds (count II). She requested the Forest Preserve to relinquish its coyote and several large
birds of prey to wildlife sanctuaries and for the court to enjoin it from acquiring more animals. The
circuit court, however, granted the Forest Preserve’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022). In this appeal, Milan seeks reinstatement of her
complaint or an opportunity to amend it.
¶2 The following is taken from the face of Milan’s pleading and its various attachments. Milan 1-24-1058 attached a study that Forest Preserve staff completed after she began advocating for the coyote’s
well-being, internal e-mail messages, correspondence with a wildlife sanctuary, and local news
reports. See Wells v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2020 IL App (1st) 190631, ¶ 29 (in a section
2-615 proceeding, court may consider exhibits attached to complaint, judicial admissions in record,
and matters subject to judicial notice); McCormick v. McCormick, 118 Ill. App. 3d 455, 460-61
(1983) (written instrument being sued over and attached to complaint is dispositive of pleading’s
factual sufficiency, but an evidentiary attachment is not).
¶3 Milan has a lifelong affinity for animals, volunteers with pet rescue agencies, and has three
rescue pets of her own. Her home in Northbrook is in Cook County, and she is a taxpayer. The
Forest Preserve is a governmental entity that conserves nearly 70,000 acres of county land, much
of which is set aside in its natural state. It maintains six nature centers, including the River Trail
center that is situated within the Allison Woods. At five of the centers, “Ambassador Animals” are
exhibited to educate the public about native animals and their importance to the local ecosystems.
River Trail’s animal program costs about $63,000 per year and relies on the support of paid and
volunteer staff and a local veterinarian practice.
¶4 The animals include a male coyote named “Rocky,” who was part of a litter born in the
wild in Tennessee in 2018. While very young, the pups were mistaken for domestic dog puppies,
taken to an animal shelter, and socialized for weeks before it became apparent that they were
coyotes. Rocky was transferred to Walden’s Puddle Wildlife Center in Tennessee, where an animal
rehabilitator worked with him for several weeks to determine if he could be released. However,
the rehabilitator and a veterinarian determined that Rocky had imprinted on humans, meaning that
he could never live in the wild. The wildlife center searched for a suitable adopter, which led to
-2- 1-24-1058 the Forest Preserve acquiring Rocky when he was about four months old. Milan first observed him
at River Trail in October 2021 when he was several years old, and she has since visited him
“dozens of times.”
¶5 River Trail’s other ambassador animals include a red-tailed hawk, a Swainson’s hawk, a
barred owl, a great horned owl, and a bald eagle.
¶6 Milan further alleged that Rocky cannot “lead[ ] a healthy and happy life” while confined
as if in a “roadside zoo.” He is always on display, next to a public trail and parking lot, in a cage
that is 266 square feet. Instead of a burrow den and structures that would enable Rocky to avoid
the commotion, he has a plastic dog cage and a hollowed log. She has seen him pace back and
forth or circle around his “tiny” space and attributes this to “excessive stress and boredom” and
“zoochosis,” which she describes as a mental illness brought on by the stress and abnormality of
his confinement. As the lone coyote, he has no opportunity to socialize. His habitat also offers
“little respite from the often severe conditions of Cook County winters,” and his water bowl has
frozen over. Furthermore, he is treated like a domesticated dog that must “perform tricks for the
public in order to get his food.” The River Trail staff “have virtually no formal education or training
qualifying them to make decisions” about his care and have, for example, chosen to feed him dry
food formulated for domesticated dogs, without questioning whether it is healthy food for a coyote.
His veterinarian, Dr. Jamie A. Abete, is similarly underqualified because she is “not a wild canid
specialist.” She has “repeatedly failed to competently address [his] veterinary needs,” “condones”
his “woefully inadequate” enclosure, and has him medicated and brought to her clinic for exams
rather than conducting his care on site.
¶7 River Trail’s birds are similarly isolated in individual, undersized cages next to the parking
-3- 1-24-1058 lot and do not have drinkable water, adequate shelter or heated perches during the winter.
¶8 The displays are intended to be educational, but the public is not observing natural, wild
animal behavior. Furthermore, the staff misinform visitors that the animals’ strange behavior is
“healthy and happy.”
¶9 The “unsafe housing, inadequate water, and lack of protection from the elements” have
upset and offended Milan in particular because she “suffers psychologically distress when she
witnesses animals in conditions that [are] physically or psychologically harm[ful] *** or are
otherwise inhumane.” She has “experienced injury above and beyond [that of] the average visitor
to [the] property due to her particular emotional attachment to the confined animals and
[subsequent] efforts to help improve the animals’ lives.”
¶ 10 After Milan first encountered Rocky in October 2021, in December 2021, she contacted
River Trail’s staff, public officials, veterinary experts, animal sanctuaries, and lawyers. Towards
the end of December, her attorneys asked that Rocky be surrendered to The Wild Animal Sanctuary
in Keenesburg, Colorado, within five days due to northern Illinois’s winter weather.
¶ 11 In January 2022, two investigators for the Cook County sheriff responded to an e-mail
complaining of neglect. They met with the assistant director of the nature center and were told that
the Forest Preserve had an exhibitor license from the United States Department of Agriculture,
which is a federal agency that conducts regular inspections, and that the size of Rocky’s enclosure
exceeded the agency’s requirements. The sheriff’s investigators did not observe any violations of
the Act and noted that Rocky “appeared to be in excellent condition.” That same month, two news
outlets reported about Rocky’s circumstances. Fox 32 Chicago wrote that there was a petition with
2,000 signatures asking that he be moved to The Wild Animal Sanctuary and that some people
-4- 1-24-1058 planned to attend a public meeting of the board of commissioners of the Forest Preserve to
advocate for his relocation. Milan’s complaint also indicates that Pat Craig, the founder of The
Wild Animal Sanctuary, was able to meet with two Cook County commissioners to discuss
Rocky’s possible relocation to his facility in Colorado. The Chicago Tribune subsequently reported
that the board of commissioners declined to transfer Rocky, despite testimony from veterinarians
and animal care consultants and 4,000 petition signatures, but that the board was putting its
ambassador animals program under review.
¶ 12 The next month, Craig sent a follow-up letter to the board of commissioners, the Forest
Preserve, and River Trail. Craig detailed that he had “professional experience” with large
carnivores, including coyotes, wolves, foxes, and other species, and that nearly a dozen coyotes
kept in conditions similar to Rocky’s confinement had been relinquished to live at The Wild
Animal Sanctuary. Craig said that Rocky’s caregivers had the confident but mistaken belief that
he was happy and healthy. Craig likened Rocky to a child raised in a closet, whose needs were
met, but who was not living a normal life and had “adapted to his severely restricted space and the
pressure of the visiting public.” He had no place to retreat or block out the sounds and smells of
visitors whom he experienced as direct threats to his territory and general safety. Craig opined that
Rocky’s behavior was “not natural and toggle[d] between stress and boredom,” but he would
dramatically transform if he were living freely with other coyotes in Colorado. He could gradually
join one of the sanctuary’s existing packs and bond with a female. Craig offered transportation to
Colorado free of charge.
¶ 13 In March 2022, Craig and the Forest Preserve continued to correspond.
¶ 14 In June 2022, as part of its review of its ambassador animals program, the board of
-5- 1-24-1058 commissioners retained two independent veterinarians to evaluate Rocky.
¶ 15 Dr. Edgar F. Garrett, DVM MS Dipl. ACT, was a member of the “Farm Animal
Reproduction Medicine & Surgery” faculty at University of Illinois Veterinary Teaching Hospital
in Urbana, Illinois. Dr. Garrett gave his opinion based on an afternoon of observation, a review of
Rocky’s records, and the standards set out in the Large Canid Care Manual of the Association of
Zoos and Aquariums (AZA manual). Dr. Garrett noted, “[t]here are no absolute standards for the
size of pen for a captive coyote.” The AZA manual suggested 5,000 square feet, but the authors
were assuming there was a pair of canids rather than a lone animal and that the canids were “not
imprinted on people and thus in need of more space to move away from [them] to reduce stress.”
Dr. Garrett deemed the existing enclosure to be of “adequate” size, but he recommended that it be
enlarged to provide more space to move about and to accommodate privacy structures. Dr. Garrett
was not concerned about the Rocky’s “mental status” and observed positive and “frequent low-
stress contact” with his keepers. Rocky was “agitated” by “disruptive” vehicles and other
maintenance equipment, primarily snowplows and mowers, and, unfortunately, “[t]he size of the
space and location of [his] enclosure [did] not lend itself to the installation of structures to
ameliorate noise.” Dr. Garrett approved the staff’s continued use of gabapentin and trazadone for
“short-term stress.” Dr. Garrett also said that he had no concerns about the staff’s record keeping
or Rocky’s nutrition or veterinary care. All in all, he praised the “exemplary management of the
coyote” by the nature center’s staff.
¶ 16 Dr. Alisa E. Kubala, DVM, MVS (Conservation Medicine), MRCVS, Ph.D. Candidate
(Conservation Medicine), based her opinion on two site visits, staff interviews, and the same AZA
guidelines referenced by Dr. Garrett. Dr. Kubala did not indicate she was currently employed but
-6- 1-24-1058 did mention work experience “in sanctuaries throughout Africa with many species of habituated
(and sterilized) wildlife [that were] hand-raised by humans, including primates and carnivores.”
Dr. Kubala emphasized that Rocky’s care would be “acceptable” for a domesticated canine, but
Rocky was a habituated wild coyote. Domestication refers to a genetic process, and domesticated
dogs see the humans they live with as their family. Rocky, however, was a habituated wild coyote,
meaning that he was a wild creature who did not fear humans but continued to see coyotes as his
family or conspecifics (members of the same species). Dr. Kubala had observed Rocky’s wild
genotype behavior, such as when his strong prey drive emerged when children ran by his enclosure
and when he was food aggressive towards his caretaker. The caretaker, however, misunderstood
the behavior and miseducated visitors about what was occurring. For instance, the caretaker said
that if Rocky caught a child, he would just lick and play with it. Also, when the coyote showed
normal, sudden food aggression towards his keeper during a training session in which he was
otherwise calm, “his keeper referred to this as his ‘weird [Jekyll] and Hyde’ moments.” Dr. Kubala
cautioned that this confusion between domesticated and habituated-wild behaviors could lull the
caretakers into being severely injured. Dr. Kubala opined that River Trail was giving Rocky good
veterinary care, good nutrition, and good training. However, based on excerpts from the AZA
manual, she insisted on two improvements. One was a much larger, more complex enclosure which
included features such as multiple hiding places, plantings and hedgerows that would muffle
undesirable sound and vibration and give him places to go cope with unexpected loud noises. The
other was that he live with another coyote, “ideally a single female or less ideally a single male,”
so that he “live a life suitable to a wild coyote” and “the Cook County public learn how to properly
care for a special wild animal.”
-7- 1-24-1058 ¶ 17 The board’s review of the ambassador animals program included not only getting the
opinions of Dr. Garrett and Dr. Kubala but also interviewing other national and local experts and
consulting literature on the subject of captive animals. The review was a collaborative effort of
eight Forest Preserve employees, took about seven months to complete, and ended in July 2022.
The research was compiled into a 22-page report. Its 19 pages of attachments included the
evaluations submitted by Dr. Garrett, Dr. Kubala, and the sheriff’s investigators. Milan attached
the complete report. The report included an “Improvement Action Plan.” One of the experts had
suggested using “an ethical lens” to compare what was known about Rocky’s current situation
(with possible improvements) and the unknown but considerable stress of being transported a long
distance, placed in a different environment, and introduced to other coyotes. The Forest Preserve
announced that it would build a more enriching and bigger enclosure (2000-to-2500 square feet)
for Rocky in 2022 and that it would improve its interpretation and messaging about him and the
other wild coyotes living in Cook County. The agency had decided against relinquishing Rocky to
a wildlife sanctuary or acquiring a second coyote because moving or living with another coyote
could be detrimental to him. In addition, Craig indicated that there were not enough openings for
the many exotic and native captive animals in the United States in need of permanent placement
and Dr. Abete testified that many “placeable, healthy, non-releasable animals are euthanized every
year.” The report stated that although Dr. Garrett’s written evaluation did not address Rocky’s
companionship, in a subsequent interview, Dr. Garrett said that some coyotes are solitary and that
in Rocky’s case, gaining a companion might be beneficial or could be too stressful. The report
emphasized that neither Dr. Garrett nor Dr. Kubala had opined that Rocky paced in an unnatural
pattern or exhibited stress-induced behavior. The 12 other “leaders in the field” of captive wild
-8- 1-24-1058 animal care that were interviewed included individuals at University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
Captive Animal Program, National Wildlife Rehabilitators Association, and Endangered Wolf
Sanctuary. The Forest Preserve had also consulted the forest preserves of Illinois’s Lake, Will,
McHenry, Kendall, and Champaign counties about their programming with ambassador animals.
After a person had expressed concern about Rocky’s care to the Illinois Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), “conservation police officers have found that ‘the coyote is healthy” and [they]
did not observe “ ‘inhumane treatment.’ ” The DNR also determined that Rocky’s “ ‘pen is
adequate’ ” and that “ ‘moving wildlife (including this coyote) is not recommended.’ ”
¶ 18 Milan filed suit in December 2022, alleging that Rocky was still living in the undersized
cage next to the nature center’s parking lot, there was no progress on the construction of a new
habitat, and even the proposed new enclosure would be inadequate. She claimed that the Forest
Preserve was not meeting any of the Act’s four standards that it owed to Rocky and its captive
eagle, owls, and hawks. See 510 ILCS 70/3(a)(1)-(4) (West 2022). It is undisputed that the coyote
and birds are “[a]nimal[s]” and that the Forest Preserve is an animal “[o]wner” within the meaning
of the Act. Id. §§ 2.01, 2.06. The Act requires that each owner provide four things: “(1) a sufficient
quantity of good quality, wholesome food and water”; “(2) adequate shelter and protection from
the weather”; “(3) veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering”; and “(4) humane care and
treatment.” Id. § 3(a). The Act is a criminal statute; if its minimal standards are not met, a person
has committed a Class B misdemeanor, with a sentence of imprisonment of up to six months. See
id. § 3(d); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-60(a) (West 2022). Milan, however, sought declaratory judgment of
a public nuisance and the misappropriation of county taxpayer funds. She also sought injunctive
relief halting those circumstances, as well as requiring the Forest Preserve to relinquish the animals
-9- 1-24-1058 to wildlife sanctuaries and not subsequently obtain wild or exotic animals.
¶ 19 A section 2-615 motion challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects
that are apparent on its face. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022). A section 2-615 motion should be
granted when no set of facts could be proven under the pleadings that would entitle the plaintiff to
relief. Alpha School Bus Company v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 735 (2009). The dismissal of
a complaint for failure to state a cause of action is reviewed de novo. Id.
“ ‘To pass muster a complaint must state a cause of action in two ways. First, it must
be legally sufficient; it must set forth a legally recognized claim as its avenue of recovery.
When it fails to do this, there is no recourse at law for the injury alleged, and the complaint
must be dismissed. [Citations.] Second and unlike Federal practice, the complaint must be
factually sufficient; it must plead facts which bring the claim within the legally recognized
cause of action alleged. If it does not, the complaint must be dismissed.’ ” Mlade v. Finley,
112 Ill. App. 3d 914, 918 (1983) (quoting People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West,
Inc., 88 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1981)).
¶ 20 Although a section 2-615 motion admits all well-pled facts as true, it does not admit
conclusions of law or factual conclusions that are unsupported by allegations of specific facts.
Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 275 Ill.
App. 3d 452, 456-57 (1995). The court may draw reasonable inferences from the well-pled facts.
Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 16. However,
if, after disregarding legal and factual conclusions, there are insufficient allegations of fact to state
a cause of action, the motion should be granted. Lake County Grading, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 457. In
Illinois state court, a complaint cannot stand on mere conclusions. Unterschuetz v. City of Chicago,
- 10 - 1-24-1058 346 Ill. App. 3d 65, 69 (2004). Illinois is a fact pleading jurisdiction, not a notice pleading
jurisdiction. Teter v. Clemens, 112 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1986). The complaint’s factual allegations are
to be interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but factual deficiencies cannot be cured
by liberal construction. Lake County Grading, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 457; see Teter, 112 Ill. 2d at 256-
57. Also relevant is the principle that exhibits that are attached to the pleading are considered to
be a part of the pleading for all purposes where the pleading is founded on those exhibits. See
McCormick, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61; Evers v. Edward Hospital Ass’n, 247 Ill. App. 3d 717, 724
(1993). When allegations in the pleading conflict with the facts disclosed in the exhibits, the exhibit
controls. Evers, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 724.
¶ 21 The parties first address count I. Milan argues that although she brought a novel action,
Illinois courts have taken a broad, inclusive, and fact-specific approach to common law public
nuisance actions. The supreme court stated in Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 661
(1994), that the “pleading requirements are not strenuous because the ‘concept of common law
public nuisance *** elude[s] precise definition’ [citation], and that the existence of a nuisance
‘depends on the peculiar facts presented by each case.’ ” A public nuisance is remediable by an
injunction or award of damages. Id. at 660. She argues that several other jurisdictions have
determined that inhumane treatment of animals can form the basis for a public nuisance suit. The
Forest Preserve responds that there is no Illinois precedent or analogy in favor of Milan’s action,
the foreign cases are inconsistent with Illinois law, and the dismissal of count I should be affirmed
because Milan is unable to meet any of the elements of her intended claim.
¶ 22 Illinois has a public nuisance statute (720 ILCS 5/47-5 (West 2022)), which neither defines
nor limits common law actions and only lists the 17 specific activities that have already been
- 11 - 1-24-1058 recognized as public nuisances. Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661 (“ ‘public nuisance is not limited
to those activities the legislature has declared public nuisances’ ” (quoting City of Chicago v.
Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 295, 303 (1982))). Milan based her complaint on the Humane
Care for Animals Act (510 ILCS 70/3(a) (West 2022)), but she was “free to plead [a] common law
public nuisance without mention of [any] statute.” Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661.
¶ 23 Illinois public nuisance law has paralleled section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1979), which describes a public nuisance as “ ‘an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.’ ” Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 660 (quoting City of Chicago v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 631 (1974)). Illinois has also defined a public
nuisance as “ ‘ “the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health
or morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the
public.” ’ ” City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351, 370 (2004) (quoting Village
of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1981), quoting William L. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed. 1971)). In contrast to a public nuisance,
a private nuisance has a much smaller scope and consists of “the substantial invasion of a person’s
interest in the use and enjoyment of [the person’s] land.” Helping Others Maintain Environmental
Standards v. Bos, 406 Ill. App. 3d 669, 689 (2010).
¶ 24 In order to plead a public nuisance action, the plaintiff must factually allege four elements:
a public right, a substantial and unreasonable interference with that right by the defendant,
proximate cause, and injury. Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 369.
¶ 25 Looking at the first element, public rights include “the rights of public health, public safety,
public peace, *** and public convenience.” Id. at 370-71 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
- 12 - 1-24-1058 § 821B(2)(a) (1979)). “ ‘A public right is one common to all members of the general public. It is
collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted or
defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.’ ” Id. at 373 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 821B cmt. g (1979)).
¶ 26 Public health nuisances include the “keeping [of] diseased animals or the maintenance of
a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b (Sept. 2025
Update). Illinois prohibits letting animal carcasses, filth, or foul substances accumulate in a way
that endangers health or is offensive; dumping animal carcasses into streets, sewers, or bodies of
water; and polluting springs, rivers, streams, ponds, or lakes in a way that injures others. 720 ILCS
5/47-5(1)-(3) (West 2022). Nuisances to public safety have included letting vicious dogs run free,
storing explosives in the midst of a city, blasting, shooting off fireworks in the public streets, and
having a structurally unsafe building. Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 371-72; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 821B cmt. b (Sept. 2025 Update). The public nuisance of imposing on the public peace has
included loud and disturbing noises from unruly taverns and dance halls, lewd behavior in an adult
bookstore, and the operating an unlicensed massage parlor. Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 372; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b (Sept. 2025 Update). “Public comfort has been affected by odors,
fumes, dust, and other sources of pollution.” Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 372. And finally, examples of
a nuisance to public convenience include obstructing a navigable stream or public highway.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b (Sept. 2025 Update). None of these examples of a
public nuisance resemble Milan’s action.
¶ 27 Public nuisance cases that involve live animals are few and far between and they are quite
dissimilar to Milan’s suit. Milan cites no Illinois authority, but the Forest Preserve cites Oehler v.
- 13 - 1-24-1058 Levy, 234 Ill. 595, 596-97 (1908), in which a stable owner was keeping about 20 horses in what
became a residential area in Chicago. The horses were filthy, and their manure and urine was
causing noxious odors that offended the residents of the adjacent three-story apartment building
and affected their health. Id. at 596, 600. The residents also had difficulty sleeping because the
horses were put to work overnight as part of a newspaper delivery service (in 1908), and there was
a staff of about a dozen people who were loud and vulgar. Id. at 596-97. The situation worsened,
however, when the stable was relocated from the basement to the first floor, horse urine began
draining to the basement to the extent that it penetrated the walls of the brick apartment building,
and the stable owner began storing the manure instead of hauling it away. Id. at 603-04. All in all,
the brick flats were unhealthy and undesirable, and their rental income was depressed. Id. at 597.
The court granted injunctive relief requiring the stable owner to maintain more sanitary conditions
and to discontinue the loud obscene and profane language. Id. It is unclear to this court, however,
whether the apartment building owner, who occupied one of the flats, intended to bring a public
nuisance claim, as opposed to a private nuisance claim regarding his real property. The court did
not specify “public” or “private,” used the general terms “nuisance” and “maintaining a nuisance
upon [the stable owner’s] premises” (id. at 596, 600), and the dispute was about waste and noise
that bothered the renters and reduced the building income, rather than impacted the general public
of Chicago. The only facts that suggest a public nuisance are that when the horses’ quarters were
relocated from the basement to the upper floor, the stable owner constructed a driveway across the
sidewalk in order to take the horses to and from the street. Id. at 597.
¶ 28 The Forest Preserve also cites a decision that was issued about a century later, Helping
Others Maintain Environmental Standards, in which an injunction stopped the construction of a
- 14 - 1-24-1058 “ ‘megadairy’ ” in Nora, Illinois, that would have held over 13,500 animals and required at least
three massive ponds of livestock waste. Helping Others Maintain Environmental Standards, 406
Ill. App. 3d at 670-71, 674. The neighbors sued to prevent air pollution, ground water
contamination from the seepage of animal waste, increased noise, diminution of their property
values, and other problems. Id. at 674. The opinion makes clear that the residents intended to bring
both private nuisance and public nuisance claims. Id.
¶ 29 The Forest Preserve argues that these two cases, infrequent as they are, illustrate that
Illinois recognizes that keeping animals can constitute a public nuisance, but it is only because of
the effect that the animals have on traditional public rights to be free of offensive odor, vicious
attack, and excessive noise. We agree that Milan’s allegations bear no resemblance to this
precedent.
¶ 30 Milan does not cite any Illinois authority involving live animals and public nuisance. Her
appeal relies entirely on four non-Illinois cases for the proposition that an alleged violation of an
Illinois statute is an actionable public nuisance. In Beretta, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to support a novel public nuisance claim with similar claims from
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 367-68. The plaintiffs were government entities
who sued gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers in an attempt to reduce the incidence of gun
violence and recoup expenses that flowed from the illegal possession and use of firearms. Id. at
355-56. The supreme court declined to rely on a similar Ohio lawsuit, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, in which the court held that
gun manufacturers and dealers can be liable for a public nuisance based on misuse of the legal
product they sell. The Illinois Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Ohio Supreme Court’s
- 15 - 1-24-1058 reasoning and noted that Illinois is a fact pleading jurisdiction, while Ohio is a notice pleading one.
Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 367-68. Allegations of fact, rather than mere legal conclusions, are required
to state a cause of action under Illinois law. Mlade, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 918. The Illinois court
indicated that when deciding whether a complaint should be dismissed on the pleadings, a
complaint’s survival in a notice pleading jurisdiction has little or no relevance to whether the
pleading meets the heavier burden imposed by Illinois. Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 368. The Ohio court’s
decision based only on skeletal notice pleading allegations did not meet the Illinois standard
requiring specific common law or statutory support to declare a public nuisance. Nevertheless, one
of the four cases that Milan cites is Collins v. Tri-State Zoological Park of Western Maryland, Inc.,
514 F. Supp. 3d 773 (D. Md. 2021), in which a court denied a motion to dismiss by applying
federal notice pleading standards to allegations that a roadside zoo’s operations were contrary to
public morals, violated the federal Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (2018)), and also
violated Maryland’s animal cruelty statute (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-604 (West 2020)).
Collins, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 778. Like the Ohio Beretta decision, the Collins ruling concerned
bareboned notice pleading allegations that do not meet Illinois’s fact pleading standard.
Furthermore, Collins is factually distinguishable, as it involved horrific conditions that were
“patent” and had been “well documented” in repeated citations from the United States Department
of Agriculture. Id. at 777, 781.
¶ 31 No more helpful to Milan’s appeal is Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc., 237 A.2d 342, 348-49 (Pa. 1968), in which the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim to enjoin a planned
bullfight as a public nuisance. Her reliance on Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Lucas, No. 2:19-40,
- 16 - 1-24-1058 2022 WL 16575761 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2022) (applying Pennsylvania law) is similarly misplaced,
as the analysis focuses on issues that are irrelevant here: whether a business invitee can maintain
a claim of public nuisance under Pennsylvania law, whether the nuisance claim can proceed when
the defendant meets regulatory requirements for the keeping of animals, and the burden of proof
for showing a certain violation of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
44 (2018)). Milan’s remaining out-of-state case, Kuehl v. Sellner, No. 19-1980, 2021 WL 3392813
(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021), is not persuasive because Iowa has its own framework for addressing
public nuisance, while Illinois employs the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (Sept. 2025
Update). See Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 370-71; Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 660 (“Illinois common
law nuisance parallels the nuisance law outlined in the Restatement.”).
¶ 32 Thus, none of the authority helps Milan show the first of the four elements in a public
nuisance action—the existence of a public right (Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 370)—with respect to the
kept animals at River Trail. She has not shown that the nature center’s ambassador animals
program “injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or works some substantial
annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 33 Given Milan’s inability to meet the first prong, we do not reach the parties’ arguments
about the three other elements of a public nuisance claim. Nor do we reach other arguments, such
as her contention that in order to bring a public nuisance claim, she needed to allege an injury
different from the injury suffered by the public at large, and that her allegations met that pleading
standard. We find that her public nuisance claim is not viable and was properly dismissed for this
reason.
¶ 34 Even assuming that Illinois recognized her novel action, Milan did not factually allege a
- 17 - 1-24-1058 violation of the Act. At 26 pages, her pleading is very long but consists almost entirely of descrip-
tive narrative, unsupported conclusions of fact, and unsupported conclusions of law. We are
largely disregarding the sections she entitled “INTRODUCTION” and “THE PARTIES” as they
are unnecessary narrative about her, her efforts to have Rocky relocated, and what he would
experience in the environment she would choose for him. We are focusing on the purported
“FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS” that begin on page four. We note that this section includes 11
photos that are so badly reproduced that they are indiscernible, despite Milan’s captioning, and
that the photos contribute nothing to her complaint.
¶ 35 She argues that she pled violations of all four of the Act’s general standards. She argues
that a lack of “sufficient quantity of good quality, wholesome food and water” (510 ILCS
70/3(a)(1) (West 2022)) is indicated by allegations that Rocky’s meals included dry food that was
created for domesticated dogs and that he and the birds had frozen water bowls. She argues that a
lack of “adequate shelter and protection from the weather” (id. § 3(a)(2)) appears in her allegations
that Rocky did not have a burrow den or other structure allowing him to get away from the elements
and the public and that the birds similarly spend their winters exposed to the weather. The absence
of “veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering” (id. § 3(a)(3)) purportedly appears in her
allegations that Rocky’s usual vet is not a wild canid specialist and that instead of coming to see
him, she has Rocky medicated and brought to her clinic. And finally, an overall lack of “humane
care and treatment” (id. § 3(a)(4)) purportedly appears in allegations that include (1) Rocky
engages in “stress-pacing”; (2) his caretakers “have virtually no formal education or training
[qualifying them to make decisions about his care]”; and (3) one staff member said in an internal
e-mail that she was a “proponent” of “releas[ing] an animal whenever possible” and that a coyote
- 18 - 1-24-1058 that does not “need[ ] to be kept in captivity” “should *** [be] reconditioned and released.”
¶ 36 We emphasize that the Act states general standards for owner conduct and does not
mandate a specific level of care or the best possible care or an adherence to any particular best
practices. Food and water are to be “sufficient,” protection from the weather is to be “adequate,”
and veterinary care is to be provided “when needed to prevent suffering.” Previous courts have
determined that the fourth requirement, overall “humane care,” is to be based on “common sense.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Kirkpatrick, 2020 IL App (5th) 160422, ¶ 47
(experienced veterinary violated the Act and the Veterinary Medicine and Surgery Practice Act of
2004 (225 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2014)) when caring for and treating pets in her residence);
People v. Curtis, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1042 (2011) (resident of two-bedroom townhouse violated
statutory duties to her pet cat after taking in 82 feral or stray cats). In our opinion, a commonsense
approach to all four requirements is consistent with the principle that a statute’s language is to be
read with its plain and ordinary meaning. See Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1,
16-17 (1996).
¶ 37 With respect to the basic need for “a sufficient quantity of good quality, wholesome food”
(510 ILCS 70/3(a)(1) (West 2022)), Milan cites her allegation that the coyote was thoughtlessly
given domesticated dog food, in the amount recommended for dogs, by a person who had “virtually
no formal education or training qualifying them to make decisions about Rocky’s care.” This
allegation was conclusory because it did not state why including dog food in Rocky’s meals was
inappropriate. We do not accept conclusions of law or fact that are not supported by specific facts.
Mlade, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 921. She did not allege, for instance, that specialized commercial coyote
food was necessary or even exists. She failed to specify that he was malnourished, overfed, or
- 19 - 1-24-1058 underfed when given the amount of dry, commercial dog food recommended for dogs. Her
pleading simply gave no factual indication that the food regimen was not humane. Furthermore,
she criticized the caretakers’ lack of schooling, but she is opining about Rocky’s diet from her
perspective as a lay person herself who lacks the credentials and expertise necessary to opine on
what a captive coyote should be fed. Her subjective disdain is not a factual allegation that he was
being misfed.
¶ 38 Furthermore, she makes this conclusory allegation despite contrary statements in her own
exhibit. Milan was critical of a staff member’s qualifications, but the Forest Preserve’s report
indicated that the staff was trained and one individual was even a licensed animal rehabilitator.
Also, training and regular consultation were being provided by a senior wildlife biologist who co-
founded the Urban Coyote Research Project and had more than 30 years’ experience with Cook
County’s wildlife. Dr. Kubala’s evaluation indicated that River Trail was meeting the nutrition
criteria in the AZA manual specific to large canids. She included quotes from the AZA manual:
“ ‘Generally, the nutritional requirements of non-domestic large canids can be met by feeding a
nutritionally complete, commercial dog food.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Also, “ ‘Diets fed to coyotes
in zoos should consist of a nutritionally complete, dry dog food, with supplemental fruits,
vegetables, and whole prey items such as mice, small rats, quail or chicks.” (Emphasis added.) The
other independent veterinarian, Dr. Garrett, documented that Rocky had a good quality diet that
centered around commercial, dry food:
“[Rocky’s diet originated from] recommendations by the staff at the Brookfield Zoo
and [is] modified based on [his] response ***. The diet uses a commercial dry food as the
core ingredient and that is supplemented with mice, rats, fish, cheese and vegetables. The
- 20 - 1-24-1058 additional ingredients are in keeping with recommendations for the feeding of large canids
and simulate the natural diet. *** The ingredients are purchased from Brookfield Zoo so
the mice, etc. are known to be safe for the coyote.”
¶ 39 Thus, Milan’s allegation about Rocky’s diet is not only a subjective, conclusory and
deficient allegation, it appears to be an incorrect one, as two independent veterinarians, backed up
by the AZA manual and staff at the Brookfield Zoo, considered commercial dry dog food to be an
appropriate foundation of Rocky’s diet.
¶ 40 As for the requirement for sufficient, good quality water, Milan alleges that at one point
“[i]n or around January 2022,” she “observed that the water bowls in several of the animals’ cages
had frozen over,” that is, she pled a single, temporary condition that common sense indicates is
not a violation of the Act. Her allegation is deficient. Also, one of her exhibits undermines her
claim. That the situation was temporary and rectified is indicated by the Cook County Sheriff’s
Police Department incident report dated January 11, 2022, in which the investigators reported that
Rocky had access to liquid water. The incident report supports the commonsense expectation that
the frozen water that Milan alleges that she saw once in January 2022 was an anomaly. The
investigators even specified that they “observed no violations of the Illinois Humane Care for
Animals Act.”
¶ 41 Milan also purports to allege insufficient protection from the weather in that Rocky was
given a plastic dog kennel and hollow log covered with a towel in the colder months and the wild
birds live outside without heated perches. Obviously, however, if the captive animals had been left
wild, they would be living outside year-round, without any added heat when the weather turned
cold. Furthermore, there is no factual basis for her personal opinion that what has been provided
- 21 - 1-24-1058 is not “adequate shelter and protection.” 510 ILCS 70/3(a)(2) (West 2022). She expresses her
subjective and nonexpert preference for the coyote to have “a burrow den or other structure that
maintains a reasonable temperature,” but she does not factually indicate that the existing habitat
does not maintain a reasonable temperature. She is opining as a layperson. She criticizes the River
Trail staff for addressing Rocky’s “day-to-day needs and general health” despite a lack of “formal
education or training qualifying them to make decisions about [captive animal] care,” but Milan
does not claim to have any schooling of any kind, let alone specialized training in the care of
canids. She describes herself as someone who “grew up with birds, dogs, cats, lizards, and snakes”
and now “volunteers with pet rescues and has three rescue pets.” Her complaint is based on her
unqualified belief that River Trail should be providing its captive animals with some other shelter
during winter weather.
¶ 42 Not only is her layperson’s statement conclusory, but it also conflicts with what the experts
said. Other than expressing concern about the size of the enclosure, Dr. Kubala commented
positively about Rocky’s habitat during the colder months and specified that Rocky did not need
a heated habitat. Citing the AZA manual regarding temperature and environment, Dr. Kubala said,
“ ‘The coyote tolerates cold weather, but should be provided with a dry den structure, with dry
bedding such as straw for shelter from rainy or windy conditions. They do not require supplemental
heating in their dens, and do not generally require specific access to an enclosed, climate-controlled
environment.’ ” Dr. Kubala did not choose a burrow den, dispensed with any need for heat or a
heated enclosure at River Trail, and only expressed a preference for straw bedding in Rocky’s
shelter. The other independent veterinarian, Dr. Garrett, said that “[t]he den is bedded with straw
in the cold season and this, coupled with the sheltered nature of the area in the trees makes the
- 22 - 1-24-1058 structure well suited for the cold season.” These expert opinions flatly contradict Milan’s
conclusory allegations that Rocky’s shelter and protection are inadequate.
¶ 43 Milan makes clear that she wants Rocky to be turned over to The Wild Animal Sanctuary,
which has burrow dens. However, even its executive director, Craig, did not describe a burrow den
as a source of protection from the weather. His main concerns were that Rocky should live in a
larger habitat so that he could choose to escape the pressure of being on display and should have
a more natural habitat/lifestyle that included freedom to roam and choose his companions. Craig
never suggested that Rocky’s existing habitat does not provide “adequate shelter and protection
from the weather.” Milan alone came to this conclusion. She alleged no facts requiring a burrow
den, despite professing that she “reached out to veterinary experts and animal sanctuaries.” Also,
it is ironic that she advocates putting Rocky in Craig’s care when he is another lay person who
does not claim to have any “formal education or training qualifying [him] to make decisions about
[captive animal] care.”
¶ 44 Milan also pleads a lack of adequate veterinary care, but she alleges that veterinary care is
provided. The statute requires only “veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering” (id.
§ 3(a)(3)) and does not dictate a specific level of care.
¶ 45 According to Milan, it is a statutory violation that the usual vet, Dr. Abete, is “not a wild
canid specialist,” meaning that she “is not qualified to care for Rocky.” Milan also criticizes Dr.
Abete for medicating and transporting Rocky so that she can see him at Niles Animal Hospital and
Bird Medical Center, rather than at the nature center.
¶ 46 Milan is making a factual conclusion that there is such a thing as “a wild canid specialist”
and that a lack of highly specialized veterinary attention violates the Act. She also assumes,
- 23 - 1-24-1058 without factual basis, that Rocky would receive better vet care at the nature center, instead of being
transported to a vet practice that has diagnostic equipment and other resources devoted to animal
care.
¶ 47 In addition, Milan cannot reconcile her conclusory allegations about vet care with her
exhibits. The Forest Preserve’s study noted that Dr. Abete’s practice is “[r]ecognized as one of the
foremost veterinary practices in the nation” and has “an outstanding in-house laboratory.” Also,
contrary to the allegation that Rocky is always taken to the vet practice, the study mentions that
“[t]he staff at Niles Animal Hospital provide yearly exams and regularly checks on the animals
with both on-site care and at its facility in Niles.” After Dr. Garett evaluated Rocky and considered
his medical records, he reported that Rocky is “healthy” and “I have no concerns about the
veterinary care program for the coyote.” The other independent veterinarian, Dr. Kubala, specified,
“In my opinion, [River Trail] has provided good veterinary care.”
¶ 48 As part of her criticism of Dr. Abete’s “veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering”
(id.), Milan alleges that Dr. Abete fails to “mitigate [Rocky’s] stress-induced behaviors” by
“addressing their root cause: Rocky’s inhumane confinement and treatment.” This allegation is
better addressed with the allegations that Milan directs at the final prong of the Act, “humane care
and treatment.” Id. § 3(a)(4). Under this heading, Milan pleads that Rocky experiences inhumane
treatment because he is being kept in a small enclosure where he engages in “obvious stress-
induced pacing” throughout the day, has to “perform dog tricks to earn food,” lacks a burrow den
and a companion, and receives day-to-day care from people who lack the necessary “formal
education or training.”
¶ 49 None of these allegations are factual indications of violation of the Act. Milan lacks the
- 24 - 1-24-1058 qualifications to declare these aspects of Rocky’s care to be wrong, and she fails to tie her
allegations to any objective requirement. For instance, her allegation that he has a “small,” even
“tiny,” enclosure of only “266 square feet” is not grounded in an authoritative source indicating
that a captive coyote’s habitat should be at least a certain size. A plaintiff is not required to plead
evidence but does need to plead the ultimate facts to be proved. Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 369;
Carriage Way West, 88 Ill. 2d at 308. Proving the allegation that Rocky’s habitat is 266 square
feet would prove that the enclosure is 266 square feet. It would not prove that the enclosure does
not meet his needs. There would be no legal consequences. She included a photo that is so poorly
reproduced that it is indecipherable and does not communicate that Rocky’s enclosure is
undersized. Similarly, out of thin air, Milan alleges, “As a coyote, Rocky requires freedom to roam
over acres of space as well as social engagement with other coyotes.” She also creates the concern,
“As a coyote, Rocky needs a structure like a burrow den where he can go to both get away from
the elements and stay warm during cold winters, and avoid the loud noises and other disturbances
made by children and cars coming and going to and from the nature center all day.” Neither of the
“[a]s a coyote” allegations is founded on an informed standard, and the court does not
independently know that a coyote “requires *** acres of space” and “needs a structure like a
burrow den.” In addition, as we pointed out above in conjunction with the statutory requirement
for “adequate shelter and protection” (510 ILCS 70/3(a)(2) (West 2022)), Milan would choose a
burrow den, but she has not factually alleged that Rocky is being treated inhumanely because he
does not have one. Furthermore, repeatedly characterizing the enclosure as “solitary confinement”
is an inappropriate attempt to inflame sympathy rather than plead facts. She alleges her personal
preferences for Rocky’s habitat, instead of actionable violations of the Act. Her allegation that
- 25 - 1-24-1058 Rocky “constantly paces around his cage throughout the day” implies that Milan is at the nature
center all day and every day observing his behavior, which is a patent exaggeration. She also fails
to factually describe the “dog tricks” that he purportedly performs to earn food, and she does not
factually state why doing so is detrimental to him and should not be considered humane care and
treatment. Then there is the allegation that River Trail staff have virtually no relevant education or
training, which is an unsubstantiated conclusion that the Act requires certain qualifications that the
Act does not require.
¶ 50 The conclusory allegations of inhumane care and treatment also conflict with her exhibits.
Dr. Garrett noted that there were “no absolute standards for the size of pen for a captive coyote,”
described the current habitat as “adequate” and said that “expansion of the enclosure is not an
urgent need.” He and Dr. Kubala suggested that the enclosure be enlarged, but neither of them
opined that the existing enclosure was in any way inhumane. Dr. Kubala did encourage
companionship, and Craig offered to take Rocky to Colorado where he could transition to a larger
habitat and companionship, but neither of them said that the River Trail facilities violated the Act.
As for the lack of a fellow coyote, the study indicated that according to the Urban Coyote Research
Project, more than a third of coyotes tracked over 22 years have been solitary animals. The Forest
Preserve expressed concern that transferring Rocky to another facility for the social benefits could
be stressful and even harmful to him. Unlike Milan, it seems like the Forest Preserve made an
educated choice about what was humane.
¶ 51 With respect to Rocky’s supposed “constant pac[ing] around his cage throughout the day,”
Dr. Garrett observed that Rocky was “more active when people were in the area,” “returned to
what seemed to be a baseline level soon after the visitors left,” and then, while Dr. Garrett kept
- 26 - 1-24-1058 stationary, Rocky “moved about in a slow steady manner and periodically sat or stood still while
listening and sniffing the air.” Dr. Garrett did not document the so-called “stress-induced pacing”
that Milan alleged she observes when she is “constantly” at River Trail, and Dr. Garrett did not
characterize Rocky’s behavior negatively. Similarly, while Dr. Kubala not only advocated for a
larger habitat and a companion, she did not document any “stress-induced” pacing. Milan
independently alleges that Rocky “stress pace[s]” and from her lay perspective she has diagnosed
him with “zoochosis”—“a form of animal psychosis” that is brought on by his confinement.
¶ 52 Regarding the “perform[ance] [of] dog tricks to earn food,” Dr. Garrett, an actual expert,
documented that Rocky follows commands to sit-stay, go in his den, and raise a paw and that his
encounters with the staff were good for his mental and physical health:
“The two feeding periods each day are coupled with interactions with the keepers. ***
[Rocky] responded to the keepers in a positive manner and seemed to thoroughly enjoy
interacting with the keepers. ***
Purpose-driven training is incorporated ***. [It] serves as a source of mental stimula-
tion for the coyote and facilitates *** activities the keepers need to perform. Basic com-
mands like sit and stay reduce the risk of escape as keepers enter and exit the pen; entering
a den/crate provides a method to move the coyote out of the pen when necessary; extending
a forelimb while sitting it allows examination of the limbs. *** [F]requent low-stress
contact allows the keepers to examine the coyote closely and touch him all over his body
so that changes can be recognized promptly.”
¶ 53 Milan claimed that River Trail’s captive birds of prey were likewise not receiving “humane
care and treatment.” Id. § 3(a)(4). Her appellate arguments, however, do not address this portion
- 27 - 1-24-1058 of her complaint, and we will not be addressing it either. An appellant forfeits review of issues that
are ill defined and insufficiently presented in the opening appellate brief. People ex rel. Illinois
Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (arguments not raised in the opening brief are considered forfeited and may not
be raised in a reply brief, at oral arguments, or in a petition for rehearing).
¶ 54 This complaint does not present facts upon which judicial relief could be granted. It
conveyed Milan’s baseless opinions but not any violations of the Act. Her exhibits contradict her
allegations and demonstrate there is no set of facts that can be proved that would entitle Milan to
relief.
¶ 55 For these reasons, we find that the court did not err by dismissing count I.
¶ 56 In count II, Milan sought a judicial declaration that the Forest Preserve was
misappropriating taxpayer funds and an injunction ceasing the misuse. In count II, she specified:
“131. Defendant fails to supply ‘Ambassador Animals’ with necessary water, shelter,
veterinary care, and humane care and treatment in violation of the Illinois Humane Care
for Animals Act.
132. Defendant’s inhumane care for ‘Ambassador Animals’ constitutes a misappropri-
ation of Cook County taxpayer funds, including taxes paid by Plaintiff Nicole Milan.
133. Unless restrained, Defendant will continue to misappropriate Cook County
taxpayer funds to finance the inhumane care of animals under the ‘Ambassador Animals’
program in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.”
¶ 57 She acknowledges that count II was based on the allegations in count I that we found to be
inadequate. A plaintiff who relies on municipal taxpayer standing must show that the municipality
- 28 - 1-24-1058 has expended funds on allegedly illegal elements of the disputed practice. Illinois Ass’n of Realtors
v. Stermer, 2014 IL App (4th) 130079, ¶ 29; Barber v. City of Springfield, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1099,
1102 (2011) (“The key to taxpayer standing is the plaintiff’s liability to replenish public revenues
depleted by an allegedly unlawful governmental action.” (Emphasis added.)). “Taxpayer standing
is based ‘upon the taxpayers’ ownership of [public] funds and their liability to replenish the public
treasury for the deficiency caused by such misappropriation. The misuse of these funds for illegal
or unconstitutional purposes is a damage which entitles them to sue.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Illinois
Ass’n of Realtors, 2014 IL App (4th) 130079, ¶ 29 (quoting Barco Manufacturing Co. v. Wright,
10 Ill. 2d 157, 160 (1956)). Milan’s allegations are deficient.
¶ 58 Furthermore, section 40 of the Cook County Forest Preserve District Act (70 ILCS 810/40
(West 2022)) gives the Forest Preserve authority to establish and maintain the Ambassador
Animals program and expend taxpayer funds on the operations. That statute states:
“The corporate authorities of forest preserve districts, having the control or supervision of
any forest preserves, may erect and maintain within such forest preserves, under the control
or supervision of such corporate authorities, edifices to be used for the collection and
display of animals as customary in zoological parks, and may collect and display such
animals *** out of the tax provided in Section 41.” Id.
¶ 59 We conclude that count II does not factually plead that public funds are being expended on
the illegal, inhumane care of captive animals, only that Milan dislikes or disagrees with the policies
about the care and treatment of those animals. The tax money is being spent as authorized by
statute and there are no facts that Milan could allege that would amount to a claim of the
misappropriation of taxpayer money. The circuit court did not err in dismissing count II as factually
- 29 - 1-24-1058 deficient.
¶ 60 Milan’s last request is, if we determine her claims are generally viable but her pleading is
infirm, that we remand with directions to the circuit court to grant leave to replead. The Forest
Preserve responds that an amendment would be futile and that she waived the opportunity.
¶ 61 Milan suggests she was caught off guard in the circuit court. Her response to the motion to
dismiss concluded with the perfunctory statement, “In the alternative, should this Court grant
Defendant’s motion in whole or in part, Plaintiff requests leave to amend her Complaint.” The
circuit court initially dismissed only count I, at which point Milan abandoned any interest in
repleading the claim and asked for an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) or
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) finding so that she could take an
interlocutory appeal as to count I. In a cross-motion, the Forest Preserve sought either
reconsideration of the court’s retention of count II or the entry of Rule 308(a) language so that the
Forest Preserve could be the interlocutory appellant. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
The circuit court entered a briefing schedule and hearing date for the cross-motions. However,
after receiving the briefs, the court decided to strike the hearing date, grant reconsideration as to
count II and dismiss it with prejudice, and then deny Milan’s motion as moot. Milan’s appeal from
the final judgment order followed.
¶ 62 Milan was not somehow deprived of the capacity to request leave to file an amended
complaint. She demonstrated her commitment to her original pleading not once, but twice. She
committed to count I when she sought interlocutory appeal language instead of seeking
reconsideration and/or leave to amend count I. She made a strategic choice. Then she stood by
count II when she took an appeal from the final judgment order instead of seeking reconsideration
- 30 - 1-24-1058 and/or leave to amend count II, followed by an appeal as a matter of right.
¶ 63 The viability of her cause of action now turns solely on the sufficiency of her existing
pleading. See Mlade, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 917 (when the circuit court strikes a complaint and the
plaintiff does not ask for leave to amend, the cause of action stands or falls upon the contents of
the stricken pleading); Robbins v. City of Madison, 193 Ill. App. 3d 379, 381 (1990) (same).
¶ 64 Furthermore, Milan has given no indication of how she might successfully state a cause of
action in count I or count II, because she has not filed a proposed amendment. “A party desiring
to file an amended pleading should incorporate the proferred amendment in his record on appeal.
Otherwise, the reviewing court has no means of determining whether the second attempt to state a
cause of action would have been any more successful than the first.” Zamouski v. Gerrard, 1 Ill.
App. 3d 890, 898 (1971). We would be speculating that someone with a demonstrated inability to
plead would suddenly manifest the ability on remand.
¶ 65 We decline to unfairly burden judicial resources and the defendant. Milan’s request is
denied.
¶ 66 The circuit court’s dismissal of Milan’s claims of public nuisance and misuse of taxpayer
funds is affirmed.
¶ 67 Affirmed.
- 31 - 1-24-1058
Milan v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 2025 IL App (1st) 241058
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-CH- 11940; the Hon. Sophia H. Hall, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Kelli Mulder and Michael J. Kraft, of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, of for Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Thomas G. DiCianni and Mary Jean Dolan, of Ancel Glink, for P.C., of Chicago, for appellee. Appellee:
- 32 -
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2025 IL App (1st) 241058, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milan-v-forest-preserve-district-of-cook-county-illappct-2025.