Mikenas v. Rieff

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 14, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-0530
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TARA MIKENAS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00530 (UNA) ) JOEL RIEFF, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff has filed a pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained below, the court will grant

plaintiff’s IFP application and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, sues an individual, Joel Rieff, who resides

in Chicago, Illinois. The complaint is far from a model in clarity. Plaintiff accuses defendant of

stalking and terrorizing her, in addition to other assorted crimes. She also contends that defendant

is connected to a vast terrorist network.

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000. A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts

that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such

facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

First, plaintiff’s claims fail to raise any federal question. The complaint does not identify

any legal authority upon which plaintiff may rely, nor can any be inferred from context. Moreover, a plaintiff may not initiate criminal proceedings by filing a complaint with this court because it has

no authority to compel the government to prosecute a criminal case. See Shoshone–Bannock

Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Cox v. Sec'y of

Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). The decision of whether or not to

prosecute, and for what offense, rests solely with the government. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v.

Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). “[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v.

Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir.

1997); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d

224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2012). Nor may

plaintiff compel a criminal investigation by any law enforcement agency by filing a petition. See

Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Jafree v. Barber,

689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). “[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether

through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute

discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).

Second, there can be no diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although plaintiff

and defendant are located in different states, plaintiff has not pled an amount in controversy, much

less the threshold amount, and the amount in controversy must be determined at the time an action

is commenced. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Indeed, it is completely

unclear what relief, if any, plaintiff seeks. For these reasons, the complaint, ECF No. 1, and the case, are dismissed without prejudice.

A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date:

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge