Mikaela Marie Stevens-Hill et al. v. Glamnetic LLC

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MIKAELA MARIE STEVENS-HILL et CASE NO. 3:26-cv-05003-DGE 11 al., ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 12 Plaintiffs, (DKT. NO. 10) v. 13 GLAMNETIC LLC, 14 Defendant. 15 16 Before the Court is Defendant Glamnetic LLC’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) 17 Plaintiffs Mikaela Stevens-Hills and Stephine Stewart’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1-1). Having 18 reviewed the parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law, the 19 Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 20 I BACKGROUND 21 A. Factual Background 22 Plaintiffs allege Defendant has violated the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act 23 (“CEMA”) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”) by “spam[ming] 24 1 Washington consumers, including Plaintiffs, with commercial emails whose subject lines employ 2 various tactics to create a false sense of urgency in consumers’ minds—and ultimately, from 3 consumers’ wallets.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11.) This false urgency wastes consumers’ time by 4 “enticing them to engage with the defendant’s marketing efforts for fear of missing out[,]” and

5 also floods consumers’ email inboxes “with repeated false notifications that the time to act—i.e. 6 purchase—is short.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant sends “False Limited Time Message[s]” 7 where marketers create pressure to buy immediately “by saying the offer is good only for a 8 limited time or that the deal ends soon—but without a deadline or with a meaningless deadline 9 that just resets when reached.” (Id. at 14) (internal citation omitted). Defendant “regularly titles 10 its emails with urgent subject headings that do not reflect the true availability of the advertised 11 deal.” (Id. at 16.) The complaint identifies various examples of allegedly false or misleading 12 subject lines where Defendant advertised deals available for a limited time, only for Defendant to 13 extend the deal for another day or sometimes several days. (Id. at 16–23, 33–34.) Plaintiff 14 Stevens-Hill allegedly received two of those emails: a July 24, 2024 email stating, “Last Call For

15 Up to 35% Off [emoji]” and an August 2, 2024 email with the subject line “LAST CALL: 25- 16 50% off Sitewide [emoji].” (Id. at 25.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff Stewart also 17 received two emails: one dated August 31, 2025 entitled “Sitewide Sale Ends Tomorrow!” and 18 one email dated September 1, 2025 with the subject line “LAST CALL: 40% Off[.]” (Id.) 19 B. Procedural Background 20 Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit in Thurston County Superior Court (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On 21 January 5, 2026, Defendant removed the case to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) On January 26, 2026, 22 Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Dkt. No. 10.) Defendant asserts Plaintiffs’ 23 complaint should be dismissed because: (1) CEMA is preempted by the Controlling the Assault

24 1 of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (“CAN-SPAM”); (2) CEMA is facially 2 unconstitutional on its face , as its requirement for out-of-state entities to identify individuals 3 currently located or residing in Washington creates a nationwide standard for commercial email, 4 which burdens interstate commerce and, unconstitutional as applied because Plaintiffs fail to

5 allege they were located in Washington when they received the emails at issue; (3) Plaintiffs fail 6 to allege facts supporting several elements of their claim under CEMA; (4) Plaintiffs’ CPA claim 7 is premised entirely on their CEMA claim, and both claims fail; and (5) Plaintiffs fail to allege 8 any facts supporting their claims for actual and treble damages under both CEMA and CPA. 9 (See generally id.) 10 Based on the stipulation of the Parties (Dkt. No. 19), the Court granted the State of 11 Washington’s motion to intervene in the case on March 2, 2026 (Dkt. No. 20). The matter is 12 now ripe for review. 13 II LEGAL STANDARD 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) motions to dismiss may be based on either the lack

15 of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 16 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Material 17 allegations are taken as admitted and the complaint is construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Keniston 18 v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 19 motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 20 the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 21 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 22 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be 23 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

24 1 allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. The complaint must allege 2 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The court need 3 not, however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice 4 or by exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,

5 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 6 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (internal 7 citation omitted). 8 III DISCUSSION 9 A. CAN-SPAM Preemption 10 Defendant argues that CAN-SPAM preempts Plaintiffs claim under CEMA. (Dkt. No. 10 11 at 24–31.) But this Court has already rejected this theory. See Liss et al. v. Skechers USA Inc., 12 Case No. 2:25-cv-05861-DGE, Dkt. No. 42 at 10–13; Devivo v. Sheex Inc., Case No. 2:25-cv- 13 05807-DGE, Dkt. No. 41 at 7. Defendant offers no new argument to persuade the Court to 14 depart from its previous rulings. Thus, the Court rejects Defendant’s preemption argument.

15 B. Constitutionality of CEMA 16 Next, the Court turns to Defendant’s constitutional argument. Defendant argues that 17 CEMA is facially unconstitutional because it imposes liability based solely on the email 18 recipient’s residency—not location—thereby controlling commerce occurring wholly outside of 19 Washington in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. (Dkt. No. 10 at 17–18.) Defendant 20 further argues CEMA is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs fail to allege 21 they were in Washington when they received the emails at issue. (Id. at 18.) 22 The Court adopts the conclusion of every other judge to address this matter and finds 23 CEMA is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Washington v.

24 1 Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1232–1233 (E.D. Wash. 2026); 2 Vernoic Repperger, Amber Lamar, Charra Caldwell, Rebekah Clark v. Ulta Salons, Cosmetics 3 & Fragrance, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00526-RLP, 2026 WL 1157157, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 4 2026); Kempf v. Fullbeauty Brands Operations, LLC, C25-1141 TSZ, 2026 WL 395677, at *7

5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2026); see also State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 412 (Wash. 2001) (en banc). 6 It is well-established that “[a]nalysis of a state law under the dormant Commerce Clause 7 generally follows a two-step process.” Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409. First, a court must “determine 8 whether the state law openly discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate 9 economic interests.” Id. In such case, the law will generally be struck down. Jessica Jackson v. 10 Hanesbrands, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-00440-SAB, 2026 WL 116144, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 11 2026). Second, if the law is facially neutral, the court must conduct a balancing test weighing 12 “the local benefits against the interstate burdens.” Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409. More granularly, the 13 dormant Commerce Clause has three “key strands,” Flynt v. Bonta, 131 F.4th 918, 923 (9th Cir. 14 2025), which involve (i) a non-discrimination principle, (ii) an “extraterritoriality” principle, and

15 (iii) a burden balancing test under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Defendant 16 addresses only the second and third strands. Nonetheless, the first inquiry, i.e., whether the state 17 law discriminates against interstate commerce, is the starting point for a dormant Commerce 18 Clause analysis. See Flynt, 131 F.4th at 926. 19 1. Non-discrimination principle 20 In National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, the Supreme Court observed that the 21 “antidiscrimination principle lies at the ‘very core’ of our dormant Commerce Clause 22 jurisprudence,” and “prohibits the enforcement of state laws ‘driven by . . . economic 23 protectionism—that is regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by

24 1 burdening out-of-state competitors.’” 598 U.S. 356, 369 (2023). As found in Kempf, “CEMA 2 treats Washington-based entities the same as out-of-state businesses,” and “[t]he statute’s 3 prohibition on e-mails containing false or misleading information in their subject line applies 4 ‘evenhandedly’ to any ‘person.’” 2026 WL 395677, at *5 (quoting Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409).

5 Defendant does not suggest anything different. CEMA does not violate the non-discrimination 6 principle. 7 2. Extraterritoriality principle 8 CEMA regulates commercial emails sent “from a computer located in Washington or to 9 an electronic mail address that the sender knows, or has reason to know, is held by a Washington 10 resident.” Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(1). Defendant argues that permitting Plaintiffs’ claim 11 could create a situation where CEMA “imposes restrictions on a company organized and based 12 in Florida (like Glamnetic) on its transmission of emails to a person in New York (for example) 13 who is nonetheless a Washington resident.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 18.) Accordingly, Defendant 14 contends this violates the dormant Commerce Clause’s principle that “states may not directly

15 regulate conduct that takes place wholly outside of their borders.” (Id. at 17.) 16 This exact hypothetical has been raised and rejected in other matters. Contrary to 17 Defendant’s attempt to frame it as such, this is not a situation where there is “a law that directly 18 regulate[s] out-of-state transactions by those with no connection to the State.” Nat’l Pork 19 Producers Council, 598 U.S. at 376, n.1. As explained in Ulta, Defendant’s “hypothetical 20 ignores that CEMA regulates activities targeting Washington residents, who remain Washington 21 residents even if they are temporarily out of state.” 822 F. Supp. 3d at 1232. Defendant’s 22 argument also ignores the reality that the national marketplace is interconnected and that most 23 state laws have some “‘practical effect of controlling’ extraterritorial behavior.” Nat’l Pork

24 1 Producers Council, 598 U.S. at 374. Accepting Defendant’s contention that CEMA improperly 2 imposes restrictions on out-of-state conduct would ultimately “invite endless litigation and 3 inconsistent results” anytime a state law has some effect on out-of-state conduct. Id. at 375. 4 Accordingly, an extraterritorially claim fails.1

5 3. Pike balancing test 6 Defendant’s claim under a Pike balancing theory is equally unsuccessful. Defendant 7 argues “Washington’s local interest in independently regulating misleading email subject lines is 8 comparatively minimal against the backdrop of an existing federal standard addressing the same 9 type of conduct.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 24.) This interest compared to the potential burden Defendant 10 may have in being “forced to apply CEMA’s restrictions nationwide in order to comply” creates 11 uncertainty, which according to Defendant, is violative of the dormant Commerce Clause. (Id.) 12 However, “increased costs to comply with state regulation alone do not suffice to establish a 13 substantial burden on interstate commerce.” Ulta, 822 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. Moreover, “a 14 plaintiff must first ‘demonstrate that a challenged law imposes a “substantial” or “significant”

15 burden on interstate commerce before Pike balancing can occur.” Id. (quoting Flynt, 131 F.4th 16 at 925). Defendant has not done so. 17 In short, Defendant’s dormant Commerce Clause arguments fail. 18 19 20

21 1 It is possible that for the reasons articulated in Sam Francis Foundation v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), a matter may violate the dormant Commerce Clause where 22 a plaintiff does in fact have little to no connection to Washington. But at this stage—and unlike Sam Francis—there is no evidence that any wholly out-of-state conduct is being regulated. 23 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has left open whether Sam Francis remains good law, and this Court need not decide it now. See Flynt, 131 F.th at 931. 24 1 C. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Allege CEMA Violations 2 CEMA provides that, “No person may initiate the transmission, conspire with another to 3 initiate the transmission, or assist the transmission, of a commercial electronic mail message 4 from a computer located in Washington or to an electronic mail address that the sender knows, or

5 has reason to know, is held by a Washington resident” that “[c]ontains false or misleading 6 information in the subject line.” Wash. Rev. Code § 19.190.020(1)(b). Defendant argues 7 Plaintiffs fail to plead facts showing (1) they actually received all of the emails identified in the 8 complaint, (2) the email subject lines contained false or misleading information, and (3) 9 Defendant knew or had reason to know Plaintiffs were Washington residents. 10 The Court finds at this stage, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to support their CEMA 11 claim, and subsequently their CPA claim, against Defendant. They assert Defendant sends 12 emails to consumers it has reason to know are owned by Washington residents and those emails 13 contain misleading information regarding the urgency of deals in the subject line. (See Dkt. No. 14 1-1 at 23–25.) According to the complaint, Defendant consistently sends emails with subject

15 lines that identify an illusory time limit for a promotion or sale, and Plaintiffs have received at 16 least four of those emails.2 (Id. at 16–23, 25.) These subject lines include phrases like “TODAY 17 ONLY” “LAST CALL” or “FINAL HOURS TO SHOP” to create a false sense of urgency. (Id.) 18 And Plaintiffs contend Defendant sends these emails while never intending to terminate the sale 19 by the described deadline. (See id.) 20 21

22 2 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint may only proceed on the emails they alleged to have actually received, as opposed to all of the emails discussed in the complaint. (Dkt. No. 10 23 at 12–13.) However, the number of emails Plaintiffs received from Defendant is a factual question the Court will not address at this stage. 24 1 The complaint also alleges multiple methods by which Defendant could know or have 2 reason to know Plaintiffs are Washington residents: (1) Defendant’s “sheer volume of email 3 marketing” puts it on notice that Washington residents would receive its emails; (2) Defendant 4 may obtain location information when consumers make purchases on its website or self-report to

5 Defendant; (3) Defendant may obtain location information by tracking IP addresses to devices 6 used to open emails and correlating them to physical locations; (4) Defendant “likely uses 7 Klaviyo” to manage its email marketing campaign which would allow identification of persons 8 who receive Glamnetic emails and is “likely” able to infer the “general geographic location of 9 recipients by state based on their IP address at the time of email open or link click”; 10 (5) Defendant may obtain location information tied to email addresses by purchasing consumer 11 data from commercial data brokers; (6) Defendant may obtain location information by using 12 “identity resolution services” which can connect email address to physical location; and (7) 13 Defendant may obtain information upon request from the registrant of Internet domain names 14 contained in email addresses. (Id. at 23–24.) The complaint, viewed in the light most favorable

15 to Plaintiffs, alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible claim under CEMA. Defendant’s 16 arguments for dismissal are inconsistent with the standards applicable to motions brought under 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which require the Court to assume the truth of the 18 allegations in the operative pleading and to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. 19 See, e.g., Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Defendant instead 20 21 22 23

24 1 invites the Court to question the truth of the allegations of the complaint and draw inferences 2 against Plaintiffs. The Court declines to do so.3,4 3 Finally, Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts suggesting they 4 sustained actual damages, any claim for actual damages, and subsequently treble damages,

5 should be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 10 at 31.) As Plaintiffs point out, “CEMA does not require a 6 showing of injury for statutory damages to be awarded because the injury is receiving the e-mail 7 that violates CEMA.” Brown v. Old Navy, LLC, 567 P.3d 38, 45 (Wash. 2025). Because 8 Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support a CEMA violation, it is premature to dismiss 9 actual or treble damages at this stage. 10 IV CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. (Dkt. 12 No. 10.) 13 Dated this 17th day of June, 2026. 14 A 15 David G. Estudillo 16 United States District Judge

17 18 19 20 3 For example, Defendant asks the Court to consider the “plausible alternative explanation” that 21 Defendant merely “renewed or extended its promotion” in response to “subsequently developed business conditions.” (Dkt. No. 10 at 14.) At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court draws all 22 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—in this case, Plaintiffs. 4 Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs’ CEMA claims fail as a matter of law, their CPA 23 claims, which are grounded in CEMA violations, necessarily fail. (Dkt. No. 10 at 31.) However, because Plaintiffs CEMA claims survive, their CPA claims do as well. 24