Miguel Pina Rangel v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 8, 2023
• Docket: 19-72991
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 8 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL ANGEL PINA RANGEL, No. 19-72991

Petitioner, Agency No. A202-177-085

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 5, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: WALLACE and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Miguel Angel Pina Rangel, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the immigration

judge’s (IJ’s) order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for

substantial evidence. Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). Where, as

here, “the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting

the IJ’s decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the

IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted).

1. The agency denied petitioner’s application for relief after rendering an

adverse credibility determination. This case is governed by the REAL ID Act, which

dictates that “an adverse credibility determination must be made after considering the

totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,

1040 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors include “the

consistency between … written and oral statements.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

The adverse credibility determination was supported by petitioner’s failure to

mention a bus robbery that he and his family fell victim to until three years after his

2 immigration case began. Petitioner was interviewed by an asylum officer and

completed an I-589 application. He did not mention the bus robbery in either of these

statements. These statements suggested petitioner’s claim for relief was based on a

conflict between petitioner, petitioner’s common-law wife, and a man named Marcos

Linares Gutierrez (“Linares”), who had been harassing and threatening petitioner and

petitioner’s wife.

But at his individual hearing before the IJ, petitioner testified regarding the bus

robbery and recharacterized his issues in Mexico as primarily arising between him and

the Mexican police. See Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016)

(“[A]n adverse credibility determination may be supported by omissions that are not

‘details,’ but new allegations that tell a ‘much different—and more compelling—story

of persecution than [the] initial application[.]’” (citation omitted)). According to

petitioner, Linares was simply an individual who was connected to the police force

and was threatening and harming petitioner at the behest of a high-ranking police

officer. As an example of the inconsistencies between petitioner’s application

materials and his testimony, in both versions of petitioner’s story, Linares and three

other men kidnapped and injured petitioner; but at his hearing, petitioner insisted that

the incident was motivated by his speaking out against the complacence of the

3 Mexican police. Based on these discrepancies, and several others, the agency

concluded that petitioner was not credible.

Substantial record evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. Petitioner’s testimony contradicted his written statements in several

ways, and even his direct examination was internally inconsistent. See Shrestha, 590

F.3d at 1047 (holding that the petitioner’s “inability to consistently describe the

underlying events that gave rise to his fear was an important factor that could be relied

upon by the IJ in making an adverse credibility determination”). Although the IJ did

not expressly address the existence of arguably corroborative evidence, such as a

statement from petitioner’s cousin who claimed to have also been a victim of the bus

robbery, the IJ did state that he had considered all proffered evidence, even if it was

not explicitly mentioned in his opinion. See Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d

885, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A general statement that the [agency] considered all the

evidence can suffice where nothing in the record indicates a failure to consider all the

evidence.”). Thus, the record does not compel the conclusion that the adverse

credibility determination was erroneous. Accordingly, we deny the petition insofar

as it challenges that determination.

2. Petitioner also challenges the agency’s denial of relief under CAT. Without

petitioner’s discredited testimony, the record here falls far short of establishing that

4 petitioner is more likely than not to be tortured with the acquiescence of a government

official upon his return to Mexico. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th

Cir. 2001). The record therefore does not compel the conclusion that he is eligible for

relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition as to the denial of CAT protection.

The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION DENIED.