Mighty Dreams LLC v. Shenzhen Beianen Automotive Supplies Co Ltd

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 7, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00793
StatusUnknown

This text of Mighty Dreams LLC v. Shenzhen Beianen Automotive Supplies Co Ltd (Mighty Dreams LLC v. Shenzhen Beianen Automotive Supplies Co Ltd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mighty Dreams LLC v. Shenzhen Beianen Automotive Supplies Co Ltd, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MIGHTY DREAMS LLC, CASE NO. C24-00793-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S THIRD 9 v. MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE

10 SHENZHEN BEIANEN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIES CO LTD et al., 11

Defendant(s). 12

13 Mighty Dreams LLC (“Mighty Dreams”) filed its third motion for alternative service under 14 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). Dkt. No. 13. The Court denied Mighty Dreams’ first 15 and second requests for alternative service because Mighty Dreams failed to show that service to 16 the identified email addresses comports with due process. Dkt. Nos. 6, 12. In particular, Mighty 17 Dreams failed to show that the newly identified email addresses for Defendants are valid and 18 currently active. Dkt. No. 12. 19 In response to the Court’s direction, Mighty Dreams sent tracked emails to the identified 20 email addresses for Defendants and received confirmation that the email addresses can receive 21 messages. As such, the Court grants Mighty Dreams’ third motion for alternative service (Dkt. 22 No. 13). 23 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The Court incorporates by reference the factual background provided in its previous orders 3 on Mighty Dreams’ first two motions for alternative service. Dkt. No. 6 at 1–3, Dkt. No. 12 at 1–

4 2. Mighty Dreams sues Defendants for false advertising under the Lanham Act (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 41– 5 50), false advertising under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (id. ¶¶ 51–63), and common 6 law unfair competition (id. ¶¶ 64–75). Mighty Dreams alleges that Defendants registered multiple 7 seller accounts on Amazon.com to manipulate sales prices on the online shopping platform, 8 deceive consumers, and coordinate these accounts to “win” the Amazon.com buy box for product 9 listings. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 10 The Court denied Mighty Dreams’ first two motions for alternative service without 11 prejudice. Dkt. Nos. 6, 12. Mighty Dreams had identified two email addresses associated with 12 the Defendants’ seller account: fantastic_09@163.com and 00459_sgister@sina.com. Dkt. No.

13 11-4. However, Mighty Dreams did not demonstrate that these email addresses were active and 14 valid by sending test messages. Dkt. No. 11 at 14. As a result, the Court denied Mighty Dreams’ 15 request, finding that without confirmation that the email addresses can receive messages, Mighty 16 Dreams cannot satisfy the due process requirement for alternative service. Dkt. No. 12 at 3–4. 17 For the third time, Mighty Dreams moves for alternative service. Dkt. No. 13. To support 18 its motion, Mighty Dreams sent tracked emails via the Yesware.com email tracking service to the 19 fantastic_09@163.com and 00459_sgister@sina.com email addresses. Dkt. No. 13-5 at 3, Dkt. 20 No. 13-7 at 2, Dkt. No. 13-1 at 3, Dkt. No. 13-10. Mighty Dreams did not receive a bounce back 21 or failure notification from either email. Dkt. Nos. 13-7, 13-10. 22 II. ANALYSIS

23 The Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction because Mighty Dreams brings 24 claims under a federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1121. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental 1 jurisdiction over Mighty Dreams’ claims that arise under Washington state law because they are 2 “so related” to the federal claims that “they form part of the same cause or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1367(a).

4 A. Legal Standard 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(2) governs service of process on foreign corporations 6 and states that foreign corporations may be served “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for 7 serving an individual.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2). Rule 4(f) provides three separate means to 8 complete international service; one is not preferred over another. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l 9 Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[S]ervice of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither 10 a last resort nor extraordinary relief.”) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs request to serve Defendants under 11 Rule 4(f)(3), which permits service “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as 12 the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). The Ninth Circuit requires service under Rule 4(f)(3) to

13 meet three thresholds: (1) it “must not be prohibited by international agreement”; (2) it “must 14 comport with constitutional notions of due process”; and (3) “the facts and circumstances of the 15 present case necessitate[] the district court’s intervention.” Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015–16. The 16 district court has “the discretion…to balance the limitations of email service against its benefits in 17 any particular case.” Id. at 1018; Microsoft Corp. v. Buy More, Inc., 703 F. App’x 476, 480 (9th 18 Cir. 2017). 19 B. International Agreements Do Not Expressly Prohibit Email Service to Defendants. 20 First, the Court finds that email service to Defendants is not prohibited by international 21 agreements. As an initial matter, the Hague Convention does not apply where the foreign 22 defendant’s address is unknown. See Hague Convention, art. 1 (“This Convention shall not apply

23 where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.”). Therefore, 24 because Mighty Dreams cannot identify valid physical addresses for Defendants, the Hague 1 Convention arguably does not apply nor prohibits process service by email. See Dkt. No. 13 at 12, 2 Dkt. No. 13-1 at 3. 3 Even if the Defendants reside in China, email service is still permitted under international

4 agreements. China is a signatory to the Hague Convention.1 The Hague Convention provides that 5 service via a country’s Central Authority is the principal means of service. Rubie’s Costume Co. 6 v. Yiwu Hua Hao Toys Co., No. 2:18-cv-01530-RAJ, 2019 WL 6310564, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7 25, 2019). However, Article 10 of the Hague Convention also “preserves the ability of parties to 8 effect service through means other than a recipient-nation’s Central Authority as long as the 9 recipient-nation has not objected to the specific alternative means of service used.” Id. China 10 expressly rejected service through means enumerated in Article 10, which includes service through 11 postal channels and via judicial officers.2 12 Despite China’s objection, courts have held that Article 10 does not preclude service by 13 electronic communication. Rubie’s Costume Co., 2019 WL 6310564, at *2. Courts distinguish 14 email service from postal mail, and thus, email service to parties located in countries that have 15 objected to Article 10 is permissible. Id. at *3. Moreover, various courts in the Ninth Circuit have 16 allowed alternative service by email to defendants located in China. Id. 17 Thus, email service to Defendants is not prohibited by international agreements. 18 C. Email Service Comports with Due Process. 19 Second, service via email addresses linked to Defendants’ selling accounts comports with 20 constitutional due process. Such service satisfies due process when this avenue is “reasonably 21 calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 22

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Mighty Dreams LLC v. Shenzhen Beianen Automotive Supplies Co Ltd, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mighty-dreams-llc-v-shenzhen-beianen-automotive-supplies-co-ltd-wawd-2025.